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ABSTRACT 
Liquidity assistance is provided for under the lender of last resort facility for solvent banks. 
Nevertheless, deposit insurance is a depositors’ protection tool to sustain depositors’ 
confidence in the banking system and to ensure there is financial stability in the market.  
Similar to other types of insurance, deposit insurance suffers from the moral hazard 
problem. Aptly, a credible design feature of deposit insurance coupled with prudential 
regulation and supervision would limit this problem.  For this reason, this thesis aims to 
investigate three objectives related to the moral hazard problem associated with deposit 
insurance.   
The first objective is, to investigate the presence of moral hazard by way of increase in 
bank risks through credit risk, insolvency risk and operational risk. Secondly, is to compare   
the changes in bank risk, both in the conventional and Islamic banks post deposit insurance.  
The last objective is to examine the credibility of the risk based deposit insurance premium 
in mitigating the moral hazard problem.  To overcome the endogeneity problem in panel 
data, instrumental variables that are the lagged explanatory variable in a dynamic panel data 
methodology are used.  Specifically, this thesis employs the System Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) estimator.  Based on literature, System GMM has the least biased 
estimator among other alternatives. The sample includes all the mandatory members 
(conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia) of deposit insurance protection over the 
period 2002-2010.     
To achieve the first and second objectives, this thesis used unbalanced panel data for the all 
banks sample and Islamic banks sample while the panel data is balanced for conventional 
banks.  During the financial crisis 2007/2008, Islamic banking grew in importance as an 
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alternative to conventional banking that appeared riskier than the Islamic banks.  However, 
the impact of deposit insurance system on Islamic banks has not been analyzed as 
rigorously as that on conventional banks.  For the all banks sample, the main findings are 
that the bank risk through insolvency risk and operational risk is significant and positively 
associated with the introduction of a deposit insurance system.  Specifically, it provides 
new insights into various implications of deposit insurance on Islamic banks risk taking.  
This study includes new empirical evidence on operational risk taking by conventional 
banks post deposit insurance system.   
An important aspect of the new financial landscape is the increased focus on financial 
stability.  A deposit insurance system accomplishes this purpose with the deposit insurance 
premium exerting as an important tool in mitigating the moral hazard problem.  This leads 
to the final objective of this study.  The banks’ annual premium amounts are estimated to 
determine whether the premium is sensitive towards bank risk in the risk-based premium. 
This thesis provides very strong evidence that risk-based deposit insurance does not 
necessarily mitigate the moral hazard problem unless the quantum of risk-premium is 
adequate to cover the increased risk.  Therefore, this thesis offers not only the 
understanding of the deposit insurance concept and theory but also provides new insights 
based on original empirical evidence.  The results have several important policy 
implications.  
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ABSTRAK 
Bantuan kecairan disediakan sebagai sumber pemberi pinjam terakhir bagi bank mampu 
bayar, walau bagaimanapun Insurans Deposit (ID) menjadi satu mekanisme perlindungan 
bagi pendeposit untuk mengekalkan keyakinan mereka terhadap sistem perbankan, selain 
dari memastikan bahawa wujudnya kestabilan kewangan dalam pasaran.  Secara kasarnya, 
seperti jenis-jenis insurans yang lain, ID turut terjejas disebabkan masalah bahaya moral.  
Namun begitu, ID yang mempunyai ciri reka bentuk yang berkredibel, ditambah pula 
dengan peraturan dan penyeliaan penuh cermat, akan mengekang masalah ini. Oleh itu, 
tesis ini bertujuan untuk menyiasat tiga objektif yang berkaitan dengan masalah bahaya 
moral pasca ID. 
Objektif yang pertama adalah untuk menyiasat sama ada wujud bahaya moral dalam bentuk 
peningkatan risiko menerusi risiko kredit, risiko ketaksolvenan, dan risiko operasi.  
Objektif kedua adalah untuk membanding perubahan dalam risiko antara bank perdagangan 
dengan bank Islam.  Objektif terakhir adalah untuk mengenal pasti sama ada premium ID 
berupaya mengurangkan masalah bahaya moral. 
Untuk mengatasi masalah  endogeneity dalam data panel, pemboleh ubah instrumen yang 
juga merupakan pemboleh ubah penjelas terlat di dalam kaedah data panel dinamik 
digunakan.  Khususnya, tesis ini menggunakan penganggar System Generalized Method of 
Moment (SGMM).  Berdasarkan kajian, SGMM dianggap sebagai penganggar yang paling 
tidak bias dalam kalangan alternatif yang ada.  Sampel dalam kajian ini termasuklah semua 
ahli wajib (bank perdagangan dan bank Islam di Malaysia) bagi perlindungan ID dalam 
tempoh  2002 hingga 2010.     
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Untuk memenuhi objektif pertama dan kedua, tesis ini menggunakan data panel tak 
seimbang bagi semua sampel bank dan sampel bank Islam, sementara data panel seimbang 
digunakan bagi sampel bank perdagangan.  Ketika krisis kewangan yang berlaku pada 
tahun 2007/2008, perbankan Islam berkembang sebagai alternatif bagi perbankan 
perdagangan yang didapati lebih berisiko berbanding bank Islam.  Namun begitu, kesan 
daripada sistem ID terhadap bank-bank Islam masih belum dianalisis sekerap bank 
perdagangan. 
Bagi semua sampel bank, dapatan utama yang diperoleh menunjukkan bahawa risiko bank 
melalui risiko ketaksolvenan dan risiko operasi didapati signifikan dan secara positif 
berkait dengan pengenalan sistem ID.  Dapatan ini khususnya memberi penemuan baharu 
berkenaan implikasi berbeza yang dibawa oleh ID terhadap amalan pengambilan risiko oleh 
bank Islam. Kajian ini turut menemukan bukti empirikal baru berkenaan amalan 
pengambilan risiko operasi terhadap bank perdagangan pasca ID. 
Satu aspek penting dalam landskap kewangan baru adalah perhatian yang meningkat 
terhadap kestabilan kewangan.  Sistem ID menyelesaikan hal ini dengan premium ID yang 
digunakan sebagai satu mekanisme untuk menangani masalah bahaya moral.  Hal ini 
membawa kepada objektif ketiga dan terakhir kajian ini. Kajian ini menganggarkan 
premium tahunan bagi pihak bank untuk mengukur kredibiliti premium ID. 
Tesis ini memberi bukti yang amat kukuh bahawa premium yang berasaskan risiko tidak 
semestinya polisi yang efektif untuk membendung masalah bahaya moral.  Justeru, tesis ini 
bukan sahaja memberi pemahaman mengenai konsep dan teori ID, malah ia turut membawa 
penemuan baru berdasarkan bukti empirikal yang sah. Keputusan daripada kajian ini 
mempunyai beberapa implikasi penting terhadap polisi. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Research Background  
In the academic literature on seminal theoretical framework by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), it was argued that deposit insurance prevents bank runs by depositors or market 
liquidity failures that are compared to a bank run.  Despite this, the empirical result of the 
study or other studies is mixed. Several past empirical studies reported that deposit 
insurance has a negative impact, as it motivates banks to increase their risk-taking that 
could lead to a likelihood of banking crisis (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; 
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane & Laeven, 2008; and DeLong & Saunders, 2011).  Their findings 
showed how explicit deposit insurance may enhance the moral hazard problem.  In other 
words, an explicit deposit insurance system might provoke financial instability by 
exacerbating bank risk taking by way of enhancing the moral hazard problem.  
Nevertheless, some studies reveal that the introduction of deposit insurance system could 
actually bring about positive impacts to an economy.  A recent study by Chernykh and Cole 
(2011) on Russian banks suggested that the deposit insurance system promotes banks’ 
deposits and thus improves the country’s financial intermediation.  Similarly, Maysami and 
Sakellariou (2008) find that implementing the deposit insurance system in countries that 
have a well-developed and liberalized banking system would probably reduce the 
occurrence of a banking crisis. 
The study on the impact of the introduction of financial safety nets in particular deposit 
insurance system, has received major attention by academic scholars.  The majority of these
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studies, however, were conducted based on cross-country analysis for developed and 
developing countries.  Little research has been done on country specific, in particular  
developing country, despite  a steady increase in the number of emerging or developing 
economies (including Malaysia) implementing explicit deposit insurance since 1974 (see 
Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven, 2008; and Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, 2001).  Each 
specific country has different governance structure and institutional environments.  For 
instance, some countries have many state-owned banks operating in the financial market 
while others have Islamic and conventional banks operating on a parallel basis. These 
institutional differences matters do influence the efficacy of regulatory policies, particularly 
for the deposit insurance policy.  Interestingly, no study has investigated the impact of 
deposit insurance on the Islamic banks in a dual banking system
1
 as well as examined in 
depth the deposit insurance premium sensitivity towards bank risk in mitigating the moral 
hazard problem.  This thesis endeavors to fill these gaps in the existing deposit insurance 
literature.   
Typically, based on the literature, the general findings and research gaps identified are as 
follows: 
(a) Most studies on deposit insurance system agree that an explicit deposit insurance has a 
negative impact, which is likely to motivate banks to increase their risk taking by way of 
moral hazard.  These studies include those by DeLong & Saunders, 2011; Hadad, 
Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro, & Zumwalt, 2011; Forssbaeck, 2011; Ioannidou & Penas, 
2010; Tuan, Ying, & Nya, 2010; Angkinand, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt, Kane & Laeven, 2008; 
Yilmaz & Muslumov, 2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt & 
                                                 
1 In a dual banking system, a country operates conventional banking as well as Islamic banking complementarily.  Added to that a county 
operating in a dual banking system like Malaysia have both conventional and Islamic deposit insurance system to protect the 
conventional and Islamic deposits respectively.    
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Detragiache,  2002; and Baer & Brewer, 1986. On the contrary, Gropp and Vesala (2004) 
study showed that the establishment of explicit deposit insurance could signiﬁcantly reduce 
the risk taking of banks.  Likewise, the overall results of Karels and McClatchey (1999) 
provided strong evidence that deposit insurance did not lead to increased risk-taking in the 
credit union industry.   
Although Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) found that an explicit deposit insurance 
system in countries with weak institutional environments is likely to lead a banking crisis, 
they also argued that introducing an explicit deposit insurance system “may create the basis 
for a more developed banking system that performs more ﬁnancial intermediation”(p.1403).  
Other recent studies maintain that explicit deposit insurance brings about increased 
financial intermediation (Chernykh & Cole, 2011; Sargent, 2011; and Cull, Senbet, & 
Sorge, 2005) of the banking system.  Similarly, Maysami and Sakellariou (2008) found that 
implementing the deposit insurance system in countries that have a well-developed and 
liberalized banking system would probably reduce the occurrence of the banking crisis, 
hence providing financial stability (DeLong & Saunders, 2011).  Likewise, the evidence on 
the benefits of deposit insurance is also reflected in Angkinand (2009).  Hence, empirical 
results on the implication of a deposit insurance system regulation are still inconclusive.   
(b) It is clear from the literature that the empirical studies sampling frame only includes 
conventional banks in the data analysis whereas the presence of Islamic banks in some of 
the countries have been excluded from the analysis.  For instance, Indonesia is the world’s 
populous Muslim country with nearly 90% or 220 million Muslims.  Notably, Hadad et al. 
(2011) ignored the four Indonesian Islamic banks in their study but only included 104 
Indonesian conventional banks over a period from 1995 to 2009, despite Indonesia
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implementing a dual banking system (i.e. Islamic and conventional banking) and having an 
Islamic deposit insurance covering the Islamic deposits in the country.   
With the increasing importance of Islamic banking, it is overwhelming that the impact of 
deposit insurance on the Islamic banks has not yet been analyzed as rigorously as the 
conventional banks.  Of the 19 countries that have an Islamic banking system, only 10 
countries including Malaysia, have set up an Islamic deposit insurance system 
(International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2010). However, among these 10 countries 
only Malaysia has an Islamic deposit insurance system in a dual banking environment that 
is operated by a government owned deposit insurer and is regulated under specific 
legislation. Today, the consumers of Islamic banking are not only the world’s 1.6 billion 
Muslims but also people of other faiths.  
(c) The distinct design features in other country specific empirical studies like Russia, 
Indonesia and Bolivia are the deposit insurance premium assessment method.  The deposit 
insurance premium could be either a flat rate premium or a risk-based premium.  Members 
bank pay comparable premium under a flat rate while the risk-based premium incorporates 
bank risk in the premium structure.  Malaysia started with the flat rate premium in the first 
two years of the deposit insurance period before transforming to risk-based premium 
structure in the year 2008.   In contrast, the three countries mentioned above continue to 
adopt the flat rate system until now.  The question lies not only to have a deposit insurance 
system in place that protects depositors but a credible deposit insurance with premium that 
is sensitive towards bank risk in mitigating the moral hazard problem and thereafter 
promoting prudent risk management among banks.  Particularly, the risk- based premium in 
contrast to a flat rate premium exerts an important function in mitigating moral hazard 
problem to ensure financial stability.  
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Hence, this study investigates whether the magnitude of risk-based deposit insurance 
premium paid (estimated with modification) is positively associated with bank risk in 
addition to whether the risk-premium sensitivity significantly improves in the risk-based 
premium assessment method (flat rate versus risk-based). These two conjectures indicate an 
effective deposit insurance premium to mitigate the moral hazard problem. The findings of 
this study would provide important insights for regulators especially with the dual banking 
system, in developing policies to strengthen the deposit insurance premium design feature
2
 
to curb the moral hazard problem.   
(d) A review of the literature suggests that most studies that examine the impact of deposit 
insurance focus largely on assessing the cross-country evidence.  During the past two 
decades, there is a lack of empirical material on bank level data to examine the cost and 
benefits of deposit insurance (Chernykh & Cole, 2011). Moreover, very few empirical 
studies on deposit insurance in the past five years examine bank-level data on banking in 
developing countries for evidence on the impact of the introduction of an explicit deposit 
insurance system. For example, Chernykh and Cole (2011) conducted a study on Russian 
banks while Ioannidou and Penas (2010) did a study on banks in Bolivia.  Meanwhile, 
Hadad et al. (2011) studied how market discipline responds to the introduction of explicit 
deposit insurance in 104 conventional banks in Indonesia.   
Among these studies examining bank level data, none had investigated the impact of 
deposit insurance on Islamic banks.
3
 More than 30 years ago, Malaysia was among the 
pioneers to develop an Islamic banking system with compatible Islamic principles that 
operate alongside the conventional system.  The deposit insurance system in Malaysia
                                                 
2 Deposit insurance system has four distinct design features; (i) the funding type, (ii) sources of funds, (iii) insurance premiums systems 
and (iv) the coverage limits and coinsurance (see for example Schooner & Taylor, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven, 2008; 
LaBrosse & Mayes, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache,2002; Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, 2001). 
3 Indonesia also operates a dual banking system.  However the study by Hadad et. al (2011) excludes Islamic banks. 
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covers both the conventional and Islamic banks with the deposit insurance fund being 
administered separately. Given this unique feature in Malaysia, a study using Malaysia as a 
country-specific sample for developing countries could not only provide in-depth analysis 
as opposed to the broad comparative cross-country studies but also compare and contrast 
the impact of deposit insurance on the conventional as well as Islamic banks. This unique 
difference for Malaysia appears to justify the expected different findings in the Malaysian 
context and adds to the Islamic banking body of literature.   
(e) There are only two published papers on deposit insurance using Malaysia as a country-
specific sample for developing countries.  Hence, a study on the impact of deposit 
insurance system in the Malaysian context, that includes both conventional and Islamic 
banks remains substantially under researched.  The two published papers are descriptive 
(Devinaga Rasiah & Peong, 2011) and empirical studies (Tuan, Ying, & Nya, 2010).   
The empirical study by Tuan, Ying, and Nya (2010) demonstrates deterioration in interest 
rate risk and risk weighted capital ratio post deposit insurance system. Their findings 
suggest that there is no significant excessive risk taking by the banks after the introduction 
of the deposit insurance system in the form of credit risk and liquidity risk. 
Notwithstanding this, their study has several shortcomings that have to be addressed by 
future research.  Firstly, future studies should cover a longer period than the time frame of 
2004-2007.  Secondly, to increase the robustness of the study, the sample frame should 
include all banks protected under the deposit insurance system that includes the foreign and 
Islamic banks as well as the local conventional banks. Lastly, employing a multivariate 
regression test other than the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and binomial test such as the panel 
data methodology would draw more conclusive and generalized results.
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(f) Banks are exposed to new and unknown risk, including their exposure to traditional 
risks such as fraud, because of technological advancement especially with the growth of e-
banking and internet banking.  While the growth in outsourcing has mitigated some risk it 
might have aggravated other risks i.e. operational risk.  Many research have focused on 
investigating the effects of deposit insurance on bank risk.  These studies have found 
significant positive evidence on the relationship between bank risks in particular, financial 
risks with deposit insurance. However, so far only one tier-one empirical study (Chernykh 
& Cole, 2011) has investigated the relationship for operational risks on deposit insurance.  
In their study, changes in operational risk is measured by the ratio of bank loans to assets.  
However, their study finds limited evidence that operational risk increased after the 
implementation of an explicit deposit insurance system. 
Based on the gaps identified above, the objectives of this thesis are threefold: 
1. To investigate whether moral hazard problem, in the form of an increase in the bank 
risk associated with deposit insurance policy, exists in the Malaysian banking system. 
2. To compare the risk taking behavior of conventional and Islamic banks after the 
introduction of the deposit insurance system. 
3. To investigate whether risk-based deposit insurance premium explains the cross 
sectional variation in bank risk in the post-deposit insurance policy period.
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1.2 Motivation for this Thesis 
“Crucial to the growth of the financial system are institutions that perform a supplementary 
role to ensure efficient and effective intermediation. The Malaysia Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (PIDM)… will continue to be key elements in safeguarding financial 
stability…” (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011, p.51).  The deposit insurance system as a 
financial safety net is not a particularly apt metaphor. In the circus, a safety net catches 
those who are falling from a height.  However, in banking, financial safety net is meant 
both to encourage prudent risk taking for banks and to provide assistance (Kane, 2000) to 
depositors of insolvent banks who have miscalculated the risk involved.  In addition, safety 
nets prevent disintermediation from the banking system and bank failures (Calomiris C. W., 
1999).     
Prior to the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, explicit deposit insurance was already 
implemented in some of the developing countries including the Philippines (1963), Taiwan 
(1985) and Korea (1996).  Other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand relied on 
implicit protection where troubled institutions are rescued by the government, so depositors 
are fully protected.  Following a number of years after the crisis, an explicit deposit 
insurance system was developed and implemented in Indonesia (2005), Malaysia (2005) 
and Thailand (2007).  All the deposit insurance systems in these countries specify clearly 
their legislative objectives, the most common being to protect depositors and contribute to 
financial stability.  Amongst these developing countries, only Malaysia included public 
policy objectives, namely deposit insurance as a tool for promoting sound risk management 
practices among the banks and minimizing costs to the financial system.    
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Malaysia leads in promoting the Islamic finance industry.  During the crisis, Islamic 
banking grew in importance as an alternative to conventional banking that appeared riskier 
than the Islamic banks (Abduh, Omar, & Duasa, 2011).  The aftermath of the global 
financial crises 2007/2008 showed that, both the conventional and the Islamic banks were 
affected. For instance, in the United States, many financial institutions suffered soberly.  
Amongst these institutions are the Royal Bank of Scotland, Bear Stearns, AIG and Lehman 
Brothers. These institutions were either assisted by the government through mergers or 
faced failures and are no longer in existence.  Big banks such as Morgan Stanley, HSBC 
and Goldman Sachs also reported serious losses.  In April 2009, the International Monetary 
Fund reported that the governments in the US, UK and European Union had spent almost 
$9 trillion to support the financial institutions (Wilmarth, 2010).    
Meanwhile, the Islamic banks were credited for resilient performance due to the intrinsic 
strength of Islamic banking.
4
 Among the intrinsic values attributed to this resilience are the 
restrictions on the use of leverage and speculation, less exposure to toxic assets like 
collateralized debt obligations and mortgage backed securities, avoidance of exotic 
derivative products and Shariah principles of using capital to build productive capacity.  In 
effect, Islamic religious values acts as its own incentive mechanism to reduce the 
inefficiency that arises from asymmetric information and moral hazard.  These intrinsic 
values of Islamic financing are akin to ethical financing.   
The deposit insurance system in Malaysia protects deposits placed with both the 
conventional and Islamic banks.  Thus, investigating the risk-taking behavior of banks post 
                                                 
4 Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability Report (Islamic Financial Services Board, 2010).   This report was initiated by the Task 
Force on Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability formed on 29 October 2008.  The Task Force was formed in response to the 
recommendation made in the Forum of the Global Financial Crisis and its Impact on the Islamic Financial Industry organized by the 
Islamic Development Bank.  The report outlined the financial crisis and financial reforms agenda for the Islamic banking industry. 
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the introduction of deposit insurance would explain if the public policy objective to 
promote sound risk management practices has been achieved.  More importantly, this thesis 
examines whether banks increase risk after the introduction of deposit insurance and 
compares the risk behavior between the conventional and Islamic banks.  
On the other hand, deposit insurance is distortionary as it could exacerbate the moral hazard 
problem. In Malaysia, an important reform on the deposit insurance premium has taken 
place.  The premium calculation migrated from the flat rate premium of 0.06% (for 2006 
and 2007) to the differential risk-based premium from 2008 onwards.  In the literature (see 
Bank for International Settlements & International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2009; 
International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2008), credible design features of a deposit 
insurance system are tools to mitigate the problem of moral hazard.  Thus, it is timely to 
assess how reforms in the deposit insurance design features discussed above have in fact 
reduced banks’ risk taking in a dual banking system, like in Malaysia.  A credible deposit 
insurance premium constitutes a mechanism that prevents excessive bank risk taking and 
thereafter promotes sound risk management practices among the banks.  
1.3  Deposit Insurance as Part of Financial Safety Net 
According to the Financial Stability Forum (2001), financial safety nets consist of three 
elements that is a deposit insurance system, the lender of last resort and prudential 
supervisory and regulatory framework. This is the most widely accepted definition. 
However, some authors defined federal safety nets to include explicit or implicit 
government guarantees on deposit taking institutions (Walter and Weinberg, 2002). In their 
definition, guarantee implies the government’s role to protect depositors from losses of 
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insolvent financial institutions.  On the other hand, Schich (2008) provided the extended 
definition of financial safety nets.   He incorporated the failure resolution as an additional 
element of the financial safety nets, in addition to the three elements proposed by the 
Financial Stability Forum (2001).  
Generally, financial safety nets are the financial regulations that are put in place to prevent 
or limit depositor losses and preserve depositor confidence in the event of a banking failure.  
More specifically, safety nets include implicit and explicit deposit insurance framework, a 
lender of last resort function, prudential regulation and supervision in addition to failure 
resolution.  Market discipline imposed by depositors could also complement the safety nets 
introduced.    
Government insurance and other assistance protect the financial system in many countries.  
Based on the definitions above, the scope of financial safety nets that take into account   
deposit insurance system is immense.    Proponents of deposit insurance include the policy 
makers.  They argue that the deposit insurance system is fundamental to promoting 
financial stability in the banking system and, maintaining confidence of depositors whose 
deposits are extended as loans and for business expansion by firms who rely on banks for 
credit.  The disruption in banks’ role to manage this flow of payments and a source of credit 
to businesses could potentially create social cost outside the banking system (Gropp, 
Hakenes, & Schnabel,  2011). Hence, it is vital to insulate banks, depositors and debtors 
from adverse shocks, particularly from systemic bank runs. Bank runs occur when 
depositors who have lost confidence in a bank simultaneously withdraw their deposits to 
force the bank to close due to liquidity problems. 
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This leads one to argue why banks are eligible to receive special treatment in the form of 
government safety net, in contrast to other profiteering firms. An understandable 
explanation relates to the spillover effects or contagion effect for other sectors if a bank 
fails.  Contagion is a process by which a run on one bank spreads to other banks resulting in 
a bank panic.  Whereas bank panic is a situation when many banks simultaneously 
experience a run.  In the event of bank runs, the banks might be driven to insolvency as 
depositors withdraw money, all at the same time forcing them to sell illiquid assets at 
discounted prices (“fire sale”) to meet this liquidity demand.  A common way to prevent 
this dire situation is intervention by the central bank either serving as a lender of last resort 
directly to the solvent banks or indirectly through open market operations to provide 
liquidity.  If a credible deposit insurance system is in place whereby depositors have 
confidence in the banking system, a run could be avoided and the lender of last resort 
facility would not have to be called upon.     
1.3.1 The Development of Deposit Insurance 
The safety net protects households and businesses from contagious shocks.  In the case of 
Malaysia, a comprehensive financial safety net that encompasses on going prudential 
regulations and supervision by the BNM, the lender-of-last-resort facility provided by the 
BNM and a deposit insurance framework by the Perbadanan Insurance Deposit Malaysia 
(also known internationally as Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation; MDIC) have all 
been put in place.  
The risk of severe financial crisis could be mitigated by having an appropriate financial 
safety net. Without one in place, rumors spread on the state of health of a banking
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institution could become contagious and turn the whole economy into a financial crisis. 
Hence, a well-designed financial safety net could preserve and boost the depositors’ 
confidence in the banking system, which could prevent bank runs and eventually full-blown 
financial crises. 
Deposit insurance was first adopted in the United States in the 1930s.  Deposit insurance is 
a form of guarantee which covers all or a portion of the deposits in a bank by the deposit 
insurer which could be the Central Bank, a subsidiary of the Central Bank or could also be 
separate like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  Hereafter, the deposit 
insurer would also be interchangeably referred to as government. The introduction of 
deposit insurance as a form of financial safety net is aimed at providing stability for the 
banking system and protecting the depositors’ interest as well as increasing savings and 
encouraging the development of the banking system.  Furthermore, it could provide 
confidence to depositors that their money or deposit is safe with the bank and arguably the 
deposit insurance provides a mechanism to these depositors to be able to quickly recover 
their funds that they have deposited in an insolvent bank. 
The Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience (April 2008) recommended that deposit insurance be incorporated as part of the 
robust mechanism that dwells with financial institutions in distress. It further pointed out 
that the various fragilities that transpired during the financial crisis of this decade illustrate 
the vital need for the introduction of an effective deposit insurance system.  Elsewhere, the 
Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (October, 2006) 
acknowledged that an effective deposit insurance system could restore public confidence in 
the banking system while at the same time limit the contagion effects from banks in 
distress.
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Likewise, to mitigate principal-agent problems due to moral hazard that could distort the 
banks financial intermediation function, the deposit insurance system has to be designed in 
a credible manner (see Bank for International Settlements & International Association of 
Deposit Insurers, 2009; International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2008) and exists 
alongside the existing prudential regulations and supervision.  
1.3.2  Deposit Insurance around the World 
Although deposit insurance was formally introduced in US in the 1900s, the history of 
deposit insurance system could be traced back to the early 1800s.  The insurance system 
then was known as the New York’s Safety Fund that covered only the State of New York. 
The objective of this insurance scheme is to protect deposits and to circulate notes in the 
event of a bank failure.  However, the scheme failed and became insolvent in 1842, as 
being private in nature, the scheme fails to fulfill its obligations.  Subsequently, eight new 
insurance schemes were introduced in the early 1920s. However, these schemes too were 
unsuccessful mainly due to limited funding and insufficient monitoring (Calomiris C. W., 
1990).   
In 1933, the first federal government sponsored deposit insurance system in the world 
known as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), was introduced in the United 
States of America to resolve a bank run that was leading towards a banking crisis at that 
time. In contrast to the previous schemes, the FDIC was funded through capital provided by 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks.  The FDIC limited guarantee scheme still 
exists with modifications to restore depositors’ confidence and financial system stability.
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In Europe, Norway was amongst the earliest countries to adopt deposit insurance for its 
savings institutions in 1921 and this was later extended in 1938 to conventional banks.  
Meanwhile, in the Western European countries, deposit insurance started between the late 
1970s and the early 1980s. The failure of banks in Western Europe such as the Bankhaus 
Herstatt in Germany in 1974, resulted in the adoption of the deposit insurance system in 
some European countries like Belgium, Austria and France in 1974, 1979 and 1980 
respectively.  Further, in 1994, most European countries have an explicit deposit insurance 
system in place to comply with the European Union’s Directive on Deposit Insurance.   
In the United Kingdom, formal deposit insurance was first introduced in 1986 to protect 
depositors and members of the Building Societies Association. The introduction of the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme in 2000 extended the deposit protection to all 
financial institutions, including insurance companies.  Elsewhere, in Canada, deposit 
insurance was introduced in 1967 and administered by the Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. 
India was the first country in Asia to adopt a deposit insurance system in   1961, followed 
by the Philippine in 1963.  Other countries in Asia like Malaysia and Indonesia, introduced 
a formal deposit insurance system in 2005 in response to the Asian financial crisis in 
1998/1999.  In 1998, the deposit insurance system was recognized by the International 
Monetary Fund as a ‘best-international practice’. The financial crisis in 2007/2008 brought 
renewed attention to the concept and practice of deposit insurance by regulators around the 
world.  Many countries that were yet to adopt or delayed in adopting a deposit insurance 
system, were driven to do so in the wake of the crisis.  Australia, for instance, was among 
the last few countries to implement the explicit deposit insurance system, which is in
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October 2008.  By the time of the Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven (2008) study, 180 
countries had adopted some form of deposit insurance system.   
From only 12 countries implementing explicit deposit insurance since 1974, the numbers 
have steadily increased to 111 countries (see Table 1.1) as at December 2012.
5
  Elsewhere, 
41 countries (see Table 1.2) are constructing or studying the implementation of an explicit 
deposit insurance system.  For countries that do not implement an explicit deposit insurance 
system, there exists an implicit deposit insurance system with  discretionary government 
guarantee or protection for the depositors. 
To share knowledge and expertise among the deposit insurers around the world, the 
International Association Deposit Insurance (IADI) was founded on 6 May 2002.  IADI 
originated in 2000 as the Working Group on Deposit Insurance established by the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF). On 18 June 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and 
the International Association of Deposit Insurers jointly issued a voluntary framework for 
effective deposit insurance practices known as the Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance System. 
                                                 
5 The information obtained in IADI website is only updated as at 31 March 2011. 
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Table 1.1: List of Countries Implementing an Explicit Deposit Insurance System 
 1. Afghanistan 38. Gibraltar   75. Nicaragua 
  2. Albania 39. Greece   76. Nigeria 
  3. Algeria 40. Guatemala   77. Northern Mariana Island      
  4. Argentina 41. Honduras   78. Norway 
  5. Armenia 42. Hong Kong   79. Oman 
  6. Australia 43. Hungary   80. Paraguay 
  7. Austria  44. Iceland   81. Peru 
  8. Azerbaijan 45. India   82. Philippines 
  9. Bahamas 46. Indonesia   83. Poland  
10. Bahrain 47. Ireland   84. Portugal 
11. Bailiwick of Jersey 48. Isle of Man   85. Puerto Rico 
12. Bailiwick of Guernsey 49. Italy   86. Romania 
13. Bangladesh 50. Jamaica   87. Russian Federation 
14. Barbados 51. Japan   88. Serbia 
15. Belarus 52. Jordan   89. Singapore 
16. Belgium 53. Kazakhstan   90. Slovakia 
17. Bermuda 54. Kenya   91. Slovenia 
18. Bosnia and Herzegovina 55. Korea   92. Spain 
19. Brazil 56. Kyrgyz Republic   93. Sri Lanka 
20. British Virgin Islands 57. Lao PDR   94. Sudan 
21. Brunei 58. Latvia   95. Sweden 
22. Bulgaria 59. Lebanon   96. Switzerland 
23. Canada (and Quebec) 60. Libya   97. Tajikistan 
24. Chile 61. Liechtenstein   98. Tanzania 
25. Chinese Taipei 62. Lithuania   99. Thailand 
26. Colombia 63. Luxembourg 100. Trinidad and Tobago 
27. Croatia 64. Macedonia 101. Turkey 
28. Cyprus  65. Malaysia 102. Uganda 
29. Czech Republic 66. Malta 103. Ukraine 
30. Denmark 67. Mexico 104. United Kingdom 
31. Dominican Republic 68. Micronesia 105. United States 
32. Ecuador 69. Moldova 106. Uruguay 
33. El Salvador 70. Montenegro 107. Uzbekistan 
34. Estonia 71. Morocco 108. Venezuela 
35. Finland 72. Netherlands 109. Vietnam 
36. France 73. Nepal 110. Yemen 
37. Germany 74. New Zealand 111. Zimbabwe 
Source: International Association of Deposit Insurers website as at December 2012 
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Table 1.2: List of Countries Constructing or Studying an Explicit Deposit Insurance 
System 
Deposit Insurance System Under Construction  
1. Costa Rica 4. Mozambique 7. Turks and Caicos Island 
2. Kosovo 5. Palestine 8. Zambia 
3. Mauritius 6. Syria  
Deposit Insurance System Under Study 
1. Angola 12.Gabon 23. Mongolia 
2. Bhutan 13. Gambia 24. Namibia 
3. Cambodia 14. Georgia 25. Pakistan 
4. Cameroon 15. Ghana 26. Qatar 
5. Central African Republic 16. Grenada 27. Rwanda 
6. Chad 17. Iran 28. Senegal 
7. China 18. Israel 29. Seychelles 
8. Congo 19. Lesotho 30. South Africa 
9. Curacao and Sint 
    Maarten 
20. Liberia 31. Swaziland 
10. Equational Guinea 21. Macao 32. Tunisia 
11. Ethiopia 22. Malawi 33. United Arab  Emirates 
Source: International Association of Deposit Insurers website as at December 2012 
1.3.3 Deposit Insurance in Malaysia  
In Malaysia, deposit insurance system was initially proposed in 2001 as part of the 
Financial Sector Master Plan.  The Malaysian deposit insurance system is mandated by law 
and administered by Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM), a statutory body 
established in 2005.  PIDM is also known internationally as the Malaysia Deposit Insurer 
Corporation (MDIC).   MDIC complements BNM’s (which is the primary regulator and 
supervisor of the banking system) role
6
 by providing safety nets for depositors and 
insurance policy holders (member bank) in promoting financial stability. MDIC was 
established under the MDIC Act on 1 September 2005 to administer the national explicit 
deposit insurance system.   
                                                 
6 MDIC role includes bank resolution function. 
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The government of Malaysia implemented the explicit deposit insurance system on 1 
September 2005.  Hence, Malaysia migrated from a system with ambiguous implicit 
deposit insurance system to an explicit deposit insurance system with partial deposit 
insurance coverage. The deposit insurance protection limit was then RM60,000 (principal 
and interest or return) per depositor per member bank.  The deposit insurance system 
covers both the conventional and Islamic banks.  The membership for the deposit insurance 
is compulsory for all conventional banks licensed under the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act and all Islamic banks licensed under the Islamic Banking Act, including 
foreign banks operating in Malaysia (see Table 1.3). Membership is compulsory as 
provided under the PIDM Act.  However, the five deposits-taking institutions [Bank 
Simpanan Nasional (BSN), Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd (Bank Rakyat), Bank 
Pertanian Malaysia Bhd (AgroBank), Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd (BPMB) and 
Bank Perusahaan Kecil dan Sederhana Malaysia Bhd (SME Bank)], investment banks, 
overseas branches of domestic banking institutions and all-non-bank financial 
intermediaries which are not supervised or regulated by BNM are not member institutions 
of MDIC.  Therefore, deposits placed in these banks or institutions are not protected under 
the deposit insurance system administered by MDIC. 
Moving on, a Government Deposit Guarantee (GDG) which is a form of blanket guarantee 
was announced on 16 October 2008, to provide additional depositor protection over and 
above the RM60,000 per depositor per member bank that was already provided by MDIC.  
Consistent with measures taken by neighboring countries, the GDG was implemented as a 
temporary pre-emptive and precautionary measure to preserve confidence in the banking 
system and maintain financial stability. Under the GDG, all Ringgit and foreign currency 
deposits placed in conventional banks, Islamic banks, investment banks and international
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Islamic banks are protected.  In addition, the five deposits-taking institutions licensed under 
the Development Financial Institution Act are also included in this GDG blanket guarantee. 
The Government provided the GDC until 31 December 2010.  Thereafter, the deposit 
insurance protection limit was increased from RM60,000 to RM250,000 per depositor per 
member bank.  As for funding of the deposit insurance, a fixed rate premium assessment 
was paid by member institutions from September 2005 until December 2007.  From 2008 
onwards, payments were based on the risk-based differential premium systems. 
The membership is now compulsory only for all conventional banks licensed under the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act and all Islamic banks licensed under the Islamic 
Banking Act, including foreign banks operating in Malaysia. The Malaysian deposit   
insurance  system  covers  Islamic and  conventional  deposits  separately.  It  is  funded  by 
annual  premiums  collected  from  the  member  institutions in  respect  of  Islamic  and  
conventional  deposits,  with the  funds  separately  administered.  The   Islamic  Deposit 
Insurance Fund is administered in accordance with Shariah principles. Following the 
expiry of GDG, deposits placed in the five deposit taking development financial institutions 
are no longer protected by MDIC.  In addition, under the MDIC (Provision of Information 
on Deposit Insurance) Regulations 2011, all member banks are required to display their 
membership sign at the entrances to all branches.  The following sections discussed the 
banking system in Malaysia.    
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Table 1.3: List of PIDM Member Banks 
Conventional Banks 
Domestic  Foreign  
1. Affin Bank Berhd 1. Bangkok Bank Berhad 11. Mizuho Corporate Bank 
(Malaysia) Berhad 
2. Alliance Bank Berhad 2. Bank of America Malaysia 
Berhad 
12.OCBC Bank (Malaysia) 
Berhad 
3. AmBank (M) Berhad 3. Bank of China (Malaysia) 
Berhad 
13.Standard Chartered Bank 
Malaysia Berhad 
4. CIMB Bank Berhad 4. Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi-UFJ 
(Malaysia) Berhad 
14.Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation Malaysia Berhad 
5. Hong Leong Bank  
Berhad 
5. BNP Paribas Malaysia Berhad India International Bank M’sia 
Bhd 
6. Malayan Banking Berhad 6. Citibank Berhad 15.The Bank of Nova Scotia 
Berhad 
7. Public Bank Berhad 7. Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) 
Berhad 
16.The Royal Bank of Scotland 
Berhad 
8. RHB Bank Berhad 8. HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad 17.United Overseas Bank 
(Malaysia) Berhad 
 9. Industrial and Conventional 
Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad 
18.National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
Msia Bhd 
 10.J.P. Morgan Chase Bank 
Berhad 
 
Islamic Banks 
Domestic  Foreign 
1.Affin Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
7. Hong Leong Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
1.Al Rajhi Banking & 
Investment Corporation 
(Malaysia) Bhd 
2.Alliance Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
8. Maybank Islamic Berhad 2.Asian Finance Bank Berhad 
3. AmIslamic Bank Bhd 9. Public Islamic Bank Berhad 3.HSBC Amanah Malaysia 
Berhad 
4. Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad 
10. RHB Islamic Bank Berhad 4.Kuwait Finance House (M) 
Berhad 
5.Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Berhad 
 5.OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad 
6. CIMB Islamic Bank 
Berhad 
 6.Standard Chartered Saadiq 
Berhad 
Source: MDIC website as at 7 January 2013 
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1.4 Banking System in Malaysia 
The Malaysian financial structure consists of the banking system and non-bank financial 
institutions. The banking system mainly consists of Bank Negara Malaysia and banking 
institutions such as the conventional banks, investment banks, Islamic banks and 
international Islamic banks (refer Table 1.4 and Table 1.5). The largest component of the 
financial structure is the banking system.  Bank Negara Malaysia was established on 26 
January 1959, under the Central Bank of Malaya Ordinance 1958 (Revised 1994) to 
oversee the operation of financial sectors, promote economic growth and maintain 
monetary and financial stability.  The BNM’s functions also include regulating and 
supervising the insurance industry, money changers and the development financial 
institutions.  BNM was also appointed as the Competent Authority under the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act 2001 (AMLA).  In addition, the Governor of BNM is also the Controller of 
Foreign Exchange. 
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Table 1.4: List of Banking Institutions in Malaysia – Commercial and Islamic Banks 
as at end of December 2012 
 Commercial banks Islamic banks 
1. Affin Bank Bhd (L) 1. Affin Islamic Bank Berhad (L) 
2. 
Alliance Bank (M) Bhd (L) 
2. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad (F) 
3. AmBank (M) Bhd (L) 3. Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad (L) 
4. BNP Paribas Malaysia Berhad (F) 4. AmIslamic Bank Berhad (L) 
5. Bangkok Bank Berhad (F) 5. Asian Finance Bank Berhad (F) 
6. Bank of America Malaysia Berhad 
(F) 
6. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (L) 
7. Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad(F) 7. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad (L) 
8. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
(Malaysia) Berhad(F) 
8. CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad (L) 
9. CIMB Bank Berhad (L) 9. HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad (F) 
10. 
Citibank Berhad (F) 
10. Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 
(L) 
11. Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad 
(F) 
11. Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) 
Berhad (F) 
12. HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad (F) 12. Maybank Islamic Berhad (L) 
13. Hong Leong Bank Berhad (L) 13. OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad (F) 
14. India International Bank (Malaysia) 
Berhad (F) 
14. Public Islamic Bank Berhad (L) 
15. Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (Malaysia) Berhad (F) 
15. RHB Islamic Bank Berhad(L) 
16. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank Berhad (F) 16.     Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad (F) 
17. Malayan Banking Berhad (L)  
18. Mizuho Corporate Bank (Malaysia) 
Berhad (F) 
 
19. National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
Malaysia Berhad (F) 
 
20. OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad (F)   
21. Public Bank Berhad (L)  
22. RHB Bank Berhad (L)  
23. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia 
Berhad (F) 
 
24. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation Malaysia Berhad (F) 
 
25. The Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad (F)  
26. The Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad 
(F) 
 
27. United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) 
Bhd (F) 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia website 
Note: L (local) or F (foreign) indicates ownership of the banking institutions. 
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Table 1.5: List of Banking Institutions in Malaysia – Investment and International 
Islamic Banks as at end of December 2012 
 Investment Banks International Islamic Banks 
1. Affin Investment Bank 
Berhad 
1. Alkhair International 
Islamic Bank Bhd 
2. Alliance Investment Bank 
Berhad  
2. Deutsche Bank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
3. AmInvestment Bank Berhad 3. Elaf Bank B.S.C. (c) 
4. CIMB Investment Bank 
Berhad 
4. PT. Bank Syariah 
Muamalat Indonesia, Tbk 
5. ECM Libra Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
6. Hong Leong Investment 
Bank 
 
7. HwangDBS Investment 
Bank Berhad 
 
8. KAF Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
9. Kenanga Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
10. MIDF Amanah Investment 
Bank Berhad 
 
11. MIMB Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
12. Maybank Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
13. OSK Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
14. Public Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
15. RHB Investment Bank 
Berhad 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia website 
Note: All the investment banks are locally owned. 
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Conventional banks were the earliest financial institution established in Malaysia.  During 
the British colonial days, foreign banks began to set-up branches in Malaysia especially 
near the harbor of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. At that time, these conventional banks 
were owned by foreign entities especially by the British.  In 1859, the first conventional 
bank known as the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China was founded in 
Penang.  The Chartered Bank and the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank were established in 
Penang in 1875 and 1877, respectively and are still operating in Malaysia.  The 
conventional banks, as a group in Malaysia, form the largest and most significant financial 
institutions in the country. As at end of August 2011
7
, the conventional banks are the 
largest component of the banking system.  The conventional banks account for 80% of the 
total assets in the banking system followed by the Islamic banks and investment banks at 
17% and 3% respectively.   
As at 31 August 2011, the deposits in the conventional banking system comprise 81% of 
the total banking system deposits of RM1.21 billion. The majority of the deposit holders 
were individual depositors (36.46%), followed by business enterprises (36.02%), financial 
institutions (16.56%) and others (federal/state government, statutory authorities etc.).  
Meanwhile, RM229.6 million deposits are in the Islamic banking system (excluding 
Islamic banking scheme).  As of December 2012, there are nine domestic and seventeen 
locally incorporated foreign banks operating through a network of about 2,325 branches 
across the country. In addition, there are 6 development financial institutions (DFIs) that 
operate alongside their conventional and Islamic banks counterparts.  The conventional 
banks and Islamic banks are licensed under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
(BAFIA) 1989 and Islamic Banking Act 1983 respectively while the DFIs are licensed 
                                                 
7Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin, August,2011 
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under the Development Financial Institution Act (DFIA) 2002, that are supervised by the 
central bank of Malaysia.  BNM is responsible for maintaining monetary stability and 
ensuring a sound financial system.  BNM acts as a banker as well as an economic and 
financial adviser to the government.  Moreover, BNM acts as lender of last resort to the 
banking system, responsible for issuing the Malaysian currency (the Ringgit) and 
administers the country’s foreign exchange control regulations. 
Malaysia embarked on a pioneering effort to develop a comprehensive Islamic financial 
system more than 30 years ago. It was among the earliest country to recognize the potential 
of creating a financial system compatible with Islamic principles that provides an 
alternative to the conventional system.  The process began with the first Islamic financial 
institution, Lembaga Tabung Haji (The Pilgrim Fund Board) which was established in 
1969.  Subsequently, the Islamic Banking Act 1983 was introduced and Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad, the first full-fledged Islamic bank commenced operations on 1 July 1983.  
On 1 October 1999, a second Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad was set up.  
The banking activities of Islamic banks are based on the Islamic principles namely Shariah 
principles.  In terms of products, all Islamic banking entities offer banking products based 
on Shariah principles.      
Investment banks emerged in the Malaysian banking scene in the 1970s.  All the merchant 
banks and discount houses were transformed into investment banks from July 2005.  
Investment banks play a role in the short term money market and capital raising activities 
including financing, specializing in syndication, corporate finance and management 
advisory services, issuing and listing of shares arrangement as well as investment portfolio 
management.  As at December 2012, there are 15 investment banks in Malaysia. 
27 
 
On the other hand, the non-bank financial institutions provide financial services that are not 
provided by the banking system.  Amongst the major players of the non-bank financial 
institutions are the insurance companies, takaful operators, savings institutions, unit trusts 
providers and other institutions like Bursa Malaysia; the stock exchange of Malaysia.  The 
insurance companies are engaged in providing insurance service; with the takaful extending 
alternative services that are based on Shariah principle.  The general insurance companies 
operate on commercial terms.  Bank Simpanan Nasional and cooperative societies are the 
main savings institutions in Malaysia.  These savings institutions operate in mainly the 
rural areas that are not adequately served by the banks to promote savings among the low 
and middle income Malaysians.             
1.4.1 The Asian 1997-1998 and 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis 
In the last decade, the Asian financial crisis that commenced with the collapse of the Thai 
Baht on 2 July 1997, led to a serious financial meltdown in Malaysia.  The crisis led 
Malaysia to initiate its financial sector reforms.  The depreciation of Ringgit and the decline 
of the stock market affected many Malaysian investors and companies especially those 
highly geared Malaysian multinational companies. The depreciation of the Ringgit forced 
these companies to default in servicing their loans that eventually created a liquidity 
pressure on the banks. As a result, Malaysia’s economic growth rate contracted to -7.3% in 
1998
8
 from 7.32% in 1997.  To maintain confidence in the economy, the Government 
announced in 1998, an implicit guarantee to cover deposits in the Malaysian banking 
institutions.  
                                                 
8Department of Statistic Malaysia website. 
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Essentially, the financial system in Malaysia remains sound despite the 1997 Asian 
financial turmoil. Hence, it is interesting to take Malaysia as a case study.  Based on 
Malaysia’s experience, the financial sector plays a crucial role in leading economic growth.  
During the Eighth Malaysian Plan
9
 period, the financial sector contributed 3.4% to the 
GDP.  The Ninth Malaysian Plan
10
 reported that the financial sector grew 8.1% during the 
period 2001 to 2005.  The share of the financial sector to economic growth increased from 
12.7% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2005.  Prior to the 1997/1998 crisis, the Malaysian economy 
was flourishing with a strong broad-based economic growth amidst low and stable 
inflation, with GDP growth averaging 8% for eight consecutive years.  The banking sector 
was also at its strongest position during the ensuing periods of regulatory enhancements.  
Malaysia rebounded from the crisis from 1999 to 2002 following a series of policies 
including the pegging of the Ringgit to the US dollar in 1998, mergers and acquisitions of 
the banking sector and selective capital controls.   
The Malaysian conventional banking industry grew tremendously in terms of assets (loans), 
deposits and equity.  All three indicators show a positive growth trend.  Total assets 
increased 138.06% during the period 2001 to 2007, while total deposits and total equity 
rose about 136% and 49% respectively.  Comparing these three indicators, the growth in 
equity lagged far behind growth in total asset and deposits.  It is a signal that most banks 
rely on debt rather than equity financing.  In this regard, bank-based rather than a market-
based financial system predominates in Malaysia as firms rely more on finance provided by 
banks rather than on the financial markets. The 2007/2008 global financial crisis threatened 
a worldwide economic recession.  The credit crunch is known as having brought panic and 
turmoil to the world financial markets.  From a subprime crisis, it quickly grew into a 
                                                 
9 http://www.epu.gov.my/eighthmalaysiaplan. 
10 http://www.epu.gov.my/ninthmalaysiaplan. 
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banking crisis with the investment and merchant banks first absorbing the impact before it 
spread to the conventional banks (Krugman P. , 2009). However, Malaysia successfully 
survived the crisis and continues to remain resilient than the other countries in the region.   
1.4.2 The Financial Sector Master Plan (2001-2010) 
In March 2001, BNM launched the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP).  FSMP amongst 
others outlined the strategies to develop a resilient, diversified and efficient financial sector.  
Furthermore, the ten year blueprint’s objective was to strengthen the financial sector that 
included the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance framework.  Its aim was “to 
develop a more resilient, competitive and dynamic financial system with best practices, that 
support and contribute positively to the growth of the economy throughout the economic 
cycle and has a core of strong and forward looking domestic financial institutions that are 
more technology driven and ready to face the challenges of liberalization and globalization” 
(p.16).   
The FSMP plan covered the period of 2001 to 2010.  The FSMP outlined the consolidation 
exercise in three phases.  Phase 1 was targeted at strengthening the banking sector through 
consolidation among local banks and finance companies.  The BAFIA was accordingly 
amended to grant dual banking licenses to conventional banks that merged with finance 
companies to allow them to continue operating banking business as well as offer the 
services of finance companies.  Phase II continued with leveling the playing field for the 
banking industry with the removal of some barriers for foreign banks while Phase III 
witnessed further liberalization where licenses were granted to new foreign banks and also 
to domestic banks which venture into foreign markets.     
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An important aspect of the FSMP that has relevance to this study is the recommendation to 
establish an explicit deposit insurance system to strengthen the existing depositor protection 
infrastructure to ensure financial stability.  This is explicitly discussed under Section III in 
Chapter Three of the FSMP.   
1.4.3 The Financial Sector Blueprint (2011-2020) 
Bank Negara Malaysia released the Financial Sector Blueprint (FSB) on 21 December 2011 
that would again act as a catalyst for the domestic banking industry which is already on a 
sound footing.  The  Financial  Sector  Master Plan  2001–2010 had  been  a  success  
considering  that the banking sectors are now well positioned to embrace new imperatives 
ahead.  The mergers of commercial banks and finance companies were completed leaving 
only ten banking groups, hence improved capitalization.  The investment banks were 
created from the mergers of discount houses, stockbroking companies and the merchant 
banks for better supervision in maintaining financial soundness.  The new entrants of 
foreign banks, particularly foreign Islamic banks, in the market encourage innovation and 
efficiency in the banking industry.  The deposit insurance system was introduced in 
September 2005 to improve the existing consumer protection framework.  Meanwhile the 
FSB,  which  advocates  further  liberalization, is  envisaged  to propel the  financial  sector  
to unprecedented heights.  There are nine focus areas of the FSB as shown in Table 1.6 
below: 
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Table 1.6: Nine Focus Areas of the Financial Sector Blueprint 2011-2020 
1 Effective intermediation for a high value-added and high-income economy 
2 Developing deep and dynamic financial markets 
3 Financial inclusion for greater shared prosperity 
4 Strengthening regional and international financial integration 
5 Internationalization of Islamic finance 
6 Regulatory and supervisory regime to safeguard the stability of the financial 
system 
7 Electronic payments for greater economic efficiency 
8 Empowering consumers 
9 Talent development to support a more dynamic financial sector   
Among the nine focus areas listed in Table 1.6, one area of concern for this study 
specifically is the sixth area related to regulatory and supervisory regime to safeguard the 
stability of the financial system.  Given this, the explicit deposit insurance system, as one of 
the elements of a safety net, plays a crucial role in safeguarding the stability of the 
Malaysian banking system. 
1.5 Problem Statement 
Banking institutions function as an efficient payment vehicle.  If a single bank fails to 
perform its basic function, it would cause a contagion effect and systemic risk to other 
banks, including the healthy banks, inadvertently leading to financial instability. The 
outcome could be severe as a systemic risk could have adverse impacts on economic 
growth.  The history of banking crises and their results worldwide have shown that banking 
crisis have resulted in losses to depositors and creditors in many countries including the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the United States and the Northern Rock bank runs in 
the United Kingdom.  During bank runs, unsophisticated depositors have insufficient 
information regarding banks’ asset quality.  Hence, they assume that all banks are in 
distress including the healthy banks.   
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Therefore, fearing the safety of their deposits, they start withdrawing their money, all at the 
same time (Mishkin, 2009).  This simultaneous withdrawal leads to a decline in funds 
available for investment and decreases lending activity. As a result, loan supply comes 
down and the interest rate goes up.   With the reduction in loan supply, the banks’ profit 
would decline as well.  The chain effect would continue and affect the shrinking economic 
growth, unless the Government intervenes.     
In order to channel funds in the form of loan to the growth sector, banks have to solicit 
deposits particularly deposits from the household, as the cost of fund of these types of 
deposit is cheap and less sticky.  However, the drawback is that most of the household 
depositors are unsophisticated depositors who have little information about the banks’ state 
of health.  Any news or rumors that could reduce depositor confidence with a bank could 
lead to a bank run. Thus, proponents of deposit insurance system argue that a guarantee on 
the deposits increases depositors’ confidence and prevents the occurrence of a future bank 
run, thereby ensuring financial stability.   
This testifies that depositors’ confidence in the banking system is crucial, as their aggregate 
savings are the basis for capital formation (Alter, Goldin, & Rotella, 1994).  Thus, deposit 
insurance plays an important role in maintaining this unsophisticated depositors’ 
confidence in the banking system but at the same time providing the incentives for banks to 
increase their risk taking due to the moral hazard problem.  It is worth mentioning that the 
United States has a deposit insurance system in place for almost 80 years and yet the 
banking system was affected by instability due to financial crisis.  However, one striking 
fact is that ordinary Americans never lost faith in the security of their bank deposits. 
Therefore, it does not matter how long a country has adopted a deposit insurance system.  
What is more important is that the system must be able to maintain depositors’ confidence.  
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The deposit insurance system appears to be like a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, a 
deposit insurance system is a regulatory policy, designed to protect depositors, hence it 
provides stability.  At the same time deposit insurance protection, could also increase 
banking system fragility due to the moral hazard problem in the form of an increase in  
bank risk.  If banks pay deposit insurance premium to mitigate the moral hazard problem, 
there will be a welfare cost to depositors, borrowers and other stakeholders.  However, if 
there is no premium, banks might increase their risk, following the introduction of deposit 
insurance system.  A properly priced and risk-sensitive deposit insurance premium would 
then offset this welfare cost.    
Without a formal deposit insurance system, governments particularly in developing 
countries extend some form of implicit deposit protection to depositors on a discretionary 
basis that could be more costly than a formal deposit insurance system.   The question is 
not just having an explicit deposit insurance system in place. A credible deposit insurance 
system is required to protect depositors as well as promote prudent risk management among 
banks i.e. mitigating the moral hazard problem.  Thus, the resolution to maintain stability of 
the banking system through various measures, including the implementation of an explicit 
deposit insurance system is pertinent and critical to prevent a worse scenario for the 
economy, particularly in a developing country (Poole, 2010).  The deposit insurance system 
is a “risk-minimizer” created to maintain depositors’ confidence and protect their savings, 
hence preventing a bank run. A credible deposit insurance system including the insurance 
premium system that is sensitive towards bank risk would mitigate moral hazard and 
complement the existing supervisory and regulatory role of the central bank.  
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1.6 Research Questions and Objectives  
The research objectives described in the previous section could be decomposed into 
detailed research questions that map the road for further investigation in this thesis.   
The research questions are as follows: 
1. Whether the moral hazard problem by way of increased risk taking by banks is 
present in the Malaysian banking system after the introduction of the deposit insurance 
system?    
2. Whether there is any significant difference in the risk taking behavior of 
conventional banks and Islamic banks after the introduction of the deposit insurance 
system?    
3. Whether the deposit insurance premium sensitivity towards bank risk improves in 
the risk-based premium system in mitigating the moral hazard problem?  
The primary objective of this study is to ascertain whether the deposit insurance system 
promotes sound risk management practices among the conventional banks as well as the 
Islamic banks under a deposit insurance premium that is sensitive towards bank risk to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem. The specific research objectives of the study include: 
1.  To investigate the presence of moral hazard by way of increased bank risk in the 
Malaysian banking system after the introduction of deposit insurance system.   
2. To evaluate and compare the risk taking behavior of conventional and Islamic banks 
after the introduction of deposit insurance system. 
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3. To ascertain whether the deposit insurance premium is sensitive towards bank risk 
in the risk-based premium system (credible) in mitigating the moral hazard problem.  
To achieve the overall objectives above, this thesis employs the dynamic panel data model 
specifically the System Generalized Method of Moment (System GMM).  For the first 
objective, this thesis first runs individually the full sample regression for the Malaysian 
banks to investigate the relationship between bank risk taking and deposit insurance 
system.  Then in the second objective, the sample is divided into conventional and Islamic 
banks to compare the differences in bank risks between these two types of banks.   
For the third objective, the annual premium paid by banks is estimated with modification 
based on the Guidelines on Total Insured Deposits, Guidelines on the Differential Premium 
System and Guidelines for Deposit Insurance Coverage for Deposits issued by the 
Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation.  These Guidelines are retrievable at the 
Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation website.  The calculation is described in detail 
under Section 3.2. in Chapter 3. This thesis investigates the sensitivity of the deposit 
insurance premium with bank risks using both the dummy variable for the insurance 
premium assessment method and the estimated annual premium amount paid by the banks 
to ascertain whether the insurance premium system is an effective or credible tool to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem.   
1.7 Contributions of the Thesis  
This study contributes from several aspects with regards to knowledge, methodology and 
policy that is discussed in the following paragraph.  
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(a) Firstly, despite the fact that there is a large literature that examine the impact of deposit 
insurance system under the moral hazard framework, there is a scarcity of prior research 
that empirically examines the impact of  a formal deposit insurance system on  Islamic 
banks.  The Malaysian Islamic financial sector is the most advanced among the countries 
that have a dual banking system and ranks higher in terms of Islamic banking assets.  In 
addition, conventional and Islamic deposit insurance coexists in Malaysia though they are 
administered separately.   In fact, some countries are looking at Islamic deposit insurance as 
a catalyst to sustain and attract Islamic funds in their countries, thus helping them to spur 
the growth of Islamic finance and the economy (Arshad, 2011).   
Therefore, the thesis extends the existing literature by examining the impact of deposit 
insurance on bank risks for both the conventional banks and Islamic banks.  This is the first 
study that investigates the implication of deposit insurance in a dual banking system 
particularly on the Islamic banks.  Although there is a significant amount of literature on 
the impact of deposit insurance on conventional banks, due to data limitations, no empirical 
study has examined the impact of deposit insurance system on the Islamic banks.  It might 
not be appropriate to apply the conclusions from conventional banks to interpret the impact 
on the Islamic banks, although similar findings could occur.   
(b) Secondly, the thesis provides new evidence in a country specific study on how the shift 
from a flat rate to a risk-based deposit insurance premium policy
11
 would not necessarily be 
effective in mitigating the moral hazard problem when the risk-based premium is 
inadequate to cover for the increase in bank risk.  The literature suggests that the risk-based 
premium method could mitigate the moral hazard problem (see for example Hovakimian, 
                                                 
11 There are two distinct premium assessment method namely the flat rate premium and the risk based premium also known as the 
differential premium system.  With the fixed rate insurance premium, all member banks paid comparable insurance premium amount 
notwithstanding their risk portfolio.  On the contrary, differential insurance premium incorporates the risk of each bank assets into the 
premium structure. Thus, the insurance premiums that each bank pays will depend on its portfolio of risk. 
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Kane, & Laeven, 2003; Cull, Senbet, & Sorge, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004).  However, none of the country specific empirical 
studies in the deposit insurance literature (see Chernykh & Cole, 2011; Hadad et al., 2011; 
Ioannidou & Penas, 2010) has thus far examined the effect of bank risk taking and deposit 
insurance under different premium methods as these countries (Russia, Indonesia and 
Bolivia) continue to adopt the flat rate insurance premium until today.  On the contrary, this 
study  suggests that although Malaysia migrated from the flat rate premium to the risk 
based premium in the year 2008, the current risk-based premium policy is arguably 
effective in preventing banks from increasing their risk.   
(c) The existing literature on bank risk have found significant positive evidence on the 
relationship between bank risks, in particular financial risks with deposit insurance but few 
has investigated the relationship for operational risks.  Only one tier 1 empirical study has 
investigated the relationship between operational risks and deposit insurance (see Chernykh 
& Cole, 2011) but found limited evidence.
12
  In their study, operational risk is measured as 
the ratio of bank loans over the asset.  However, this thesis introduces management 
efficiency measured by the ratio of overhead expenses to total asset; OVERHEADTA as an 
alternative measure for operational risk. As operational risk is intrinsic on how managers 
think and act, the OVERHEADTA ratio is more appropriate in measuring operational risk.  
The study supports with empirical evidence that operational risk taking increases 
significantly after the introduction of a deposit insurance system.   This is the third 
contribution of this thesis. 
                                                 
12 The results in their study reported increased operational risk after the implementation of a deposit insurance system but the increase is 
not statistically significant. 
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(d) With respect to methodology, this thesis contributes in two ways, that is estimating the 
annual insurance premium paid by the Malaysian banks and employing the dynamic panel 
model for the Islamic banks sample.  Exceptional from the existing studies, this thesis 
estimates the annual insurance premium paid by the banks.  To my knowledge, this thesis is 
the only study that estimates the annual insurance premium based on the deposit insurer 
methodology. The detail calculation is described in Chapter 3 of this thesis. This allows this 
thesis to investigate whether the risk-premium sensitivity improves in the risk-based 
premium assessment method and whether the magnitude of the annual premium paid is 
positively associated with the bank risk.  In this respect, employing the deposit insurer 
methodology to estimate the annual premium is the thesis’s fourth contribution.   
(e) The final contribution of this study is also on methodology.  This study employs more 
robust methodology using appropriate methods for panel data that provide more accurate 
results in the regression models.  The use of the dynamic panel model on the Islamic banks 
is this study’s second methodology contribution.  Based on literature, the dynamic panel 
methodology is found to be less biased compared to alternative approaches.  In the deposit 
insurance literature, only one recent empirical study employs the dynamic model but only 
on the conventional banks.
13
 However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
dynamic panel model has yet to be tested using both the conventional and Islamic bank 
data.  Although there is prior research that uses Malaysia to evaluate deposit insurance 
impact on bank risk taking (Tuan, Ying, & Nya, 2010), it focuses only on local 
conventional banks in the sampling frame whereas the foreign conventional banks and 
Islamic banks are excluded.  In addition, the methodology used is the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test and binomial test instead of a more sophisticated statistical test.  Along these lines, 
                                                 
13 Hadad et al. ( 2011) employ the dynamic panel model more specifically the System Generalized Method of Moment to investigate bank 
risk taking and market discipline in Indonesian conventional banks. 
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this thesis improves the robustness of the findings by including all the conventional and 
Islamic banks in the sample.   
(f) The findings of the study would enable the Malaysian policy makers and regulators to 
ascertain whether the policy on the deposit insurance system implemented in September 
2005 is effective in preventing excessive bank risk taking by the conventional banks as well 
as the Islamic banks.  The findings of this thesis call for further reforms under the risk-
based insurance premium system.  Besides, the thesis provides empirical evidence to 
banking supervisors and regulators from countries with flat-rate premium to carefully 
consider an effective design of the risk-based premium so that the premium is positively 
correlated with the increase in risk and thereafter provides the incentives for banks to 
improve their risk management practices.  This study will thus be of legitimate concern to 
regulators and supervisors of the financial system particularly the Ministries of Finance, 
central banks and deposit insurers.     
1.8 Scope of Thesis 
Malaysia is selected as the sample for this study for several reasons.  According to a survey 
done by the International Association of Deposit Insurance (2010), there are currently nine 
countries namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Turkey, United Kingdom, Bahrain, 
Jordan, Bosnia and Kuwait that practice dual banking system as well as conventional and 
Islamic deposit insurance system.  Amongst these countries, only Malaysia has an Islamic 
Deposit Insurance that exists concurrently but is administered separately.  In contrast, the 
other eight countries operate the Islamic deposit insurance together with the conventional 
fund while the Malaysian model manages their Islamic deposit insurance fund in 
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accordance with Shariah principles that is separate from the conventional deposit insurance 
fund.  Moreover, the Malaysian Islamic financial sector is the most advanced among the 
countries that have a dual banking system and ranks higher in terms of Islamic banking 
assets.  An important reform on the deposit insurance premium has also taken place.  The 
risk-based premium replaced the flat rate premium.  Therefore, this allows this thesis to 
investigate the efficacy of deposit insurance policy in reducing bank risk in Malaysian 
market where Islamic and conventional banking co-exist. Hence, the selection of Malaysia 
as a sample for this study is justified. 
Notwithstanding this, the availability of the respective banks annual report is also an 
important consideration as banks that operate Islamic banking window reported their 
Islamic banking operations under the Income Statement notes to the account.  The 
breakdown of the Islamic banking activity is only reported in the notes to the account in the 
respective banks individual annual report.   
The study sample comprises all the conventional banks, Islamic banks and Islamic banking 
window that are mandatory members under the deposit insurance system for the period 
2002 to 2010.  The development financial institutions are excluded from the sample as 
these institutions are fully owned by the Government, which already have some form of 
implicit guarantee even prior to the introduction of the deposit insurance system.  The study 
period of 2002-2010 is chosen because from 2002 onwards, the Malaysian conventional 
banks underwent and finalized significant consolidation through mergers and acquisitions.  
In addition, data prior to 2002 were often unavailable and therefore collecting data from 
earlier years was not feasible.  Furthermore, from 2011 onwards the deposit insurance 
protection limit was increased from RM60,000 to RM250,000.   
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1.9 Chapter Organization 
To address the research questions and achieve the objectives mentioned in Section 1.6, the 
study is organized into six chapters as follows.  
Chapter 1 is the introduction chapter.  This chapter states the overall idea of the research. It 
begins with the background and motivation for the study.  This is followed by the definition 
of a financial safety net and narration on the development of deposit insurance in 
international and local settings.  Next, the banking system in Malaysia is discussed.  This 
chapter also presents the problem statement, research questions and  research contributions.  
This chapter concludes by providing the structure of the research where the main contents 
for each chapter of the thesis are explained.   
Chapter 2 is the literature review.  The two distinct differences of an explicit and implicit 
deposit insurance system are first explained.  It also offers information regarding the design 
features of an explicit deposit insurance system before moving to the conceptual and 
empirical literature on deposit insurance.  Further, this chapter explains the rationale for a 
deposit insurance system and the potential moral hazard problem related to this deposit 
protection.   
Chapter 3 is concerned with the hypotheses and the research design.  It defines the research 
methodology adopted by the researcher.  It  also  explains  the  research  design,  strategy,  
and  methodology  used  in  the study.  It  details  the  research  processes  in  providing  an  
understanding  of  how  the  researcher goes about answering the research questions to 
achieve the research objectives.  The formulation of the research variables based on 
literature,  as presented in Chapter 2,  are also shown  together  with  the  hypotheses  
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developed  in  this  research.  The  statistics  used  in analyzing  the  data  and  the  method   
are  also  explained.   
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results concerning the presence of moral hazard 
problem by way of increased bank risk taking after the introduction of deposit insurance 
system for conventional and Islamic banks in a dynamic panel framework.  Chapter 5 
presents and discusses the results concerning the sensitivity between bank risk and the risk-
based deposit insurance premium.  Finally, Chapter 6 presents the main findings of this 
thesis.  In addition, the implications, limitations and suggestions for future research are also 
presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
2.0  Introduction  
This chapter would first elaborate on the types of deposit insurance systems and their 
design features. This chapter would also present the theoretical development of the study 
and the literature review of past studies on deposit insurance. 
Section 2.1 lays down the two types of deposit insurance and the differences between 
explicit and implicit deposit insurance system.  In addition, the four distinct design features 
of an explicit deposit insurance system are also described in detail.  
Section 2.2 considers the theoretical development, followed by the previous empirical 
studies in Section 2.3 on the impact of the introduction of a deposit insurance system, 
particularly bank risks taking due to principle-agent moral hazard problem.  Finally, the 
chapter summarizes and reveals the relevant research gap in the existing empirical literature 
in Section 2.4.   
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2.1 Definition and Types of Deposit Insurance 
A deposit insurance system is just one part of a much wider financial safety net that 
includes a lender of last resort function, prudential regulations and supervision, in addition 
to failure resolution.  It is designed to ensure the soundness of banks as well as to expand 
the reach of the formal banking system.  Deposit insurance could be a form of full or 
limited guarantee to the depositors that their deposits would be reimbursed by the deposit 
insurer in the event of bank failures. If the guarantee is explicitly defined in the legislation 
of a country, then this form of guarantee is known as the explicit deposit insurance system.  
Otherwise, a form of implicit deposit insurance system exists from the verbal promises 
and/or past actions of the governments. 
Generally, one could distinguish between two basic types of deposit insurance, that is 
implicit deposit insurance and explicit deposit insurance. If a country does not explicitly 
communicate that it is adopting a deposit insurance system, an implicit deposit insurance 
system exists in that said country. With the implicit deposit insurance system, the 
government is not legally bound to provide the guarantee for reimbursement of deposits if a 
bank fails. It is an unofficial guarantee by the government to help banks that are 
experiencing a crisis, in particular a bank run. On the other hand, an explicit deposit 
insurance is just the opposite of implicit deposit insurance through which the government 
obligation is well defined in laws and other regulations.  Having said this, participation 
differs according to countries, whereby the banks’ participation in the deposit insurance 
system could be mandatory or voluntary. 
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These two different deposit insurance system would be further elaborated in the following 
section.  
2.1.1 Implicit Deposit Insurance 
Implicit deposit insurance is a form of deposit insurance not explicitly governed by laws or 
regulations.  Hence, it is a form of a government guarantee to prevent systemic failure of 
other banks when a bank experiences a bank failure due to insolvency or a bank run. 
Deposit insurance is implicit when its enforceability builds public confidence to avoid a 
bank run on banks that become economically insolvent. To reiterate, for implicit deposit 
insurance, there is no official communication by the government to the public or bankers on 
the deposit insurance coverage or the amount of its coverage. Therefore, the government is 
not legally bound to provide the deposit guarantee to depositors.  
Even in an explicit deposit insurance system, there exists a form of implicit deposit 
insurance to avoid the contagion effects of a troubled bank crashing the entire country’s 
economy. The onset of a banking crisis creates political incentives for any government, 
even those with an explicit deposit insurance system to extend guarantee coverage that 
exceed the limit of the explicit deposit insurance specified in the country’s laws and 
regulations.  This is evident in Malaysia when the government introduced a blanket 
guarantee known as the Government Deposit Guarantee from 16 October 2008 until 31 
December 2010. In addition, the implicit deposit insurance system is prevalent in countries 
with one or more state-owned banks (Kane, 2000). Despite being unfunded, an implicit 
deposit insurance system is important and adopted by many countries in the world. 
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2.1.2 Explicit Deposit Insurance 
The previous section highlighted the distinct features of implicit deposit insurance as a 
system, that is not officially announced by the government regarding its existence or the 
deposit insurance coverage.  On the contrary, an explicit deposit insurance system is well 
defined by the government in the laws and other regulations regarding the existence of the 
deposit insurance system and the amount covered.  The government clearly outlines its 
commitment through regulation concerning a specific amount of guaranteed protection on 
deposits. Nevertheless, both implicit and explicit deposit insurance systems could co-exist 
particularly in large financial crisis to optimize the social costs involved (McCoy, 2007).  
The decision by the government to establish an explicit deposit insurance system is usually 
influenced by a number of objectives. The first objective is to provide protection to small 
unsophisticated depositors who, due to their incapacity or asymmetric information are 
unable to assess the risk of the banks where they deposit their savings.  Secondly, a deposit 
insurance system would assist in the preservation of confidence towards the deposit taking 
institutions. It would reduce the probability of systemic run that could crumble the banking 
system as a whole. Thirdly, an explicit deposit insurance system delimits the government 
liability to only the established limits of coverage that is stipulated within a country’s 
legislation.  As the coverage limit is clearly specified, it reduces the government off balance 
sheet items or contingent liabilities than under an implicit deposit system. In addition, it 
provides the avenue to strengthen depositor protection in a time of crisis with a more 
formal mechanism.  One of the strongest arguments for explicit but limited deposit 
insurance is that only some deposits would be protected and hence the incentive to monitor 
and discipline the banks would still be prevalent.  
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As such, contrary to implicit deposit insurance, generally an explicit deposit insurance 
system has four distinct design features
14
, namely the funding type, sources of funding, 
insurance premiums systems and coverage limits and coinsurance.   
2.1.2.1 Design Features: Funding Type 
Explicit deposit insurance funding is divided into three, that is ex-ante funding, ex-post 
funding and hybrid funding.  In an ex post funding, there are no advance contributions.  
Only when there is a failure amongst the member institutions, then the funds are collected 
from member institutions.  While this approach is less expensive, it is less equitable for 
other member banks, as a failed member bank would not be able to contribute, as it is 
already insolvent.  In an ex-ante funding, the funds are accumulated prior to a bank failure.  
Member institutions contribute towards the fund through insurance premium or other 
means.  Lastly, the combined features of both ex ante and ex post funding is known as 
hybrid funding. 
2.1.2.2 Design Features: Sources of Fund 
Generally, there are three sources of funds namely government sources, private sources and 
a combination of both government and private sources.  When required, the government 
sources of funding could be called upon in the form of initial contributions by the 
government when the deposit insurance system was established, government loans or 
grants.  In other words, when a bank fails, the taxpayer funded the government source of 
fund. On the other hand, in private funding, member institutions are the main source of 
                                                 
14 This four design features has been discussed by many authors.  See for example Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2004), International 
Association of Deposit Insurance Guidelines and LaBrosse & Mayes (2007).   
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funding through the annual insurance paid. Hence, the insured banks hold the financial 
burden of a bank failure. Arguably, the private insurance fund could be insolvent whereas 
the government fund remains solvent.  Notwithstanding this, Malaysia is amongst the 
countries that have a combination of government and private funding sources.       
2.1.2.3 Design Features: Insurance Premium Systems 
For privately funded deposit insurance system, the amount each bank has to pay could be   
either flat rate (uniform) insurance premium or differential (risk-based/adjusted) insurance 
premium. The difference between the two is the premium amount paid by member 
institutions.  With the flat rate insurance premium, all member banks paid comparable 
insurance premium amount notwithstanding their risk portfolio.  On the other hand, 
differential or risk-based insurance premium incorporates the risk of each bank’s assets into 
the premium structure. Thus, the insurance premiums that each bank pays would depend on 
its portfolio of risk.  Therefore, it reduces cross-subsidization among member banks with 
low risk while at the same time discourages banks to have high-risk appetite as the riskier 
the banks’ assets, the higher the premium they have to pay for the insured deposits.    
2.1.2.4 Design Features: Coverage Limits and Coinsurance 
Apart from the above mentioned three design features of deposit insurance (funding type, 
sources of funding and insurance premium systems), the final design feature of an explicit 
deposit insurance system is the limit of coverage and coinsurance.   
Coverage limits could be defined as not only limiting the amount that the government 
would reimburse the depositors in the event of a bank failure but also the types of eligible 
49 
 
institutions or deposits that are covered by deposit insurance against the specified losses.  
On the other hand, the existence of coinsurance (as opposed to paying the whole amount 
covered under the insurance) in the design features of an explicit deposit insurance system 
requires the depositor to cover some of the losses of a bank failure. For example, a deposit 
is covered up to the maximum of $20,000.  Nevertheless, in an event of bank failure, 
depositors would not be reimbursed up to the maximum protection limit of $20,000.  
Instead, the depositors are reimbursed lower than the maximum protection limit.  Hence, 
the difference is the coinsured amount i.e. loss borne by depositors.  On this account, the 
existence of coinsurance might not provide comfort to depositors because a bank run could 
still occur.    
Overall, an effective and credible design feature for deposit insurance (see Bank for 
International Settlements & International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2009; 
International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2008) could provide banks’ board of 
directors with a trigger alarm on risk related issues as well as an incentive for depositors to 
monitor their bank.  Hence, market discipline would be exercised while at the same time 
discourage banks from venturing into risky business which would reduce the moral hazard 
problems.  Section 2.3.1 discusses the moral hazard problems.   
2.2  Theoretical Development 
The main purpose of implementing a deposit insurance system is twofold, that is to prevent 
bank runs  (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) and promote financial stability or prevent a banking 
crisis (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002).  Recent studies also showed that deposit 
insurance reduces the social cost of a banking crisis (Gropp, Hakenes, & Schnabel, 2011).  
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However, theoretical evidence (e.g. Merton, 1977; Kareken & Wallace, 1978; Hazlett, 
1997; Gorton & Huang, 2004; Freixas & Rochet, 2011)  showed that like other insurance 
schemes, deposit insurance could lead to moral hazard problem in the form of excessive 
risk taking by the banks.  Thus, the benefits of deposit insurance are sometimes 
outweighed, when the problems of moral hazard are excerbated.  In other words, banks’ 
role as financial intermediaries and the alteration of incentives in the contracts between 
banks as the agent and depositors as the principal, transforms the riskiness of the contract, 
which imminently leads to moral hazard problems.  
Notwithstanding this, empirical evidence suggests that a credible design feature of deposit 
insurance system could mitigate the moral hazard problem (see Demirguc-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 2004; Maysami & Sakellariou, 2008; Karas, Pyle & Schoors, 2013) and increase 
financial intermediation (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; Chernykh & Cole, 2011).  
The next part of this thesis deals with the relevant theoretical framework of this study.   
2.2.1 Theory of Deposit Insurance  
Deposit insurance promotes financial stability by creating stabilization of deposits in the 
bank and assuring depositors that their deposits are protected and safe.  The seminal paper 
by Diamond and Dybig (1983) argues that the benefits of deposit insurance in preventing 
bank runs relate to the main function of financial institutions as an asset transformation 
agent as well as a liquidity provider.   
The deposit insurance system reduces the danger of bank runs and a systematic effect of a 
run on a bank that could cause the contagion effect to other banks, the banking system and 
even the entire economy of a country.  Banks’ role in maturity transformation enables them 
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to collect demand deposits like savings, fixed deposit and current account as well as raise 
short-term funds in the capital market.  However, this demand deposits and short-term 
funds are utilized to finance long-term investment or assets.  Hence, there is a maturity 
mismatch in the asset transformation process.   
Notwithstanding this, the mismatch allows banks to offer higher return opportunity for risk 
savvy depositors who are willing to share the risk with the banks.  Apart from the benefit of 
sharing risk with the depositors, the banks’ depositors expose banks to the risk of early 
withdrawal of money at the same time.  Thus, deposit insurance prevents the panic run by 
depositors by installing their confidence with the banking institution.  In theory, deposit 
insurance systems should provide financial stability in the banking system by decreasing 
the risk of bank runs.   
Even if a crisis occurs, at least the deposit insurance system acts as “risk minimizer” by 
protecting some of the majority depositors’ deposit. Anticipating that their deposits are 
guaranteed under a deposit insurance system, depositors without immediate consumption 
needs will not rush to withdraw their money in the bank, thereby averting a contagious 
bank run and reducing the social costs of a banking crisis.  Bank runs could lead to 
systemic banking system failures that incur a real cost.  Hence, to prevent this contagious 
bank run, the government backed deposit insurance is the optimal solution.  The restoration 
of depositors’ confidence is crucial as it not only encourages the individuals without 
banking arrangements to deposit money in the bank but also stretch the banks’ size in the 
form of increased deposits (see Chernykh & Cole, 2011). 
Several historical cases appear to support the argument for the implementation of a deposit 
insurance system that prevents bank runs and their contagious effects. For instance, none of 
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the member banks under the Indiana deposit insurance system experienced bank failure 
during its 30 year history (Calomiris, 1990).  Added to this is the success story of the FDIC 
in reducing the occurrence of bank failures from 50 a year in 1939 to 17 a year in 1944.  It 
continued to maintain an average of 12 a year until 1982, before the Savings and Loan 
Association crisis (Matthews & Thompson, 2008).  Thus, not only in theory but also the 
historical events support the view that deposit insurance system prevents bank runs.  
Despite creating moral hazard, deposit insurance as a tool for depositor protection has 
become an important feature of most banking systems to reduce the instability and 
minimize the probability of crises (see Talley, 1994; Cull, Senbet, & Sorge, 2005; Maysami 
& Sakellariou, 2008; Angkinand, 2009; DeLong & Saunders, 2011). 
In the literature, the three main rationales for adopting a deposit insurance system are 
preventing a run, ensuring financial stability and reducing the social costs of a bank failure.  
If the deposit insurance system is necessary for financial stability but possess a danger of 
systemic bank runs, then incentives-compatible risk control tools are required.  Credible 
deposit insurance system accompanied by stringent regulatory framework not only prohibit 
excessive risk taking by banks but also limits the government’s commitment to depositors 
as well as ensures increased financial intermediation of the banking system (see Cull, 
Senbet, & Sorge, 2005; Maysami & Sakellariou, 2008; Angkinand, 2009; Karas, Pyle & 
Schoors, 2013; Chernykh & Cole, 2011).   
One could argue that an element of ambiguity (in instances where no explicit deposit 
insurance system is in place) is advantageous as people would want to protect themselves 
from loss as they are uncertain whether the Government would step in (Talley, 1994).  On 
the other hand, the consequences of ambiguity could be detrimental as well because 
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depositors, debtors and bankers might believe that more insurance is provided and hence 
take greater risks, exposing themselves to moral hazard problems. 
Deposit insurance does exacerbate the moral hazard problem (see Kareken and Wallace, 
1978) when unaccompanied by a stringent regulatory framework that permits excessive risk 
taking by banks.    Thus, regulators must figuratively step into the shoes of depositors to 
control this moral hazard problem not only in the conventional banks but in the Islamic 
banks as well.  Regulators attempt could be through the use of various regulatory controls 
like imposing minimum capital requirements and a risk-based deposit insurance premium 
that are aimed at forcing the bank to internalize the cost of increased risk.  The following 
section would provide an overview of moral hazard problem in general and in the context 
of Islamic banking.  
2.2.2 Moral Hazard: The Deposit Insurance Problem  
In an agency framework, a moral hazard problem or sometimes referred as “hidden action” 
is an action of one party to a transaction (agent) that is unobservable by the second party 
(principal) who authorized the transaction (Kreps, 1990).  Krugman P. (2009) defines moral 
hazard as “the possibility that you will take less care to prevent an accident if you are 
insured against it”.  To fully understand moral hazard and its importance in financial 
economics, a brief description of the principal agent theory is discussed in the next 
paragraph. 
The agency theory, also referred to amongst others as the principal-agent theory or agency 
problem, is concerned with resolving two major principal and agent (agency) problems that 
could occur in the agency relationship.  It involves the risk, which is a problem for the 
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principal to verify that the agent has behaved appropriately to serve the principal interest 
rather than the agent’s interest.  In addition, it includes the problem of risk sharing when 
both of them have different attitudes toward risk.  Scholars in various fields including 
finance and banking have used the agency theory (e.g. Fama, 1980) to describe the 
principal and agent problems derived under incomplete or asymmetric information that 
leads to the potential problem of moral hazards. 
Thus, dealing with financial intermediation, the nature of banking is such that it suffers 
from this incentive problem between the principal and agent. In general, the agency theory 
assumes that agents would not necessarily act according to the principle instruction as 
agreed.  According to Heffernan (2005), the agency theory could be applied to explain the 
nature of contracts between the principal and agent in the following manner: 
i. the shareholders of a bank (principal) and its management (agent); 
ii. the bank (principal) and its officers (agent); 
iii. the bank (principal) and its debtors (agent); and 
iv. the depositors/creditors (principal) and the bank (agent) 
2.2.2.1 Moral Hazard in Banking 
Concerning deposit insurance, the interesting aspect of the principal agent theory revolves 
around the agent’s risk behavior in alliance with the principal.  Information is the main 
concern in the principal agent framework. In the banking sector, this asymmetric-
information problem could arise when there exists a deposit insurance system to prevent 
bank runs. Moral hazard in banking could stem from the relationship between banks and 
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borrowers as well as the insurer.  The moral hazard problem would likely reduce 
depositors’ effort to control their banks (market discipline) and banks’ might tend to 
finance very risky projects with deposits, reap the benefits if the project succeeds. 
Under the financial intermediation theory, the intermediary and payment functions explain 
why bank exists (see Allen & Santomero, 1997).  The presence of asymmetric information 
makes it viable for household and firms to deposit funds with banks instead of lending 
directly to potential borrowers.  Asymmetric information is prevalent in any financial 
transactions, as one party may not have complete information withheld by the other party 
(investors/debtors) and vice versa.  Hence, banks help depositors or investors from adverse 
selection of undesired risk exposure by screening prospective borrowers.  
Although the prospective borrowers have been selected, the bank faces another asymmetric 
problem if borrowers conduct diverted from the original purpose of funds. When the loans 
are disbursed to borrowers, banks no longer have control of the funds if the manager 
decides to divulge the borrowed funds to another project with higher risk exposure but 
promises greater return. This increase change in borrower’s risk appetite is called moral 
hazard. Notwithstanding this, bank too is the potential cause of moral hazard.  
In banking, moral hazard occurs when the bank does not execute the desires or commands 
of the depositor.  Likewise, when the incentives of the depositor and bank change, it alters 
the riskiness of the contract and raises the moral hazard problem. The moral hazard 
problem from the banks’ position also happens under asymmetric information. Banks 
usually have more information about their actions or intentions than the depositor as the 
depositor usually cannot completely scrutinize the banks. Similarly, if the depositors’ 
lackadaisical attitude to monitor the bank’s activities known to the bank, the riskiness of the 
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contract also altered as the bank may divulge in riskier activities than it would in the 
presence of close monitoring.  This exhibits the classic agency problem of moral hazard.    
In the agency analogy to bank deposits and the deposit insurance system, both banks and 
depositors are subjected to moral hazard.  Moral hazard alters the willingness for both 
banks and depositors to assume greater risk.   The moral hazard behavior of the banks can 
be observed in the form of increased risk taking.  The main objective of deposit insurance 
system is as a depositor protection that eventually protects the banking system from bank 
runs or market liquidity failures that are compared to a bank run.   
In confronting with information asymmetries, it is vital to provide protection for small 
depositors who are likely to cause a bank run (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994).  These small 
depositors cannot correctly assess the risk they take when depositing their savings in a 
particular bank or do not have the incentive to monitor banks.  Nevertheless, like any other 
insurance, deposit insurance system creates a moral hazard by reducing depositors’ 
incentives to monitor the bank risk taking, as depositors are free from the consequences of 
their action and the banks’ action. If not properly addressed the lack of depositors 
disciplining role will encourage the banks to alter their risk appetite.  
In theory, deposit insurance is clearly good (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) in creating banking 
system stability.  Unfortunately, deposit insurance can generate moral hazard and can 
encourage banks to take excessive risk.  Merton (1977) is the first to quantify the moral 
hazard problem.  He identifies the value of deposit insurance as the equivalent of the US 
Federal Deposit Insurance put option.  At that time, a flat rate insurance premium was 
charged irrespective of the risk of the banks.  The flat rate premium provides the incentives 
for banks to alter their riskiness because they are only incurring part of the losses if the 
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assets become non-performing.  Hence, moral hazard may even occur in normal times if the 
incentives increase risk taking is sufficiently attractive.  Rolnick (1993) also illustrates how 
deposit insurance distorts bank’s behavior and creates moral hazard.    
Karels and McClatchey (1999) stated that: 
“Many financial economists have argued that the crisis in the thrift industry in the 1980’s 
was the result of inattention to the moral hazard problem by regulators. Studies by Kane 
(1989), Mckenzie, Cole, and Brown (1992) and Cole (1993) suggests that moral hazard 
behavior was responsible for a significant portion of S&L losses”(p. 106). 
The above statement is in contrast with the benefit of deposit insurance in maintaining 
financial stability. Notwithstanding this, the moral hazard problem purportedly created by 
regulators at that time could be minimized by ensuring a credible design feature of deposit 
insurance.  During the periods under study, the insurance premium was charged on a flat 
rate basis rather than risk-based premium that could hinder the incentive by banks to 
increase their risk taking.  The moral hazard problem surfaces with the presence of deposit 
insurance as the insured banks leverage on the deposit insurance and have the incentives to 
increase risky activities while the depositors forego their monitoring role on the banks risky 
activities as their deposits are guaranteed.  Thus, timely government intervention may 
prevent the risk of failure shifting from the banks to the deposit insurer, depositors and even 
the taxpayer via government bailout of banks.  
While deposit insurance can stabilize a bank’s deposit base and contagious bank run, 
deposit insurance can create potential instability.  In the presence of deposit insurance, 
depositors will not exercise market discipline as they know that their deposits with the 
banks will be repaid and require no risk premium on the funds than otherwise.  Similarly, 
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banks responded to this risk-free interest rate by taking greater risks that correspond to 
higher returns.  Thus, deposit insurance can undermine market discipline (depositors) and   
financial discipline (banks) by subsidizing both depositors and banks risk taking.   
2.2.2.2 Moral Hazard: Islamic Banking 
Islamic banking is operationalised through Shariah compliant contracts.  Due to this 
contractual setting where asymmetric information is always possible, from an agency 
framework, moral hazard may also occur in Islamic banks.  The prohibition of uncertainty 
(gharar) and freedom of contract are the two dimensions that evolved the risk concept in 
Islamic banking (Obaidullah, 2005). The element of uncertainty can arise due to 
asymmetric information, illicit profits, speculation or gambling and even the riskiest of a 
business or project itself (Kettell, 2011).  Therefore, Islamic banks operation warrants high 
level of disclosure and transparency.  This information disclosure minimizes uncertainty 
and risk in Islamic banking plausibly minimised moral hazard.
15
  Notwithstanding this, 
undertaking some degree of risk based on educated analysis and understanding of the risk 
involved is permissible and accepted as business norm under an Islamic contract.  This is 
because the elements of uncertainty   associated with the risk have been eliminated as 
participants of contracts have sufficient information about the future performance of an 
investment decision.   
In Islamic banking, as a general principle, all contracts are permissible unless prohibited by 
the Shariah (Kettell, 2011).  Therefore, due to this contractual setting, from an agency 
framework, moral hazard is also present in Islamic banks.  Parties in the contract are open 
                                                 
15 Moral hazard occurs when there is lack of incentives to protect against risk when one is protected from its consequences. 
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to moral hazard problem due to asymmetric information.  For instance, in Mudharabah 
contract, the mudarib (agent/borrower) possess better information on the performance of 
his business than the rabb al-mal (capital owner/bank) as the mudarib is involved in the 
daily business operations and his action determines the success of his business.  The 
mudarib can utilize this strategic position to his advantage by cheating or deviating away 
from the original purpose of the financing after signing a Mudharabah contract.  In 
Mudharabah contract, although the capital is provided by banks, there is no guarantee 
provided for the return of the capital, as it is not a loan.        
Similar to conventional banks, Islamic banks solicit deposits from depositors, invest these 
investment deposits on behalf of their depositors, and share the agreed profit and losses.  
The theoretical underpinning of Islamic banks’ deposit contract under Shariah16 such as 
Qard, Wadiah, Mudharabah and Murabahah are unique as they feature a different risk and 
return. Nevertheless, the incentives for Islamic banks to be involved in riskier business are 
constrained by the Shariah principles which advocate financing on real assets.  It is 
plausible to mention that due to it being linked to asset financing according to the Shariah 
principles, Islamic banks are less affected by the financial crisis (Hasan  and  Dridi,  2010).   
Islamic banking introduced greater discipline into the financial system by requiring the 
banks to share the profits as well as the risks involved.  This risk-sharing feature should 
impose a higher level of disclosure and transparency in the Islamic banks in comparison 
with the conventional banks.  The disclosure and transparency allowed market discipline to 
take place which would mitigate the moral hazard problem.  Moreover, features in Shariah 
principles provided built-in checks and balances, which ensure the Islamic banking 
                                                 
16 See Shanmugam, Alam and  Zahari (2008) for further reading of Islamic banking terminology and definition. 
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stability. By abiding to the Shariah principles, Islamic banks appear to be safe with higher 
asset quality and better capitalized than the conventional banks (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Merrouche, 2013; Ariss, 2010).  Thus, moral hazard could be less prominent than in the 
conventional banks (El Tiby, 2010) even without deposit protection and no increased risk 
after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  Subsequently, the Islamic banks’ 
behavior towards risk are expected to be different from the conventional banks, even with 
the existence of explicit deposit insurance protection.    
Like any other business in an economy, risk is a consequence of choice under uncertainty.  
Unlike the conventional banks, the Islamic banks endorsed risk sharing and diversification 
rather than risk transfer (debt financing) in its financing instruments and contacts 
(Mirakhor, 1989).  Sharing allows risk to be spread among the Islamic banks and its 
customers.  By sharing risk, Islamic banks have the incentives to protect against risk as 
similar to the borrowers; the Islamic banks are not protected from the consequences of risk 
or uncertainty.  Therefore, even with the introduction of deposit insurance moral hazard is 
mitigated as similar principles are still endorsed for all financing of the economic activities.  
2.2.3 Deposit Insurance: A Rationale 
Notwithstanding the moral hazard issue discussed above, there still is a need for a deposit 
insurance system.  If deposit insurance is the reason for moral hazard (i.e. increases in bank 
risk) as discussed in the previous paragraph, then why is there a need for it?  The seminal 
work by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that a run could even cause a healthy bank to 
default.   As the banking landscape is changing rapidly following liberalization, banks rely 
on market forces and hence become more vulnerable and submit to greater instability 
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(Caprio & Honohan, 1999).  In response to the 1999 Asian currency crisis, the Financial 
Stability Forum was formed by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to 
promote global financial stability. In fact, in April 2008, this forum recommended that 
deposit insurance be incorporated as part of the robust mechanism that dwells with 
financial institutions in distress.  Liberalization and globalization emphasized the need to 
regulate financial institutions beyond their institutional risk, that is the systemic risk they 
posed towards the financial system (Nijskens & Wagner, 2011).     
Banks’ liquidity transformation function makes them vulnerable to runs as bank finance 
long-term assets via short-term deposits.  Deposit insurance instills depositors’ confidence 
in preventing a run that could create systemic instability in the financial system.  It could be 
a powerful source of financial stability depending on the deposit insurance built-in 
incentives together with prudential regulations and supervision (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002).  The moral hazard effects of deposit insurance could be overcome 
through the design features of the deposit insurance and other regulatory initiatives 
including  risk-based premium pricing, reserve requirements, partial insurance coverage 
and capital requirements aimed at curbing excessive risk taking.  The generally accepted 
view in literature concurs that in mitigating moral hazard, the deposit insurance design 
features should have the incentives to prevent banks from taking excessive risk.  
The outcomes of bank runs could be detrimental as it not only affects the stability of the 
entire economy but reduces financial intermediation.  For example, during the credit crisis 
in 2007, Northern Rock, a British bank experienced a bank run (depositors’ withdrawing 
deposits).  The subprime crisis sparked fears among depositors that the bank might become 
insolvent. The withdrawal of deposits from its depositors disrupted Northern Rock 
intermediation function whereby the bank has sought and received a liquidity support 
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facility from the Bank of England.   On the contrary, more recently, the evidence in 
Chernykh and Cole ( 2011) study revealed that in a stable banking system, financial 
intermediation is greater for banks that have been long under the explicit deposit insurance 
system.   
The following section would discuss the empirical evidence with regard to the 
implementation of an explicit deposit insurance system.        
2.3 Empirical Evidence  
Despite a continuing debate among the academics, policymakers and others over the 
tradeoff between the negative and positive impacts of deposit insurance system for almost 
two centuries, the results are still inconclusive on the implications of implementing deposit 
insurance system due to the moral hazard problem created by deposit insurance. The debate 
on deposit insurance schemes started as early as in 1800s when the US government adopted 
various deposit insurance system in their states to ensure the stability of their state banking 
system (Calomiris & White, 1994).  Some studies contend that the costs of moral hazard 
are too great and that deposit insurance should be scaled back, reformed or, at the extreme, 
perhaps be eliminated altogether.   
The following section would neutralize this contention by providing empirical evidence on 
the moral hazard implications, the importance of credible design features of deposit 
insurance system to mitigate the moral hazard problem and finally justify that a credible 
deposit insurance would lead to financial stability as well as financial intermediation. 
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2.3.1 Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard  
Moral hazard in banking could be viewed from two sides, which are the banks and 
depositors.  However, this research is only concerned with the banks’ moral hazard 
problem.  In passing, the literature review also includes market discipline by depositors.  
The number of emerging or developing countries (including Malaysia) implementing 
explicit deposit insurance since 1974 has steadily increased (see Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, & 
Laeven, 2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, 2001; IADI website).  In fact, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiach (2002) conducted a prominent study to justify that moral hazard matters. 
Their findings from 61 countries in the period 1980-1999 showed international evidence 
that a country would experience a likelihood of banking instability in the form of a banking 
crisis in  the presence of an explicit deposit insurance system. 
The  benefits  of  deposit  insurance  are  the  protection  of  small  depositors,  the  
maintenance  of  public  confidence  in  the  banking  system  and  the  minimization  of  the  
broader  economic consequences  that  could  accompany  bank  failures  (Diamond  and  
Dybvig  (1983).  Unfortunately, deposit insurance could generate moral hazard and  
encourage banks to take excessive risk (Merton, 1977).  By absorbing part of the losses  
when  a  bank  fails,  deposit  insurance  is  equivalent  to  a  subsidy  for  bank  risk  taking.  
Deposits insurance obstructs market discipline by the depositors on the banks’ risk taking 
activities.  Studies suggest (see Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004) that the presence of 
market discipline curb bank’s incentive to take excessive risk.  Depositors could punish 
bank to limit the banks’ risk taking by way of either withdrawing their deposits or 
demanding higher interest rates that commensurate with the risk taken by the banks (Peria 
& Schmukler, 2001).   
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The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kareken and Wallace (1978) models respectively 
have isolated the benefits and costs of deposit insurance.  In relation to this, there exists 
concern among researchers and academics (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; Maysami & Sakellariou, 2008; Angkinand, 2009; 
Ioannidou & Penas, 2010; DeLong & Saunders, 2011; Hadad et al., 2011) about balancing 
deposit insurance’s role as “risk minimizer” as well as mitigating the moral hazard problem 
associated with it.  A vast empirical literature exists to analyze the implications of moral 
hazard on deposit insurance.  
The prevention of financial and banking crisis justifies the existence of financial safety 
nets.  Thus, deposit insurance serves as the most common tool used by many to protect the 
majority of the unsophisticated depositor and ensuring stability of the banking system.  
Although  an  explicit and  formal  deposit  insurance  scheme  is  considered  as  an 
important device to ensure bank stability, empirical studies provide conflicting results on 
the impact  of  explicit  deposit  insurance  schemes  on  bank  risk-taking  behavior.   
As early as in the 1990s, empirical evidence showed that deposit insurance posed the 
problem of moral hazard.  A study by Kansas, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) showed that 
deposit insurance membership increased the probability of bank failure, consistent with the 
theory that some form of insurance or guarantee provided banks the incentives for higher 
risk taking.  Later, Laeven (2002) study argued that deposit insurance encouraged higher 
risk taking by banks and reduced the incentives of depositors to monitor banks.  Using 
estimates of the value of the deposit insurance premium
17
 as a proxy for risk taking, he 
concluded that the banks' incentive on risk taking would differ depending on the 
governance structure and institutional environment. Added to that, his study revealed that 
                                                 
17 He employs the Merton (1977) put option model of deposit insurance to estimate the deposit insurance premium. 
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the bank with concentrated private ownership and state-owned operating in a weak 
institutional environment, particularly in developing countries, tend to take higher risk in 
the presence of deposit insurance.   
Hovakimian et al. (2003)  reached  a  similar  conclusion  when  they argued  in  their  
study  that  moral hazard problem caused by deposit insurance shifted the risk exposure by 
banks or even the depositor to the government (as deposit insurer) especially in a poor 
institutional environment.  In the literature, this is sometimes known as subsidizing risk 
taking.  Likewise, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) employed cross country data for 30 
countries over the period 1990-1997 and found that the explicit deposit insurance design 
features vary internationally, and that would have different impacts on the banks risk taking 
behavior.  Their paper also highlighted that more empirical studies on deposit insurance are 
needed to make better informed policy recommendations to mitigate the tradeoff  between 
protecting depositors and at the same time increase bank risk taking.  Similarly, another 
cross-country  study  showed  that  explicit  deposit  insurance  might  encourage  banks  to  
take excessive risks (e.g. Wheelock, 1995; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detriagache, 2002; 
Hovakimian et al.,2003).   
A number of studies have considered risk adjusted insurance premium requirement to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem.  For instance, Cull, Senbet, and Sorge (2005) suggested 
that amongst others, to affix the premium amount to the banks’ risk portfolio rather than a 
flat premium for all.  They argued that the moral hazard problem could aggravate in a 
generous deposit insurance system in countries lacking adequate banking regulations and 
supervision. Thus, due to the moral hazard problem, deposit insurance might be an obstacle 
for financial system stability.  A call for more empirical research particularly using bank 
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level data is timely (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; Chernykh & Cole, 2011), to 
analyze the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk taking.   
There are very few empirical studies on the moral hazard implication of an explicit deposit 
insurance system in the past ten years, which look at data for their studies on a bank-level 
particularly for the banking industry in developing countries.  Recently, there have been a 
number of studies on deposit insurance that examined country-level data on banking in 
developing economies.  Chernykh and Cole  (2011) affirmed this by pointing out to a lack 
of empirical material for the past two decades that examined the implication of deposit 
insurance on bank level data.  Chernykh and Cole (2011) conducted a study on Russian 
banks while Ioannidou and Penas (2010) did a comparison study on bank risk-taking pre 
and post implementation of deposit insurance system for banks in Bolivia.  
Hadad et al. (2011) studied how market discipline responded to the introduction of explicit 
deposit insurance during the presence of  implicit deposit insurance system in 1998 and  
explicit deposit guarantee in 2005.  Using data from 104 conventional banks in Indonesia 
during the period 1995-2009, they found that bank risk taking improved despite weaken 
market discipline after the introduction of the explicit deposit insurance in contrast to the 
period of implicit deposit insurance. 
Most  studies  on  the moral hazard implication of deposit insurance focus on US  and  
European  banks,  while  empirical evidence  from developing countries has  remained  
limited. In a study of the Turkish banking system, Yilmaz and Muslumov (2008) explained 
that moral hazard exists, especially among local banks.  Using the Wilcoxon and Binomial 
test, their results described that deposit insurance could distort market discipline and hence 
change the banks’ behavior in taking excessive risk.  Meanwhile, the study by Ioannidou 
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and Penas (2010) in a Bolivian setting, provided strong evidence that banks are more likely 
to increase risk taking by initiating riskier loans after the introduction of deposit insurance.  
Employing the credit quality of bank loans to analyze the effect of deposit insurance on 
bank risk taking,  their study also demonstrated that banks with a high share of large 
depositors take less risk before the introduction of deposit insurance in comparison to after 
the introduction of deposit insurance system.  Their findings indicate that the large 
depositors exercise market discipline.    
A study on the impact of deposit insurance system towards a Malaysian banking system 
remains substantially under researched.  The two published papers are a descriptive study 
(Devinaga Rasiah & Peong, 2011) and an empirical study (Tuan, Ying, & Nya, 2010).  The 
empirical study by Tuan, Ying, and Nya (2010) demonstrated deterioration in interest rate 
risk and risk weighted capital ratio post deposit insurance system. Nonetheless, there is no 
significant excessive risk taking by the banks after the introduction of the deposit insurance 
system in the form of credit risk and liquidity risk. Notwithstanding this, their study has 
several shortcomings that could be addressed by future research.  Firstly, further study 
should include a longer period of study than the current period of 2004-2007.  Secondly, to 
increase the robustness of the study, the sample frame should include all banks that are 
protected under the deposit insurance system.  This includes the foreign conventional banks 
and Islamic banks as well as the local conventional banks. Lastly, employing a multivariate 
regression test other than the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and binomial test would draw more 
conclusive and generalized results.  
Another prominent moral hazard problem of deposit insurance is reduced market discipline 
that leads to increased bank risk taking (e.g. Laeven, 2002; Ioannidou & Penas, 2010; 
DeLong & Saunders, 2011). To put it simply, depositors are no longer concerned about the 
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state of bank's soundness and hence surrender their market monitoring exercise or 
“policing” efforts.  As a result, depositors are no longer a source of threat to the banks, and 
this encourages the banks to indulge in excessive risk taking (e.g. Forssbaeck, 2011; 
DeLong & Saunders, 2011; Ioannidou & Penas, 2010).  In the Asian case, Hadad et al., 
(2011) argued that deposit insurance increases bank risk taking when depositors relinquish 
their disciplining role to monitor the bank.  By quantifying market discipline as higher 
deposit rates, they deduced the existence of an inverse relationship between market 
discipline and blanket guarantee, as well as the capital adequacy ratio.  Their paper also 
highlights that listing a bank in the capital market, either foreign or locally owned bank is a 
good way to encourage market discipline.  
Lastly, in a study of 800 Russian banks, Chernykh and Cole (2011) found that the 
implementation of voluntary explicit deposit insurance system increased moral hazard 
problem in the form of increased risk-taking.  Their results showed that ﬁnancial risk 
increased signiﬁcantly after the introduction of deposit insurance but there was limited 
evidence for operational risk taking.  However, their findings also showed that the banks’ 
level of deposits and deposit to asset ratio rose the longer the duration a bank had opted into 
the deposit insurance system, suggesting increased bank financial intermediation.  Further, 
they concluded that the deposit insurance system provided a level playing field between 
state-owned banks and privately owned banks.  In Russia, the state-owned banks enjoyed 
full government guarantee prior to the introduction of a voluntary deposit insurance system 
in December 2003.  
Despite the implication of moral hazard on the implementation of a deposit insurance 
system, some empirical studies have found that explicit deposit insurance reduces the moral 
hazard problem (bank riskiness) or has no moral hazard impact on it.   Karels and 
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McClatchey (1999) found no evidence that  the  credit unions risk taking behavior 
deteriorated post deposit  insurance system.  Their study examined the impact of deposit 
insurance within the US credit union industry.  In the European case, Gropp and Vesala 
(2004) showed that explicit deposit insurance in the European banking system has reduced 
banks’ risk taking through a decrease in leverage risk.  They argued that the limited 
government commitment in the design of explicit deposit insurance might mitigate the 
moral hazard problem. Hence, their evidence pointed towards supporting the 
implementation of explicit deposit insurance as a risk reducing effect rather than implicit 
deposit insurance.  
Consequently, Maysami and Sakellariou (2008) reported similar findings.  Their study 
showed that countries with liberalized financial sectors would have a more stable banking 
sector as deposit insurance system lowers the cost of moral hazard by reducing 
vulnerabilities. In a study of 47 banking crisis episodes in 35 industrial and emerging 
markets, Angkinand (2009) showed that deposit insurance had no implications of moral 
hazard problem.  Instead, they argued that a higher coverage of deposit insurance mitigated 
the moral hazard problem.  Consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and 
Cull, Senbet & Sorge (2005), concluded that some restriction on bank activities together 
with prudential bank regulations and supervision, support the role of deposit insurance as a 
ﬁnancial safety net tool that avert bank runs as well as reduce banks incentives to take 
excessive risk. 
More recently, the study by Forssbaeck (2011) supported the view that the presence of 
explicit deposit insurance reduces bank risk taking.  In a study of US, DeLong and 
Saunders (2011) analyzed 60 publicly traded financial institutions that consist of banks and 
trusts over the period 1932-1935.  Their study showed that following the introduction of 
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deposit insurance, banks in general became more risk oriented.  However, this was because 
the insurance premium during that period was based on a flat rate premium.  The US 
implemented an explicit deposit insurance system in 1933 with a flat rate premium before 
converging to the risk-based premium in 1993.  Notwithstanding this, their results also 
showed that after the introduction of deposit insurance, depositors demonstrate higher 
confidence as they were less prone to withdraw their deposits from weaker banks, thereby 
increasing the overall stability of the banking system. 
Using panel regressions on several hundred banks worldwide over the period 1995–2005, 
Forssbaeck (2011) demonstrated the effects of moral hazard when market discipline is 
lacking on the part of creditors and shareholders in the presence of limited deposit 
insurance.  The results of his baseline regressions confirm that the creditors policing role 
reduces bank risk in the presence of limited explicit deposit insurance.  In the agency-cost 
model, he found that banks with higher leverage are closely under the watchful eyes of their 
creditors and shareholders’ although this was not evident during the financial crisis.    His 
study partially confirms that ownership structure has a conditional effect on risk taking.      
2.3.2 Deposit Insurance and Financial Stability 
In the short run, a deposit insurance system is a common antidote that reduces the 
occurrence of bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) that creates banking system instability. 
Furthermore, a deposit insurance system is also a tool to ensure the stability of the banking 
system, which could eventually lead to increased financial intermediation (Demirguc-Kunt 
& Detragiache, 2002).  An explicit and formal deposit insurance scheme is considered as an 
important device to ensure bank stability.     
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Relatively, little empirical evidence has tested the implications of Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) analysis of a bank run.  This is partly due to insufficient data on the occurrence of 
bank runs.  However, an interesting exception is the study by Iyer and Puri (2008).  Their 
paper used micro depositor data in the Indian state of Gujarat to describe a run when a 
neighboring bank failed.  In line with Diamond and Dybvig prediction, they too showed 
that the implementation of deposit insurance helps limit the potential for bank runs, thus, 
ensuring financial stability.  Their findings further illustrated that bank run have a long 
lasting effect.  Preventing a run is crucial, as when a bank run occurs only a few depositors 
who run will return to the bank, which results in a reduction in banks' depositors’ base.  
Moreover, they identified that the social network effect is a potential important factor in 
exacerbating the contagion effects of bank runs.   
In estimating the probability of a banking crisis, Maysami and Sakellariou (2008) proved 
that explicit deposit insurance increased financial stability in a financially liberalized 
environment.  Their multivariate logit results showed that the benefits of explicit deposit 
insurance in preventing self-fulfilling bank runs prevail over the costs of moral hazard, 
resulting in a more stable banking system.  Likewise, DeLong and Saunders (2011) 
provided the evidence that deposit insurance increased the overall stability of the banking 
system.  They argued that deposit insurance also reduced discrimination by depositors 
between stronger and weaker banks as the presence of deposit insurance created a level 
playing field among deposit taking institutions.  In this circumstance, even with reduced 
depositor discipline, it still provides greater banking stability.  Finally, during the 
2007/2008 financial crisis, countries that implemented deposit insurance system were found 
to have lower bank risk and were systemically stable (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, & Zhu, 
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2012).  Their study proposes that the deposit insurance system provides stability during the 
financial crisis.  
2.3.3 Deposit Insurance and Financial Intermediation  
The restoration of depositors’ confidence is crucial as it not only encourages the individuals 
without prior banking arrangements to deposit money in the bank but also stretch the 
banks’ size in the form of increased deposits (see Chernykh & Cole, 2011).  A guarantee of 
depositors’ deposit, especially covering the majority of unsophisticated ones, would instill 
confidence and thus remove any incentive to participate in a bank run.  When the majority 
of these depositors are confident with the banks, panic withdrawal could be averted.  
Hence, by preventing bank run, banking stability would also be enhanced for financial 
intermediation.  This supports the view for deposit insurance as a financial safety net tool in 
preventing bank runs by creating financial stability and thereafter increased financial 
intermediation.    
The outcome of bank runs could be detrimental as it not only affects the stability of the 
entire economy but might reduce financial intermediation.  For example, during the credit 
crisis in 2007, Northern Rock, a British bank experienced a bank run (depositors’ 
simultaneously withdrawing deposits).  The subprime crisis sparked fears among depositors 
that the bank might become insolvent. The withdrawal of deposits from its depositors 
disrupted Northern Rock intermediation function, and the bank had to seek and received a 
liquidity support facility from the Bank of England.  More recently, the empirical evidence 
in Chernykh and Cole (2011) study revealed that in a stable banking system, financial 
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intermediation is greater for banks that have been long under the explicit deposit insurance 
scheme.   
Deposit insurance reduces depositors’ incentives to monitor the bank.  Explicit deposit 
insurance creates a more developed banking system in a country with good institutional 
framework (Cull, Senbet, & Sorge, 2005) that allows for increased financial intermediation.  
Very few empirical studies explain the benefits of deposit insurance.  Although Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002) found that an explicit deposit insurance scheme in countries 
with weak institutional environment is likely to lead to incidences of banking crisis, they 
also highlighted the benefits of deposit insurance in their findings.  They pointed out that 
introducing an explicit deposit insurance system “may create the basis for a more 
developed banking system that performs more ﬁnancial intermediation”.  A cross-country 
data over the 1980-1995 period was examined by Cull (1998) for evidence on the benefits 
of deposit insurance towards financial intermediation of a country.  His findings suggest 
that deposit insurance might increase depositor confidence in the banking system which 
could lead towards increased financial intermediation.   
The resulting evidence in Cull (1998) mirrors the study by Chernykh and Cole (2011) who 
examined the positive effect in the Russian banking system of the explicit deposit insurance 
system on the depositors and banks.  Their findings suggest that the banks’ financial 
intermediation increased in the presence of explicit deposit insurance system as evident 
from the increase level of bank deposits.  Apart from that, Maysami and Sakellariou (2008) 
found that explicit deposit insurance provides stability and reduces the probability of 
banking crisis occurrence, especially in countries with developed and liberalized banking 
system.  Therefore, it provides a conducive environment for financial intermediation.   
74 
 
2.3.4 Deposit Insurance and Operational Risk  
Most studies on bank risk in the literature have found significant positive evidence on the 
relationship between bank financial risks (e.g. Forssbaeck, 2011; DeLong & Saunders, 
2011; Ioannidou & Penas, 2010) but not specifically on operational risks. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, only Chernykh and Cole (2011) have investigated the relationship 
between deposit insurance and operational risks. Their study examines the changes in 
operational risk as measured by the ratio of bank loans to assets before and after the 
introduction of explicit deposit insurance system.  However, they found limited evidence 
that operational risk increased after the introduction of deposit insurance in Russia. On the 
other hand, the use of accounting data to measure operational risk is also conducted in the 
study by Lei and Tzu-Pu (2011) on bank efficiency, that measures operational risk as stock 
return volatility, return on asset volatility and equity to asset ratio. 
2.3.5 Deposit Insurance and Its Design Features 
Deposit insurance is certainly a “risk minimizer”, preventing panic runs by strengthening 
public confidence and hence supporting the stability of banking operations.  However, the 
deposit insurance system certainly cannot absolutely stop a banking crises or be the   
guarantee of banking  stability.  The financial crisis in 2007/2008 brought renewed 
attention to the concept and practice of deposit insurance by regulators around the world.  
Many countries that were yet to adopt or delayed in adopting a deposit insurance system 
had to do so in the wake of the crisis. During the crises, the prevention of bank runs to 
ensure financial stability was a vital concern for governments rather than the problem of 
moral hazard.  Australia, for instance, was among the last few countries to implement an 
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explicit deposit insurance system in October 2008.  Although deposit insurance is widely 
accepted, there is no universal design for a deposit insurance system.  The designs and 
institutional arrangement of deposit insurance vary according to the objectives of a deposit 
insurance system.  
Recognizing that the government would rescue the banks and reimburse the depositors, 
more risk-loving banks might be attracted to enter the market.  This is due to the fact, that 
there exist no differential costs in obtaining funds from the market among banks with good 
risk management or otherwise. A mandatory deposit insurance mitigates this adverse 
selection among banks (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002). Eventually, it would reduce 
the undesirable outcome where solvent and stable banks could lose their market share to the 
unstable banks due to regulatory arbitrage.   
Likewise, with the implementation of deposit insurance, the depositors might not have the 
incentive to monitor the banks' activities or check their solvency. A low coverage amount is 
less effective in restoring depositors’ confidence and might defeat the purpose of having a 
deposit insurance framework where bank runs could occur.  However, moral hazard 
problem could be greater with a higher coverage amount specified.    Hence, an effective 
coverage amount should be in place to balance between restoring depositors’ confidence 
and reducing moral hazard.  One could also argue that without explicit deposit insurance 
the depositors would diligently monitor the banks' activities (Hadad et al., 2011) and avoid 
depositing money with a fragile bank to avoid bearing risk in the event of the bank’s 
failure.  
In the early stages of introducing explicit deposit insurance system, most countries 
introduced an insurance premium that did not commensurate with risk.  Hence, the moral 
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hazard problem became worse, as there is no incentive for banks to avoid excessive risk in 
their portfolio.  Literature suggests that the risk-based premium method could mitigate the 
moral hazard problem (see for example Cull, Senbet, & Sorge, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004).  The International Association of 
Deposit Insurance survey as at 9
th
 September 2011, revealed that only 24 countries 
including Malaysia, introduced a risk-based deposit insurance premium replacing the flat 
rate premium to mitigate the moral hazard problem.  A sensitive risk-based premium 
towards bank risk would prompt the insured banks to think twice before embarking in a 
higher risk activity as the higher the risk in their asset portfolio the higher the premium the 
insured banks have to pay.  This is seen as some sort of penalty to the banks if they divulge 
in risky activities.  In addition, it is believed that because of this penalty, banks would have 
the incentives to improve their risk management practices.      
In many countries, especially prior to the 1998 financial crisis, there usually existed an 
unofficial or also known as the implicit deposit insurance system.  This situation also 
applies to Malaysia.  Malaysia only introduced an explicit deposit insurance system on 1 
September 2005. Prior to that, there existed an implicit deposit insurance system.  In 
addition, the insurance premium was not risk rated until in 2008.   In practice, whenever 
appropriate, countries modify the original design features of their deposit insurance system 
to ensure that the new and better design could be an effective tool to mitigate the moral 
hazard problem.  Similarly, the introduction of a credible(see Bank for International 
Settlements & International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2009; International 
Association of Deposit Insurers, 2008) explicit deposit insurance system is pertinent to not 
only limiting the government’s commitment to depositors, but also mitigating moral hazard 
problem, thereby ensuring increased financial intermediation of the banking system.  Thus, 
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the design of deposit insurance is crucial in ensuring banking stability rather than the 
duration of the deposit insurance system implementation itself.  
It is obvious that the institutional structure of deposit insurance system coupled with 
prudential supervision and regulation (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002) exert an 
important function in mitigating moral hazard problem to ensure financial stability.  If 
financial instability other than bank runs cause bank failures, then it cannot be concluded 
that deposit insurance system was unsuccessful.  Bank  failures could  be  due  to  many  
other  external factors  like  bad  economic  environment,  political  instability,  or  non-
credible design of the existing deposit insurance system and  thus  more  prone  to  banking  
instabilities.   
2.4 Summary  
This chapter discusses the differences between explicit and implicit deposit insurance 
system.  In addition, the four distinct design features of an explicit deposit insurance system 
are also described in detail.  
Further, the purpose of this chapter has been to establish the academic literature on the 
impact of the introduction of a deposit insurance system in relation to bank risks, taking 
into account the principle-agent moral hazard problem.  This chapter reveals the following 
research gap in the existing empirical literature.  First, the findings from these studies 
remain inconclusive.  Second, from the literature, the empirical studies sampling frame 
only includes conventional banks in the data analysis whereas the presence of Islamic 
banks in some of the countries has been excluded due to data limitation.  Third, none of the 
current country specific studies have investigated the effectiveness or credibility of the risk-
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based deposit insurance premium i.e. whether the risk-premium sensitivity significantly 
improves in the risk-based premium assessment method as the countries studied still 
continue to adopt the flat rate premium.    
Fourth, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no recent study has estimated the annual 
deposit insurance premium and investigated whether the magnitude of the annual premium 
paid is positively associated with bank risk.  In spite of this, some authors like Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2004) have investigated the relationship between bank risk and the risk 
premium assessment method using a dummy variable (flat rate versus risk-based premium).   
This thesis estimates the annual insurance premium paid by individual banks each year to 
describe the magnitude of the premium paid and its relationship with bank risk in a deposit 
insurance system.  Fifth, there is limited evidence that operational risk increased after the 
implementation of an explicit deposit insurance system in conventional as well as the 
Islamic banking system.  Finally, only very few previous studies have analyzed the 
implications of moral hazard on deposit insurance on bank level data. Therefore, this study 
attempts to deal with these issues in depth.  
Chapter 3 considers the methodological issues applicable to the design of the research and 
sets out the approach. 
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Chapter 3 : Hypotheses and Research Design 
3.0  Introduction 
The purpose of this current chapter is to examine methodological issues that affect the 
design of the study that lays out the research design framework for data collection and 
analysis.  The chapter is structured as follows:-  Section 3.1 outlines the hypotheses and 
research design for the first part of this study that addresses the first two research questions.  
Section 3.2 specifies the hypotheses and research design for the second part of this study 
that estimates the explanatory variable to be used in answering the final research question.  
The design of the research framework is formulated by discussing the research approach, 
sample and data selection and measurement of key variables. In Section 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, the 
hypotheses are developed based on the literature review. Section 3.1.3 and Section 3.2.3 
describe the two research methodologies adopted in this thesis.  Finally, Section 3.3 
provides the conclusion and summary. 
3.1 Part 1: Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk in a Dual Banking System  
This thesis investigates the implications of deposit insurance for both the conventional and 
Islamic banks.  Despite the increasing popularity of Islamic banking, studies undertaken on 
Islamic banking are still scarce.  According to the International Association of Deposit 
Insurance 2010 survey, only ten countries, including Malaysia have set up an Islamic 
deposit insurance system.  Table 3.1 shows the list of Islamic banking system with Islamic 
Deposit Insurance. 
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Table 3.1: List of Islamic Banking System with Islamic Deposit Insurance  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
       Source: International Association of Deposit Insurers website as at December 2012 
However, among the above mentioned 10 countries, only Malaysia administered the 
Islamic deposit funds separately, operated by a government owned deposit insurer and  
regulated under a specific legislation. Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey implemented their 
Islamic deposit insurance system in 2005 (Table 3.1).  Table 3.2 shows a comparison of the 
number of Islamic banks operating in a dual banking system in Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Turkey.  It is very apparent from this table that Malaysia has the most number of Islamic 
banks operating in a dual banking system.  Coincidentally, financial data are available and 
accessible for the Islamic banks in Malaysia unlike in Indonesia and Turkey.  Hence, 
Malaysia is an ideal sample to be used in this thesis to achieve its research objectives. 
Another important empirical question in addressing the bank risk is extending the risk 
analysis to include operational risk.  Operational risk is not a new risk.  However, the 
operational risk profile is becoming more complex, given the deregulation and 
                                                 
18 Sudan operates a full fledge Islamic banking system. 
Country Organization & 
Implementation Date 
Country Organization & 
Implementation Date 
1.Indonesia Indonesia Deposit  
Insurance Corporation 
(22 Sept 2005) 
6.Bahrain Central Bank of Bahrain 
(1993) 
2.Malaysia Malaysia Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
(1 Sept 2005) 
7.Jordan Jordan Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
(2000) 
3.Turkey Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund 
(December 2005) 
8.Bosnia Deposit Insurance 
Agency 
(2002) 
4.Singapore Singapore Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 
(April 2006) 
9.Kuwait Central Bank of Kuwait 
(2008) 
5.United 
Kingdom 
Financial Services 
Compensation 
Scheme 
(2001) 
10.Sudan
18
 Bank Deposit Security 
Fund 
(1996) 
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globalization of financial services, as well as the growing sophistication of financial 
technology, new business activities and delivery channels (Moosa, 2007).  It is evident that 
a bank's ability to properly assess and control, or even hedge itself against the negative 
economic consequences caused by operational risks is less developed than its management 
of credit and market risks (Flores, Bonson-Ponte, & Escobar-Rodriguez, 2006).  Major 
operational losses caused by internal or external fraud are a common cause of bank failures.  
For instance, fraud accounted for eight of the eleven bank failures in 2002 (Powell, 2003).   
Added to that, Islamic banks face an unique mix of risks and risk sharing arrangement 
resulting from the contractual design of the financial instruments, which is based on the 
principle of Shariah.  Errico and Farahbakhsh (1998) highlighted the importance of 
prudential regulation and supervision that includes greater emphasis on effective 
operational risk management.  Islamic banks are perceived to have higher operational risk 
exposures, as the operational risk definition by the Islamic Financial Services Board also 
includes the non-compliance of Shariah principle risk.  Shariah non-compliance risk is 
unique and significant in Islamic banks as it could lead to a loss of confidence in the bank 
by depositors, resulting in instability of the whole banking system (Tiby, 2011).   
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Table 3.2:  List of Islamic Banks in Countries that Implemented Islamic Deposit 
Insurance in 2005  
Country 
Organization & 
Implementation 
Date 
List  of Islamic Banks in Bankscope 
1.Indonesia Indonesia 
Deposit  
Insurance 
Corporation 
(22 Sept 2005) 
1. PT Bank BRI 
Syariah 
2. PT Bank, 
Muamalat Indonesia 
Tbk 
 
3.PT Bank Syariah 
Bukopin 
4. PT Bank Syariah 
Mandiri  
5. PT Bank 
Syariah Mega 
Indonesia 
2.Malaysia Malaysia Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation 
(1 Sept 2005) 
 
1. Affin Islamic 
Bank 
2. Alliance Islamic 
Bank 
3.AM Islamic Bank 
4. Bank Islam (M) 
Bhd 
5. Bank Muamalat  
6. CIMB-Islamic 
7. EONCap Islamic 
8. Hong Leong 
Islamic 
9. Maybank Islamic 
10. Public Islamic 
11. RHB Islamic 
12. Al-Rajhi Bank 
13. Asian Finance 
Bank 
14. HSBC Amanah 
15. Kuwait Finance 
House  
16. OCBC Islamic 
17. Standard 
Chartered 
Islamic 
18. Citibank 
(Islamic 
window)  
19. Deutsche 
Bank (Islamic 
window) 
#In terms of Islamic banking asset globally, Malaysian Islamic banks ranks higher in the world 
than its peers in Indonesia, Singapore, Turkey & the UK (Bankscope). 
3.Turkey Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund 
(December 2005) 
1.Asya Katilim 
Bankasi AS-Bank 
Asya 
2. Turkiye Finans 
Katilim Bankasi AS 
 
3. Kuveyt Turk 
Katilim Bankasi 
A.S.-Kuwait 
Turkish 
Participation Bank 
Inc 
4. Albaraka 
Turk 
Participation 
Bank-Albaraka 
Turk Katilim 
Bankasi AS) 
Source: Derived by author from several sources 
3.1.1 Hypotheses Development 
Financial risk refers to risk other than operational risk.  However, in this thesis, financial 
risk is confined to credit risk and insolvency risk.  Post deposit insurance could have an 
increasing or decreasing effect on the banks financial risk taking.  An increasing effect 
would signify the presence of moral hazard problem that could alters the riskiness of the 
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conventional banks (see for example Kansas, Wheelock & Wilson, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt 
& Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou & Penas, 2010).  A decreasing effect on financial risk taking 
could be due to credible design features of deposit insurance (Gropp & Vesala, 2004; 
Karels & McClatchey, 1999) coupled with prudential regulatory and supervisory measures 
(Cull, Senbet, & Sorge, 2005; Angkinand, 2009 ) that limit the banks’ appetite for 
excessive risk taking after the introduction of deposit insurance.  Contrary to previous 
empirical research, this study is unique as the banks in the sample include both the 
conventional and Islamic banks.  This study investigates the relationship between deposit 
insurance and banks risks in both the conventional and Islamic banks.   
As the majority evidence indicate that banks are inclined to take on more risk after the 
introduction of deposit insurance system, this study proposes the following testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases after the introduction of a 
deposit insurance system.  
Most studies on bank financial risk taking, as highlighted in the literature on deposit 
insurance, have found significant positive evidence on the relationship between bank risks 
and deposit insurance  (e.g. Forssbaeck, 2011; DeLong & Saunders, 2011; Ioannidou & 
Penas, 2010) but not specifically on operational risks.  Chernykh and Cole (2011)  
examined the relationship between deposit insurance and operational risks in conventional 
banks.  They found that operational risk taking increased after implementation of deposit 
insurance system, though the evidence was limited.  Empirical research on operational risk 
is a new area. Hitherto literature on empirical research is scarce (Chernobai, Jorion, & Yu, 
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2011). By definition
19
, operational risk includes the risk of losses from inadequate or failed 
internal process, people, system and external events.   
As mentioned, the introduction of a deposit insurance system could lead to an increase in 
the banks’ operational risk taking. An increasing effect would indicate that the moral 
hazard problem exists in the case of operational risk taking.  As people and technology are 
fundamental in operational risk, the banks are exposed to operational risk even before 
commencement of any banking transaction.  Frauds are reported to be one of the main 
factors that causes severe operational risk loss (Cope, Piche, & Walter, 2012).  Banks rely 
on technology, that is supported by people and which has created growth opportunities for 
the banks’.  In the presence of deposit insurance, banks are inclined to be more aggressive 
in expanding their business through new channels, such as agent banking and mobile 
banking, apart from existing channels such as internet banking and automated teller 
machine.  However, this technology-based channel is a potential operational risk concern, 
in the form of fraudulent act (security threat) in the online banking space, that could disrupt 
the banking business operations.  Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases after the introduction of a 
deposit insurance system. 
This study predicts a difference in the outcome between the conventional and Islamic banks 
risk taking ventures, either in financial risk or operational risk, following the 
implementation of deposit insurance.  The Islamic bank financing is based on a partnership 
relationship unlike the conventional banks’ lender and borrower relationship.  As a result, 
the Islamic banks share risks with their depositors instead of just lending out these deposits.  
                                                 
19
 As defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
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Although loss (other than the Islamic banks’ negligence) arising from the lending or 
investment activity is borne by the capital owner (depositor), the Islamic banks still appear 
to be less risky than the conventional banks due to the Shariah compliance features in the 
financing contract  (Cihak & Hess, 2008).  This makes the Islamic banking industry a more 
viable and competitive alternative to the conventional banks in the global market (Khan & 
Bhatti, 2008). The article by Abdelaziz Chase and Lateef A.M. Syed (2010) on the 
resilience of Islamic financial institutions during the global financial crisis covers aspects of 
Islamic banks’ risk management to address the crisis.  Their paper suggests that the Islamic 
banks operation, that is subjected to compliance of Islamic finance principle, has enabled 
the Islamic banks  to be more resilient than their conventional counterparts during the 
global financial crisis. 
However, if there is an increase effect on financial risk in the Islamic bank risk taking after 
the implementation of deposit insurance it would signify that the presence of deposit 
insurance also bring about similar problem of moral hazard in the Islamic banks as in the 
conventional banks.  Inadvertently, the Shariah principles might not be able to limit the 
incentives for excessive financial risk taking on the Islamic banks.  With the introduction of 
deposit insurance, Islamic banks take the extra cushion provided under the guarantee to 
improve their profitability by extending more loans but with less stringent credit 
assessment.  For example, loans extended without sufficient collateral and the rise in 
personal financing which is normally unsecured loans.   
Similarly, an increasing effect on operational risk taking by the conventional and Islamic 
banks post deposit insurance would signify that the banks place greater emphasis on 
enhancing their profitability with greater reliance on technology, and this amongst others is 
a tradeoff to higher exposure to operational risk. Specifically, an increasing effect on 
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operational risk in the Islamic banks indicates that the source of operational risk from 
people, systems and processes could be acute in the Islamic banks as Islamic banks are 
relatively new in comparison to the conventional banks. As an emerging industry, Islamic 
banking is less understood than conventional banking. It might not have the appropriate 
qualified professionals who are fully conversant with Islamic finance principles  (El-
Hawary, Grais, & Iqbal, 2007) to conduct Islamic banking operations.  These professionals 
might not operate according to Shariah compliance and could present an operational risk to 
the Islamic banks.  Likewise, greater reliance on technology and computer software,  
developed for conventional banks, might not be appropriate for the Islamic banks as the 
nature of their business differs (Khan & Ahmed, 2001).   
The effects of deposit insurance on financial risk and operational risk in the Islamic banks 
are yet to be tested.  Islamic banks face unique mix of risks and risk sharing arrangement, 
arising from the contractual design of the financial instruments, which is based on the 
principles of Shariah.  The theoretical underpinning of Islamic banks’ differs from the 
conventional bank particularly the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty) and compliance with 
the Shariah principles in the financing contract that constraint the Islamic banks from 
embarking on higher risk taking although there are incentives to do so.   
In contrast, the conventional banks do not operate under similar Shariah constraints.  The 
profit and loss sharing as a basic principle in Islamic banking is not applicable under the 
conventional banking.  Hence, the conventional banks’ greed and appetite for a higher 
return that is attached to higher risk taking is not limited (Kayed & Hassan, 2009).  The 
global financial crisis testifies that Islamic banks are more prudent i.e. taking less risk in 
comparison to their conventional counterparts.  Moreover, the Islamic banks are less 
severely affected by the financial crisis due to their Shariah compliance constraints (Al-
87 
 
Hamzani M, 2008).  For instance, Islamic banks distance their business activities from 
mortgage back debt securities like the subprime mortgages due to the prohibition of interest 
and speculation activities.  Further, the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty) constraints 
Islamic banks from being involved in high uncertainty investment projects.   
However, there is very little empirical evidence to support these arguments in the literature 
concerning deposit insurance, on Islamic banks. Generally as reported by Abdelaziz Chazi 
and Lateef A.M. Syed ( 2010), Islamic banks risk as measured by capital adequacy is lower 
than the conventional banks.  Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi (2011) also mentioned that 
Islamic banks exhibit lower credit risk than the conventional banks.  Hence, there should be 
no increase in bank risk taking either in terms of financial risk or operational risk, in the 
Islamic banks as it is evident that compliance with the Shariah principles in fact prevents 
them from taking excessive risks.  The experience of Malaysia, where Islamic banks and 
conventional banks have been operating alongside each other, might provide more insights 
when studying this relationship.   
Therefore, Islamic banks might react differently from conventional banks to the 
introduction of deposit insurance system.  Hence, the following hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis 3: Bank risk in the form of financial risk  increases in the conventional banks 
after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
Hypothesis 4: Bank risk in the form of operational risk  increases in the conventional banks 
after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
Hypothesis 5: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases in the Islamic banks after the 
introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
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Hypothesis 6: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in the Islamic banks after 
the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
3.1.2 Data  
The sample includes 22 conventional banks both local as well as foreign owned banks 
incorporated in Malaysia and 18 Islamic banks both local and foreign owned which are 
mandatory members’ bank under the explicit deposit insurance system administered by 
MDIC as shown in Table 3.3.  The study period is from 2002-2010.  Specifically this thesis 
uses the panel data to observe the changes to the repeated observation of the banks over the 
nine-year period (2002-2010) to investigate the moral hazard implication of the deposit 
insurance protection in the Malaysian dual banking system.  The panel data sets are 
constructed using balance sheet and income statement from audited year-end financial 
statement for each individual bank.    
For each bank, there should be at least three years of data. The period under study is from 
2002 until 2010.
20
  This study period is selected because from 2002 onwards the Malaysian 
conventional banks have undergone significant consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions. In addition, data prior to 2002 is often missing and therefore obtaining data for 
the earlier years is not feasible.
21
  The five deposit taking institutions namely the 
development financial institutions that are not mandatory members of the deposit insurance 
protection system are excluded from the sample. As state-owned banks, these DFIs
22
 have 
                                                 
20 From 2011 onwards the coverage limit has been increased to RM250,000 from the RM60,000 covered in 2006-2010. 
21 Most of the missing data from Bankscope is complemented by the data in annual report of individual bank sourced from either the 
bank’s website or the Bank Negara Malaysia Knowledge Management Centre (KMC). Where the data is not available in the bank’s 
website or KMC, attempts have been made to contact the bank requesting for the missing data.  However, almost all the banks contacted 
did not respond to our request for the missing data.       
22 The DFIs are also excluded from the sample as these banks are not required to report their risk weighted asset and risk weighted capital 
ratio and are regulated by the central bank under a different act (Development Financial Institutions Act 2002). 
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some form of implicit guarantee by the government on the deposits even before the 
introduction of deposit insurance system in Malaysia.  Other more specialized institutions, 
like investment banks are also not included in the sample. 
This thesis uses secondary data to gather information pertaining to the research topic.  The 
data were collected personally from the banks’ financial statements as of calendar year-end, 
from either the Bankscope
23
 or individual bank’s annual reports. The major data source is 
from the annual reports of individual banks, particularly the Islamic banks, as banks that 
operate Islamic banking window report their Islamic banking operations under the Income 
Statement notes to the account.  The breakdown of the Islamic banking activity is only 
reported in the notes to the account in the respective bank’s individual annual report.  The 
study uses the bank unconsolidated statements if available. 
                                                 
23 Bankscope is a database of bank account figures by Bureau Van Djik, a publisher of financial database. 
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Table 3.3: Sample Banks 
Conventional Banks 
Local banks (9 banks) Foreign banks (13 banks) 
1. Affin Bank Bhd 1.Bangkok Bank Bhd 8.J.P Morgan Chase Bank 
Bhd 
2. Alliance Bank Bhd 2.Bank of America (M) Bhd 9.OCBC Bank (M) Bhd 
3. AmBank (M) Bhd 3.Bank of China (M) Bhd 10.Standard Chartered Bank 
Malaysia Bhd 
4. CIMB Bank Bhd 4.Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi-
UFJ (M) Bhd 
11.The Bank of Nova Scotia 
Bhd 
5.Eon Bank Bhd 5.Citibank Bhd 12. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Bhd 
6. Hong Leong Bank Bhd  6.Deutsche Bank (M) Bhd 13.United Overseas Bank 
(M) Bhd 
7. Malayan Banking Bhd 7.HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd  
8. Public Bank Bhd   
9. RHB Bank Bhd   
Islamic Banks 
Local banks (11 banks) Foreign banks (7 banks) 
1.Affin Islamic Bank Bhd 7.EONCAP Islamic Bank 
Bhd 
1.Al-Rajhi Banking & 
Investment Corp (M) Bhd 
2.Aliance Islamic Bank Bhd 8. Hong Leong Islamic Bank 
Bhd 
2.Asian Finance Bank Bhd 
3.AmIslamic Bank Bhd 9.Maybank Islamic Bhd 3.HSBC Amanah Malaysia 
Bhd 
4.Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd 10.Public Islamic Bank Bhd 4. Kuwait Finance House 
(M) Bhd 
5.Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Bhd 
11.RHB Islamic Bank Bhd 5.OCBC Al-Amin Bank Bhd 
6.CIMB Islamic Bank Bhd  6.Standard Chartered Saadiq 
Bhd 
  7.Citibank (Islamic window) 
The sample for the conventional banks is a balanced panel while the panel is unbalanced 
for the Islamic banks sample.  Table 3.3 lists the name of banks included in the sample.  
The final sample is an unbalanced panel
24
 where different numbers of bank-year 
observations are used in each regression, depending on the availability of data for the 
variables included in that regression. The total number of banks included in this study is 
                                                 
24 The conventional bank sample is a balance panel.  On the contrary, the panel is unbalance for the Islamic banks as new foreign Islamic 
banks especially from the Middle East started their business operations in Malaysia only from 2005 onwards. 
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forty banks
25
 over a nine-year period. However, as this thesis employs the dynamic panel 
model, several observations had to be dropped from the total number of observations 
available due to the first differencing of the variables and lagged values of instruments for 
the endogenous variables in a GMM framework. 
3.1.3 Methodology -  A Dynamic Panel Regression 
In the literature on deposit insurance, two studies namely, Chernykh and Cole (2011) and 
Hadad et al. (2011) employ the random effect estimator and the Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) estimator, respectively.   
A panel regression could minimize the biased estimations resulting from aggregating 
individual units into a broad one. Essentially, there are three main advantages of panel 
regression summarized by Gujarati (2003) as follows: 
i. The combination of time series and cross section observations could provide more 
information, variability, degree of freedom with less collinearity among intercept dummy 
variables; 
ii. The relationship in a panel regression is examined by repeating the cross sectional 
observation, thereby providing better link to study the dynamic change or adjustment; and 
iii. Panel regression could obtain or detect some association that could not be found in 
either pure time-series or cross sectional regression.   
                                                 
25 Three foreign conventional banks namely the Industrial and Conventional Bank of China (Malaysia) Berhad, Mizuho Corporate Bank 
(Malaysia) Berhad and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Malaysia Berhad are excluded from this thesis sample as they do not meet 
the sample selection conditions in paragraph 2 of Section 3.1.2.    
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A panel regression could be divided into two structures, that is static panel and dynamic 
panel.  Depending on the rule, one could estimate the coefficients in the model based upon 
Random Effect (RE) estimator and Fixed Effect (FE) estimator under the static panel and 
the GMM and Seemingly Unrelated Regressor (SUR) under the dynamic panel (Baltagi, 
2005).  This thesis does not employ SUR because the panel data in this thesis is short.  SUR 
is based on a larger number of periods; T that approaches infinity than the number of 
groups (Baltagi, 2005).  The FE is the preferred estimator as the RE can be an invalid or 
inconsistent estimator when some of the regressors are associated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity effect.    Notwithstanding this, the FE estimator is unable to compute the time 
invariant coefficients like ownership and banking system inbuilt in the model of this thesis.   
Although the FE model could be corrected to estimate the time-invariant variables in the 
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable model, it doesn’t solve the correlation problem with 
the unobserved heterogeneity effect.  This is because the instrumental variables are selected 
from the explanatory variables in the model that might still cause the endogeneity problem.  
The instrumental variables are in fact the lagged variables among the regressors in the 
GMM model.  It is unlikely that this lagged variable would be correlated with the 
unobserved heterogeneity effect, so the dynamic panel solves the endogeneity problem.  As 
a result, this thesis opts for the dynamic panel instead of the static panel as it is more 
unbiased, precise and an efficient estimator, particularly in solving the endogeneity 
problem in a panel data model. Precisely, this thesis employs the System Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998).
26
  
                                                 
26 The system GMM estimator handles important modeling concern like the fixed effects, endogeneity of regressors and avoiding 
dynamic panel bias (Baum, 2006).  I employ the system GMM because system GMM handles my modeling concern in relation to  fixed 
effect.  The static panel particularly the Fixed Effect estimator is unable unable to compute this fixed effect ie. the time invariant 
coefficients like ownership and banking system inbuilt in the model of this thesis.  On the other hand, System GMM (specifically two-
step system GMM) allows the estimation of the time-invariant coefficients.  Although the system eliminates the time invariant variables, 
the time-invariant variable coefficient is estimate in first difference.  
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Arellano and Bond (1991) originated the standard GMM estimator, also known as first-
differenced GMM.  They applied the difference of each variable for both the dependent and 
explanatory variables in the regressions and introduced instrument variables from the 
lagged levels of the regressors.  However, the lagged levels of the regressors could be a 
poor instrument if there is serial correlation in the errors.  In this case, first-difference 
GMM might result in imprecise or even biased estimators.   
To overcome these shortcomings discussed above, the System GMM was introduced by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
27
  The System GMM generates 
efficient estimators of the dynamic model particularly when the time period is smaller than 
the number of groups.  The System GMM comprises two types of simultaneous equations, 
whereby one equation is in lagged difference of the dependent variable as instruments for 
equation in levels and lagged levels of dependent variables as instruments for equation in 
first difference. Concerning time-invariant variables, the system eliminates the effect of 
time-invariant variables in first difference but estimates in levels.   
Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate in their paper that the System GMM has smaller 
variances and is more efficient, thereby improving the precision in the estimator.  
Furthermore, it adjusts the biases of the time-invariant estimates while the momentary 
condition ensures no correlation between the unobservable effect/time-invariant effect/ 
instrument variables particularly when the time period is small. All in all, the dynamic 
panel addresses potential problems of endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
in the data.   
                                                 
27 They develop the System GMM framework to look for an efficient instrumental variable for dynamic panel data models.   
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Baltagi (2005) points up that the presence of a lagged dependent variable is a unique 
characteristic of a dynamic panel model.  This thesis model follows a one-way error 
component model and is written in the model as follows: 
                                     (3.1) 
                                  (3.2) 
Where: 
        - level of bank risk of bank i in period t 
       - the lagged of the bank risk 
        - a scalar 
       - the explanatory variables of bank i in period t 
       - a random term which comprise two components  
       - the unobservable time-invariant individual or firm specific effects 
      - the remainder disturbance  
Model 3.1 is first estimated by the ratio of non-performing loans over total asset (NPLTA) 
for our credit risk measure as the dependent variable.   Then, the same model is re-
estimated with the ZSCORE and the ratio of overhead expenses to total asset 
(OVERHEADTA) including five explanatory variables.  Instead of introducing interaction 
terms (Greene, 2012) between the deposit insurance variable and the key explanatory 
variable; banking system (conventional versus Islamic banks), we undertake a conservative 
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approach by splitting
28
 the conventional banks and Islamic banks into two samples.  Hence, 
this thesis runs three separate samples that comprise the full sample, Islamic banks sample 
and conventional banks sample.  Altogether there are three equations as below. 
NPLTAi,t =  β0YNPLTA it-1 +  β1POSTDIi,t + β2FOREIGNi,t + β3RWCRi,t   + β4SIZEi,t  + 
β5OVERHEADTAi,t + β6BKGSYSi,t + error i,t                                          (3.3) 
ZSCOREi,t  =  β0YZSCORE it-1 + β1POSTDIi,t + β2FOREIGNi,t + β3RWCRi,t   + β4SIZEi,t  + 
β5OVERHEADTAi,t + β6BKGSYSi,t + error i,t                                       (3.4) 
OVERHEADTAi,t =  β0YOVERHEADTA it-1 + β1POSTDIi,t + β2FOREIGNi,t + β3RWCRi,t   + 
β4SIZEi,t  + β5NPLTAi,t + β6BKGSYSi,t + error i,t                                               (3.5) 
Where:  
NPLTA i,t = the ratio of non-performing loans to total asset of bank i at time t   
ZSCORE i,t = the risk index of bank i at time t   
OVERHEADTA i,t = the ratio of overhead expenses to total asset of bank i at time t   
Y BANK RISK it-1  = the lagged dependent variable (NPLTA, ZSCORE & OVERHEADTA) of  
bank i at time t   
POSTDI i,t  = a dummy variable: one for the year 2006-2010 (after the introduction of 
deposit insurance system); zero for the year 2002-2005 (before the 
introduction of deposit insurance system)   
FOREIGN i,t  = a dummy variable: one for foreign banks; zero for local banks   
                                                 
28 The analysis is perform separately for conventional and Islamic banks to allow the researcher the opportunity to investigate how 
significantly different is the conventional and Islamic banks in their risk taking after the introduction of deposit insurance protection. 
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RWCR i,t  = the risk weighted capital ratio of bank i at time t   
SIZE i,t  = the natural log of total assets of bank i at time t   
BKGSYS i,t  = a dummy variable: one for conventional banks; zero for Islamic banks   
error i,t   = is the error term 
 3.1.3.1 Dependent variables
29
 
The focus of this thesis is to investigate the presence of moral hazard problem by way of 
increased bank risk taking after the introduction of a deposit insurance system.   
In the literature, the commonly used risk measures are the accounting-based measures that 
include non-performing loans, ZSCORE and liquidity ratio.  Some authors also use 
different measures of risk such as the abnormal return of publicly traded banks (DeLong & 
Saunders, 2011) and the credit quality of bank loans (Ioannidou & Penas, 2010).   The 
market measures of risk are not taken into account in this study as the Islamic banks are 
listed under their holdings company unlike the conventional banks.  Moreover, the study 
has to retain the richness of the Islamic banks’ data.  Hence, the first dependent variable for 
this thesis is the ratio of non-performing loans to asset; NPLTA (Maysami & Sakellariou, 
2008; Gropp & Vesala, 2004; Karels & McClatchey, 1999).  NPLTA is a proxy for credit 
risk and a high ratio in NPLTA indicates high risk.   
                                                 
29 The explanatory variables are selected based on the current deposit insurance literature.  The current literature presented in Section 2.5 
covers past studies that not only include cross sectional studies for developed and developing countries but also  country specific studies 
like US, Bolivia, Turkey, Indonesia and Russia.  The variables are derived from annual reports which are mostly the accounting-based 
variables.  The annual reports of the Malaysian firms not only meet the standard prescribed by the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 
but also comply with the international standard prescribed by the International Accounting Standards Board of the IFRS.       
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Besides NPLTA, ZSCORE is the second variable for bank risk in this thesis.  ZSCORE is a 
proxy for insolvency risk.  It is a bank risk index developed by Hannan and Hanweck in 
1988.  This thesis calculates the ZSCORE by following Hadad et al. (2011) and Boyd et al. 
(2006) but with two years moving windows. ZSCORE is the sum return on average asset 
and return on equity, divided by the standard deviation of the return on asset. 
The ZSCORE is calculated as follows: 
ZSCOREi,t = [ROAi,t + EQTAi,t] / StdROA             (3.6) 
Where  
ROAi,t  = return on average asset for bank i at time t 
EQTAi,t = equity capital to asset ratio for bank i at time t 
StdROA = the standard deviation of ROA 
In Equation (3.6), return on average asset is equal to net income divided by average total 
assets.  The total assets are averaged using the arithmetic mean of the value at the end of 
the year t and t-1.  Given that StdROA for each bank is computed over the observed time 
period, the ZSCORE value in this thesis is measured based on a time series approach.   
The ZSCORE is an index that incorporates three standard elements of bank risk namely the 
ROA, the standard deviation of ROA and equity capital.   The standard deviation of ROA 
in the formula imparts the volatility of bank earnings.  On the other hand, the bank 
performance is provided by the ROA itself.  The equity capital defines the available capital 
that a bank has to absorb unexpected losses.  To a degree, ZSCORE measures how much 
the earnings could decline until the bank has a negative book value and become insolvent 
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(Nash and Sinkey, 1997).  A higher ZSCORE implies a safer bank whereas a low ZSCORE 
implies a riskier bank.  
The final dependent variable for this thesis is operational risk.  In the literature concerning 
operational risk, the loss data is used to measure operational risk.  However, in 
circumstances where the operational loss data are unavailable, operational risk is measured 
using the accounting-based ratio.  Previous studies measure operational risk as bank loan to 
assets ratio and equity to asset ratio (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004; Chernykh & Cole, 
2011; Lei & Tzu-Pu; 2011).  Operational risk differs from financial risk (e.g. credit risk and 
insolvency risk) as it relates to how the bank management and staff operate, that is even 
prior to financing being made available to borrowers (Moosa I. A., 2007).   
Operational risks reflect the ethos prevalent among bank employees that could lead to 
deceit practices.  It propagates an environment where the various types of operational risk 
as outlined in Basel II, such as internal and external fraud, defective employment practices 
and security at workplace, unsuccessful ventures related to clients, products and business 
practices, destruction of physical assets, interruption to business and system breakdowns 
and implementation issue arise (Chernobai, Jorion, & Yu, 2011).   Hence, this thesis 
introduces management efficiency measured by the ratio of overhead expenses to total 
asset; OVERHEADTA as an alternative measure for operational risk.  As operational risk 
underpins managers’ responses, the OVERHEADTA ratio is more appropriate in 
measuring operational risk. A high ratio of OVERHEADTA might indicate management 
deficiencies or inefficiency.  
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 3.1.3.2 Explanatory Variable  
The explanatory variable in Equation (3.3) until (3.5) are defined as follows: 
Deposit Insurance Period 
A dummy variable that takes the value zero if the observation is from 2002-2005 (before 
the introduction of deposit insurance system) and one if the observation is from 2006-2010 
(after the introduction of deposit insurance system).  This is similar to that adopted in the   
current literature, for example Chernykh and Cole (2011) and Ioannidou and Penas (2010). 
3.1.3.3 Control Variables 
In investigating the relationship between risk and an explanatory variable, six other 
variables based on literature, that might have an impact on bank risk taking have to be 
taken into account.  These are controlled for in this thesis through Equation (3.3) until (3.5).   
Ownership 
Normally, foreign banks look at possible risk exposure in the initial stage of their product 
financial innovation by employing technology that is more sophisticated.  In addition, 
foreign banks would employ more sophisticated risk management tools and a better internal 
control system. Thus, the foreign banks have fewer incentives to increase their risk taking 
behavior in the presence of deposit insurance protection.  In addition, foreign banks have 
the capacity to diversify their asset portfolio across countries.  Therefore, this thesis has put 
in place control for bank ownership by differentiating the two types of ownership, such as 
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foreign and local banks present in the Malaysian banking system.  A dummy variable takes 
the value one if the bank is a foreign bank and zero if it is a local bank.  
Banking System 
As Malaysia is operating a dual banking system, this thesis controls for the banks’ license 
type through Equation (3.3) till (3.5) for the full banks sample. The banking system is 
divided into the conventional banking system and Islamic banking system.  All the 
conventional banks and Islamic banks are regulated by the Banking and Financial 
Institution Act (1989) and the Islamic Banking Act (1983) respectively. A dummy variable 
takes the value of one for conventional banks and zero for Islamic banks.   
Bank Size 
A larger bank has a greater potential to diversify its asset risk.  Alternatively, the larger a 
banking firm, the lower the information asymmetry that could lead to adverse decision 
making in their business and investment activities.  Larger banks have more information 
that they could obtain either in-house or from external financial analysts.  Moreover, 
depositors believe that regulators are unwilling to let larger banks (too big to fail banks) to 
fail, where implicit guarantees arise in the absence of the formal deposit insurance system. 
The failure of the “too big to fail banks” could trigger a contagion in the financial system.  
Hence, asset size is used to control for other factors that might affect the level of bank risk.  
If too-big-to-fail guarantees are present in the Malaysian banking system, one would expect 
very large banks to take more risks than smaller banks. 
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Regulatory variables: Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (RWCR)  
Capital is the primary cushion against adverse changes in the bank’s asset quality and 
earnings. RWCR is controlled in this thesis equation to provide different levels of riskiness 
among the banks due to regulatory constraints. A rise in RWCR indicates that banks are 
decreasing their assets or increasing their capital which would have a positive effect on 
bank operations as banks have sufficient buffer to handle unexpected adverse shock.  When 
banks reduce lending, leverage falls as assets are comprised mostly of loans. Thus, 
regulatory pressure could prevent the banks from taking high risks following the 
introduction of deposit insurance. 
Risk Variables 
The inclusion of the risk variables NPLTA and OVERHEADTA are to control the bank’s 
risk taking behavior.  The thesis incorporates the credit risk measures; NPLTA as one of the 
control variables to redress the impact of deposit insurance on operational risk while 
OVERHEADTA is controlled in the estimates for credit risk and insolvency risk (financial 
risk).   
General Macroeconomic Conditions  
As in other studies, this thesis incorporates elements to check macroeconomic situation. 
Earlier studies such as Mannasoo and Mayes (2009) and Bonfim (2009) have shown that 
adverse macroeconomic conditions normally herald bank failures. Further, the present 
world predicament calls for a good grasp of the potential consequences of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions on the buoyancy of the banking system. Chernykh and Cole 
(2011) applied year dummy variables to control for overall macroeconomic situations. On 
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the other hand, Ioannidou and Penas (2010) used among others the Gross Domestic Product 
growth rate and the inflation rate to control for general macroeconomic conditions.   
Since macroeconomic factors are common factors that affect all the banks in a certain 
period, though they vary from period to period, their effects could be captured simply by 
including time-specific effects in the regression.  The time dummies is a collection of 
dummy variables; (n=T-1) where T is the number of years included in the study which are 
equal to 1 for one given year and zero otherwise. The inclusion of time fixed effects is one 
way of capturing the effect of unobservable common factors that vary with time but are 
constant for all banks.  As there are nine years in the sample period, the research would 
have eight time dummies.  Similar to Chernykh and Cole (2011), this study uses year 
dummy variables to control for general macroeconomics conditions such as inflation, 
household income, economic growth etc. and seasonal effects apart from the presence of 
explicit deposit insurance itself.   
3.2 Part 2: Risk-Premium Sensitivity and Bank Risk  
Literature for cross sectional study suggests that the risk-based premium method would 
mitigate the moral hazard problem (see for example Hovakimian et al., 2003; Cull, Senbet, 
& Sorge, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004).  
However, none of the current country specific empirical studies in the deposit insurance 
literature have thus far examined the sensitivity of the deposit insurance premium with 
bank risks in a risk-based assessment method as these country specific studies (for example, 
Russia, Bolivia and Indonesia) adopted the flat rate insurance premium.   
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In Malaysia, the flat-rate premium of 0.06% was imposed during the initial stage of  
implementation of deposit insurance, that is from 2006 until 2007.  Thereafter, the risk-
based premium system was introduced in 2008 and continues to be in place until today.  
Under a risk-based premium, each member banks’ annual premium is calculated differently 
based on the prescribed premium rate according to their individual risk categories.   
3.2.1 Hypotheses Development 
This part of the thesis examines the sensitivity of deposit insurance premium towards bank 
risks in the risk-based premium assessment method in mitigating the moral hazard problem.  
A positive relationship between the risk-based premium and bank risks illustrates that the 
risk-premium sensitivity improves in the risk-based premium assessment method.  Under 
the risk-based premium assessment method, banks that fall under the high-risk category pay 
a higher premium rate than those in the low risk category.  Hence, this would encourage the 
former to improve its risk management practices.  
On the other hand, this thesis would also explain whether the magnitude of annual premium 
paid by banks is positively associated with bank risks.  The annual premium paid is 
calculated based on the prescribed risk-premium rate and total insured deposits. If the risk-
based deposit insurance premium is positively associated with bank risk, then the 
government risk-based deposit insurance policy would effectively mitigate the moral 
hazard problem.  At the same time, banks are subject to a minimum annual premium of 
RM250,000.  In relation to this, if the actual premium estimated under the risk-based 
premium is lower than the stipulated amount, the banks would still have to pay a minimum 
mandatory premium of RM250,000.  Therefore, the annual premium paid by banks does 
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not necessarily reflect the riskiness of banks.  These arguments underlie the following 
testable hypothesis: 
H7: The risk-premium sensitivity significantly improves in the risk-based premium 
assessment method. 
H8: The magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively associated with the bank risk. 
3.2.2 Data 1: Estimation of Annual Insurance Premium 
Under this section, data are collected to estimate the annual premium paid.  Malaysian 
Deposit Insurer Corporation’s (MDIC’s) methodology is employed to estimate the annual 
premium as it allows for computation of the premium paid by conventional banks and 
Islamic banks. Table 3.4 lists down the data requirement for the formula as laid out in 
Section 3.2.3.  All the data for the period 2006-2010 were obtained directly from various 
issues of the annual reports for all the 22 conventional and 18 Islamic banks that are 
available on the banks’ websites or at Bank Negara Malaysia Knowledge Management 
Centre.  In determining the selection of data and estimation of the annual premium, experts 
from MDIC were consulted.  These experts verified that the annual premium estimated is 
relatively consistent with the actual figures.   
The estimated annual premium, including the estimated value for the five quantitative 
criteria in Table 3.4 and the total insured deposits value under Section 3.2.3.2.2 are deemed 
as sensitive information.  A confidentiality agreement was signed between MDIC and the 
thesis author. Amongst others, the author is prohibited from disclosing any data pertaining 
to the estimation of the banks’ annual insurance premium to any third party.   
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Table 3.4: Summary of Criteria and Data Requirement  
Criteria Data Requirement 
Prescribed Premium Rate 
Capital 1. Risk weighted capital ratio 
2. Core capital ratio 
Profitability 
For conventional banks 1. Profit before tax  
2. Total risk weighted assets 
For Islamic banks 1. Profit before tax 
2. Profit equalization reserve (PER)  
3. PER written back 
4. Capital 
5. Specific investment deposit  
6. General investment deposit 
7. Total risk weighted assets 
Asset Quality 
 1. Total impaired loans 
2. Total individual impairment provisions  
3. Capital base 
4. Gross loans 
Asset Concentration 
 1. Loans to household sector 
2. Total loans outstanding 
Asset Growth 
 1. Total risk-weighted assets 
2. Risk weighted assets for operational risk  
3. Total assets 
4. Credit equivalent of off-balance sheet 
items 
Total Insured Deposits 
Deposits from Customers  1.Government & Statutory Bodies 
 2.Business Enterprise 
 3.Individuals 
 4.Others 
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3.2.3 Methodology 1: Estimation of Annual Premium Paid 
The International Association of Deposit Insurer (IADI) issued a General Guidance for 
Developing Differential Premium Systems  in February 2005 (updated October 2011) as a 
reference for countries considering the adoption of a risk-based insurance premium system.  
Although a flat-rate premium is easily calculated and administered, the flat rate premium 
does not capture the bank’s risk profile in the computation of the premium paid by the 
banks.  Moreover, the flat rate premium is perceived as unfair as the same premium rate is 
charged to all banks regardless of their level of risk.  As a result, many countries are 
contemplating to shift from the flat rate premium to the risk-based premium.  Nevertheless, 
the risk-based premium system requires resources to administer the system appropriately as 
measurement and pricing of risk is a complicated task.  Further, sound accounting practices 
and financial reporting disclosure are essential.   
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) introduced the first recorded risk-based 
premium system in 1993.  Since then, the number of countries adopting a risk-based 
premium has grown with an estimated twenty-four countries.  Based on the results of the 
Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation International Deposit Insurance Survey in 2003 and 
2008 and IADI surveys, the countries shown in Table 3.5 had adopted the risk-based 
premium system. 
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Table 3.5: List of Countries Adopting the Risk-based Insurance Premium       
Argentina Italy Nicaragua Singapore 
Canada Kazakhstan Nigeria Sweden 
Colombia Malaysia Peru Taiwan 
Finland Marshal Island Poland Turkey 
France Micronesia Portugal United States 
Germany Netherlands Romania Uruguay 
Source: International Association of Deposit Insurers website as at December 2012 
 
There is no one universal approach to differentiate bank risk.  However, the general 
methodologies comprise mainly the objective (quantitative) approach or subjective 
(qualitative) approach and a combination of both.  For the quantitative approach, financial 
data are gathered to assess risk.  Usually, one or a combination of quantitative factors is 
used to differentiate risk among banks. On the other hand, qualitative approach relies on 
regulatory and supervisory judgments or rating system and information.   The qualitative 
assessment provides an indication, such as the current and future financial status of a bank 
and compliance with existing guidelines that is not captured by quantitative approach. Such 
information is only exclusively accessible by regulators, supervisors and the like. In 
comparison, the major advantage of using the quantitative approach is its transparency and 
it is less susceptible to arguments than a subjective approach.  This thesis estimates the 
annual premium paid
30
 by the banks using the quantitative approach with modifications 
based on MDIC guidelines
31
 accessible from the website.   
                                                 
30
 I wish to thank the experts from the Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation (MDIC) for their excellent coaching in understanding 
the annual premium methodology.  I signed the Confidentiality Agreement as required by the MDIC legal advisor. The Confidentiality 
Agreement is attached in the Appendix.  By signing the Confidentiality Agreement, I am prohibited from disclosing any data pertaining 
to the estimation of the five quantitative criteria and total insured deposits in the thesis.  The data for these five criteria is deemed as 
sensitive information.  
31 The banks annual premium is estimated by the author based on the Guidelines on Total Insured Deposits with maximum deposit 
coverage of RM60,000, Guidelines on the Differential Premium System and Guidelines for Deposit Insurance Coverage for Deposits 
issued by Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation.  These Guidelines are retrievable at 
http://www.MDIC.gov.my/downloads/2012/gpcp/GL1_A1_2011_TID-ENG.pdf , 
http://www.MDIC.gov.my/downloads/2012/gpcp/GL2_A1_2011_DPS-ENG.pdf and 
http://www.MDIC.gov.my/downloads/2012/gpcp/GL10_2011_COV-ENG.pdf respectively. 
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3.2.3.1 Flat rate Premium 
In the early years (2006-2007) of Malaysia’s adoption of a deposit insurance system, the 
annual premium paid by the insured members’ bank was based on a flat rate premium 
system.  Under this system, the annual premium rate was calculated as either 0.06% of total 
insured deposits or 0.02% of total deposits, subject to a minimum premium of RM250,000  
as  required  by  the  MDIC  Act. This requirement applied to all insured members,’ both 
conventional and Islamic banks.  The flat rate premium was calculated based on the 
Equation (3.7) or (3.8).     
Annual premium = Total insured deposits X 0.06%                      (3.7) 
Total insured deposits are defined
32
 as follows  
(a) Islamic  and  conventional  deposits  placed  with  a  member  such  as  savings, demand 
and fixed deposits;   
 (b)  Bank  drafts,  cheques  or  other  instruments  or  payment  instructions  entered  
into  a  designated  payment  system  under  subsection  6(1)  of  the  Payments  
System Act 2003; and  
(c)   Foreign currency deposits.  
or 
Annual premium = Total deposits X 0.02%            (3.8) 
                                                 
32 Definition is as per MDIC Guidelines on Total Insured Deposits: Calculation and Completion of Return dated 4 th March 2011.  
Accessible at http://www.pidm.gov.my/downloads/2012/gpcp/gl_tid2011_ENG.pdf 
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For consistency, this thesis estimates the annual insurance premium based on Equation 
(3.7) for the 2006-2007 period under the flat rate insurance system. 
3.2.3.2 Risk-based Premium 
The objective of a risk-based premium is to provide incentives for the banks to avoid 
excessive risk taking and introduce more fairness into the premium assessment process.  
This is because the risk-based assessment warrants banks with a higher risk profile to pay 
higher premiums than the banks with lower risks. The risk-based premium provides for the 
segregation of the higher risk banks in a different category from the lower risk banks.   
The risk-based premium replaced the flat-rate premium in 2008.  In retrospective, this 
thesis adopted the risk based premium system methodology applying only the quantitative 
approach
33
 based on MDIC Guidelines on The Differential Premium Systems issued on 4
th
 
March 2011.
34
  The objectives of the Malaysian risk based premium includes (i) providing 
incentives for member institutions to adopt sound risk management practices; (ii) 
differentiating members’ bank according to their risk profiles; (iii) introducing more 
fairness into the premium assessment process; and (iv) promoting financial stability. 
In line with most countries, Malaysia also adopted a combined approach of both 
quantitative and qualitative measures to assess the risk of members’ bank under the risk 
based premium.  Similar to the Equation (3.7), the annual premium under the risk-based 
premium is calculated as the function of total insured deposit.  However, the premium rate 
is no longer the flat 0.06% rate but is replaced with a prescribed differential premium rate 
                                                 
33 Malaysia  adopted a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in the risk-based premium system methodology. The 
previous MDIC guidelines issued on the risk-based premium system are based on data reported under Bank Negara Malaysia Financial 
Institutions Statistical System (BNM FISS) which has restricted accessibility to only Bank Negara Malaysia and respective banks.  
34 These guidelines supersede the Guidelines on the Differential Premium Systems issued in 2008 and Amendment to Section 6 of the 
Guidelines on the Differential Premium Systems issued in 2009. 
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based on the bank's risk profile. The premium rate is calculated based on the quantitative 
measures.  Following this, the annual premium under the risk-based premium system is 
equated as follows: 
Annual premium = Total insured deposits X Prescribed premium rate                            (3.9) 
3.2.3.2.1 Prescribed Premium Rate Computation: Quantitative Criteria 
In Equation (3.9), the prescribed annual premium rate is derived based on several factors 
under the quantitative and qualitative criteria, as summarized in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Summary of Criteria, Measures and Scores 
CRITERIA MAXIMUM SCORE 
QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA 60 
Capital 20 
Risk weighted capital ratio 10 
Core capital ratio 10 
Profitability 15 
Return on risk weighted Asset Ratio 8 
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility 7 
Asset Quality 15 
Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio 8 
Net Impaired Loans Ratio  7 
Asset Concentration 5 
Household Sector Concentration Ratio; and  5 
Aggregate Sector Loans Concentration Ratio  
Asset Growth 5 
Risk weighted Assets to Total Assets Ratio; and 5 
Total Asset Growth Ratio  
*QUALITATIVE CRITERIA 40 
Supervisory Rating 35 
Other Information 5 
TOTAL 100 
*Excluded from this thesis computation due to data limitation.  This thesis only employs the quantitative criteria.   
The prescribe premium rate is estimated based on a scoring measure as shown in Table 3.7 
below.  The prescribed premium rate would classify members’ bank into one of the four 
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premium categories based on their risk-based premium score with category 1 representing 
the lowest risk profile (best) and 4 representing the highest risk profiles (worst).  The 
lowest premium rate is imposed for the best risk profile while the worst risk profile is 
charged the highest premium rate.  A score of less than 50 out of 100 would be placed in 
the highest premium category (Category 4) while those with a score of 85 or higher would 
fall under the lowest premium category (Category 1).   
Table 3.7: Premium Rate Under the Risk-based System 
Premium 
Category 
(Column 1) 
Score 
(Column 2) 
Premium Rate 
(Column 3) 
1 ≥ 85 0.03% 
2 ≥ 65 but < 
85 
0.06% 
3 ≥ 50 but < 
65 
0.12% 
4 < 50 0.24% 
   
In Table 3.7, members’ bank are assessed and classified into different premium categories 
in an assessment year based on the quantitative criteria. In this study the quantitative 
criteria are given a total score of 100.
35
  
The quantitative criterion generally uses factual data or data from the financial statements 
for premium assessment.  The quantitative measures used by the insured Malaysian banks 
consist of five factors namely the capital, profitability, asset quality, asset concentration and 
asset growth with each factor represented by two proxies. The detail calculation is 
demonstrated under subsection (i) to (v) below. 
                                                 
35 In the MDIC Guidelines the risk-based premium is calculated based on a quantitative and qualitative criteria.  The quantitative criteria 
is given a total score of 60 while a score of 40 is assigned to the qualitative criteria.  The factors under the qualitative criteria are 
confidential with limited access to the central bank (BNM) and the deposit insurer (MDIC).  Overall the Malaysian banking system is in a 
healthy state as there are no reported bank failures during the study period.  Hence, there is unlikely to be a big difference in the rating 
amongst the banks. Therefore, the annual premium is estimated based on only the quantitative criteria. 
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i. Capital Factor  
The capital factor is further divided into two proxies that is the risk weighted capital ratio 
(%) and a core capital ratio (%).  The formula for the risk weighted capital ratio is as 
follows: 
(
            
                         
)        
                 (3.10) 
Equation (3.10) would be used to calculate the risk weighted capital ratio.  The ratio 
obtained would be matched against the scoring grid in Table 3.8 to determine the score for 
the members’ bank.  Table 3.8 outlines the scoring grid for the risk weighted capital ratio.  
Table 3.8: Scoring Grid – Risk Weighted Capital Ratio (%) 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio 
Range of Results Score 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio ≥  12%    10 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio ≥  11% but  < 12% 8 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio ≥  10% but  < 11% 6 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio ≥  9% but  < 10%   4 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio ≥  8% but  < 9% 2 
Risk Weighted Capital Ratio < 8% 0 
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A risk weighted capital ratio of 12% and higher earns the full score of 10 while those banks 
with a score of below 8% do not get any score under the risk weighted capital ratio proxy.   
The second proxy for the capital factor is the core capital ratio.  The formula for the core 
capital ratio is as follows: 
(
            
                         
)      
                (3.11) 
The core capital ratio obtained would be scored based on the following range of results as 
shown in Table 3.9.  
Table 3.9: Scoring Grid – Core Capital Ratio (%) 
Core Capital Ratio 
Range of Results Score 
Core Capital Ratio ≥ 8%   10 
Core Capital Ratio ≥ 7% but < 8% 8 
Core Capital Ratio ≥ 6% but < 7% 6 
Core Capital Ratio ≥ 5% but < 6% 4 
Core Capital Ratio ≥ 4% but < 5% 2 
Core Capital Ratio < 4% 0 
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A core capital ratio of 8% and higher gets the full score of 10 while those banks with a 
score of below 4% would not get any score under the core capital ratio proxy. 
ii. Profitability Factor 
The profitability factor is further divided into two proxies that is the return on risk weighted 
asset ratio (%) and mean adjusted return ratio (%).  The profitability factor formula for the 
conventional banks differ from the Islamic banks. There are two formulas used to calculate 
the return on risk weighted asset ratio for the conventional and Islamic banks respectively, 
as follows: 
Return on Risk Weighted Asset Ratio -For Conventional Banks 
                                       
 [(
                          
                        
                         
)   (
                          
                                   
                         
)]   
      
                                          (3.12) 
Return on Risk Weighted Asset Ratio -For Islamic Banks 
The Profit/(Loss) Before Taxation and Zakat is adjusted as follows: 
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     (3.13)
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The return on risk weighted asset ratio obtained would be scored based on the following 
range of results as shown in Table 3.10.  
Table 3.10: Scoring Grid – Return on Risk Weighted Asset Ratio (%) 
Return on Risk Weighted Assets Ratio 
Range of Results Score 
Return on Risk Weighted Assets Ratio ≥  2.75%   8 
Return on Risk Weighted Assets Ratio ≥  2.25% but < 2.75% 6 
Return on Risk Weighted Assets Ratio ≥  1.75% but < 2.25% 4 
Return on Risk Weighted Assets Ratio ≥  1.00% but < 1.75% 2 
Return on Risk Weighted Assets Ratio < 1.00% 0 
A return on the risk weighted asset ratio of 2.75% and higher would get the full score of 8 
while those banks with a score of below 1% would not get any score under the return on 
risk weighted asset ratio proxy. 
The second proxy for the profitability factor is the mean adjusted return volatility.  The 
formula for the mean adjusted return volatility is as follows: 
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility 
                                                                        
                                                           
 
                (3.14) 
Where the semi-deviation of profit or loss before taxation and zakat over 3 years is 
calculated as per Equation (3.15) while the mean profit or loss before taxation and zakat 
over 3 years is calculated using Equation (3.16). 
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√
                  
     
     
(3.15) 
Where a = Mean profit or loss before taxation over 3 years 
         
 
     
 (3.16) 
 b = Profit or loss before taxation and zakat for the 1
st
 preceding assessment year 
 c =  Profit or loss before taxation and zakat for the 2
nd
 preceding assessment year 
 d = Profit or loss before taxation and zakat for the 3
rd
 preceding assessment year 
The mean adjusted return volatility obtained would be scored based on the following range 
of results as in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Scoring Grid – Mean Adjusted Return Volatility  
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility 
Range of Results Score 
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility ≥ 0 but ≤ 0.3 7 
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility > 0.3 but ≤ 0.7 4 
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility > 0.7 0 
Mean Adjusted Return Volatility is negative or the mean profit /  
(loss) before tax and zakat is zero 
0 
A mean adjusted return volatility of between 0 and 0.3 would obtain the full score of 7 
while those banks with a score of below 0.7 or negative would not get any score under the 
mean adjusted return volatility. 
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iii. Asset Quality Factor 
To measure asset quality, the two proxies used are the net impaired loans to capital base 
ratio and total impaired loans ratio.    
Net Impaired Loans To Capital Base Ratio 
The formula for the net impaired loans to capital base ratio is as follows: 
[
                                                            
            
]       
^This is also referred to as Total Individual Assessment Allowance             (3.17) 
 
The net impaired loans to capital base ratio obtained would be scored based on the 
following range of results as in Table 3.12. 
Table 3.12: Scoring Grid – Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio  
Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio 
Range of Results Score 
Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio ≤  20%   8 
Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio > 20% but  ≤  40% 5 
Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio > 40% but  ≤  60% 2 
Net Impaired Loans to Capital Base Ratio > 60% 0 
A bank with the best net impaired loans to capital base ratio of 20% or less would obtain 
the full score of 8 while those banks with a larger than 60% net impaired loans to capital 
base ratio would be worse off with a zero score.   
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Total Impaired Loans Ratio 
The second proxy for the asset quality factor is the total impaired loans ratio.  The formula 
for the total impaired loans ratio is as follows: 
[
                    
           
]       
                            (3.18) 
The total impaired loans ratio obtained would be scored based on the following range of 
results as in Table 3.13. 
Table 3.13: Scoring Grid – Total Impaired Loans Ratio 
Total Impaired Loans Ratio 
Range of Results Score 
Total Impaired Loans Ratio ≤ 4%   7 
Total Impaired Loans Ratio > 4% but  ≤ 6% 5 
Total Impaired Loans Ratio > 6% but  ≤ 8% 3 
Total Impaired Loans Ratio > 8% but  ≤ 10% 1 
Total Impaired Loans Ratio > 10% 0 
The lower the total impaired loan ratio the better score a bank would obtain for its asset 
quality.  A bank with the best asset quality would have a total impaired loan ratio of 4% 
and less.  Subsequently, this bank would get the highest score of 7 for its asset quality.  
Meanwhile, banks with total impaired loan ratio of higher than 10% have poor asset quality 
and obtain a zero score.  
iv. Asset Concentration Factor 
Unlike the previous factors like capital, profitability and asset quality; the asset 
concentration factor proxy data requirement were not all available in the annual reports or 
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financial statements as the data are reported under the Bank Negara Malaysia Financial 
Institutions Statistical System (BNMs FISS).  Therefore, this thesis used instead available 
information in the banks’ annual reports that closely represented the sectors involved.    
To measure asset concentration, the two proxies used are the household sector 
concentration ratio and aggregate sector loans concentration ratio.    
Household Sector Concentration Ratio 
The formula for the household sector concentration ratio is as follows: 
[
                        
                       
]       
                                           (3.19) 
Before determining the asset concentration score, the aggregate sector loans concentration 
ratio has to be calculated first, in two steps as below:-   
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Aggregate Sector Loans Concentration Ratio 
Equation (3.20) determines loans by sectors exceeding 20% of total loans outstanding, 
which defines the aggregate sector loans concentration ratio (as listed in Table 3.14).   
[
                
                       
]        
                                                                 (3.20)    
Step 1: Determine the percentage of each loans by sector out of the total loans outstanding 
Step 2: Aggregate each loan by sector that exceeds 20% i.e. sum of all loans by sectors 
exceeds 20%, then divide with total loans outstanding. 
Table 3.14: Lending by Sectors 
No. Sector No. Sector 
1 Primary Agriculture 7 Transport, Storage and Communication 
2 Mining and Quarrying 8 Finance, Insurance and Business 
Activities 
3 Manufacturing (including Agro-
Based) 
9 Education, Health and Others 
4 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 10 Adjusted Household  (excluding  
purchase  of residential property and 
transport vehicles) 
 
5 Construction and Real Estate 
Activities 
11 Purchase of Residential Property 
6 Wholesale  and  Retail  Trade  and 
Restaurants and Hotels 
12 Purchase of Transport Vehicles 
After both the household sector concentration ratio and aggregate sector loans 
concentration ratio are calculated using Equation (3.19) and (3.20), respectively, the asset 
concentration factor is scored based on the following range of results as in Table 3.15.
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Table 3.15: Scoring Grid – Asset Concentration  
Asset Concentration 
Range of Results 
Household Sector  
Concentration Ratio 
Aggregate Sector Loans  
Concentration Ratio - exposures  
of loans by sectors exceeding 20%  
of loan outstanding 
Score 
Household  Sector  ≥  
55%  of  Total  Loans  
Outstanding 
Aggregate  Sector  Loans  
Concentration ≤ 50% 
5 
Aggregate  Sector  Loans  
Concentration > 50% 
3 
Household  Sector  <  
55%  of  Total  Loans  
Outstanding 
Aggregate  Sector  Loans  
Concentration ≤ 35% 
5 
Aggregate  Sector  Loans  
Concentration > 35% but ≤ 50% 
3 
Aggregate  Sector  Loans  
Concentration > 50% but ≤ 75% 
1 
Aggregate  Sector  Loans  
Concentration > 75% 
0 
The asset concentration factor penalizes banks that have exposures of loans by sectors 
exceeding 20% of total loan outstanding.  From Table 3.15, it is noted that a bank with a 
household sector of 55% or higher of total loans outstanding is better off in comparison to a 
bank with lower than 55% household sector of total loans outstanding as the lowest score of 
the former is 3 while the latter is 0.  
v. Asset Growth Factor 
The final quantitative criteria is the asset growth factor.  With the exception of asset 
concentration factor, akin to the capital profitability and asset quality factor, the asset 
growth data are also available in the annual reports or financial statements of the individual 
members’ bank.  To measure asset growth, the two proxies used are the risk weighted 
assets to total assets ratio and total assets growth ratio.   The equation for the risk weighted 
assets to total assets ratio is as follows: 
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[
                                                                  
                                                        
]      
                    (3.21) 
Prior to determining the asset growth score, both the risk weighted assets to total assets 
ratio and the total assets growth ratio have to be calculated.  Equation (3.22) corresponds 
with the total assets growth ratio calculation.   
[(
                                          ⁄
                                          ⁄
)   ]       
                  (3.22) 
Assets Year 1: Refers to total assets and credit equivalent of off-balance sheet items as of  
31 December of the fourth year preceding the assessment year.   
Assets Year 2: Refers to total assets and credit equivalent of off-balance sheet items as of  
31 December of the third year preceding the assessment year.   
Assets Year 3: Refers to total assets and credit equivalent of off-balance sheet items as of  
31 December of the second year preceding the assessment year.   
Assets Year 4: Refers to total assets and credit equivalent of off-balance sheet items as of  
31 December of the first year preceding the assessment year.    
 
After both the risk weighted assets to total assets ratio and the total assets growth ratio have 
been calculated using Equation (3.21) and (3.22) respectively, the asset growth factor 
would be scored based on the following range of results as shown in Table 3.16. 
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Table 3.16: Scoring Grid – Asset Growth  
Asset Growth 
Range of Results 
Risk Weighted Assets to Total  
Assets Ratio 
Total Asset Growth Ratio Score 
Risk Weighted  Assets  to  Total  
Assets Ratio < 70% 
Total  Asset  Growth  Ratio  
< 20% 
5 
Risk Weighted  Assets  to  Total  
Assets Ratio < 70% 
Total Asset Growth Ratio ≥  
20% 
3 
Risk Weighted  Assets  to  Total  
Assets Ratio ≥ 70% 
Total  Asset  Growth  Ratio  
< 20% 
1 
Risk Weighted  Assets  to  Total  
Assets Ratio ≥ 70% 
Total Asset Growth Ratio ≥  
20% 
0 
Under the asset growth scoring grid, banks with a total asset growth ratio of 20% and 
higher but with risk weighted assets to total assets ratio of 70% and higher are worst off as 
the score for their asset growth would be zero.  In contrast, the highest score of 5 is  given 
to a bank that has a risk weighted assets to total assets ratio of lower than 70% and total 
asset growth ratio of lower than 20%. 
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3.2.3.2.2 Total Insured Deposits Computation 
The amount of total insured deposit for conventional and Islamic deposits is calculated 
separately and is derived in Equation (3.23) below. 
Total Insured Deposits = Total Insurable Deposits – Aggregated Deposits Balances in    
                                         Excess of RM60,000                   (3.23) 
 
In this thesis, the total insurable deposits is defined as 90% of customer deposits.  The 
aggregated balances in excess of RM60,000 are calculated from a percentage of the total 
insurable deposits.  The notes to the account in the annual report of each individual bank in 
the sample for the period 2006 until 2010 are scrutinized to identify the percentage trend of 
bank deposits by type of customer i.e. corporate deposits, retail (individual)  deposits or 
combination of both corporate and retail deposits.   Then each bank is classified into three 
categories, namely banks with majority retail deposits, banks with majority corporate 
deposits and banks with equal deposits from retail and corporate accounts.   
If banks have mainly corporate deposits, 90% of total insurable deposits are assigned to 
account for the aggregated deposit balances in excess of RM60,000.  This is based on the 
assumption that corporate depositors generally have deposited more than RM60,000 in one 
individual account.  However, banks with high retail deposits and banks with equal amount 
of retail and corporate deposits are assigned 70% and 75% of total insurable deposits 
respectively.
36
  The logic of defining the aggregated deposit balances in excess of 
RM60,000 in the above manner is a reflection that the deposit insurance system protects a
                                                 
36 This alternative total insured deposits computation is derived from several discussions with Malaysia Deposit Insurer Corporation 
official. The percentages of total insurable deposits to account for the aggregated deposits balances in excess of RM60,000 are derived 
based on the assumptions that are believed to be consistent with MDIC calculations.  
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 relatively higher percentage of retail depositors but a smaller percentage of corporate 
creditors to provide market discipline (Garcia, 2000).       
3.2.4 Data 2: Dynamic Panel Data 
Reminiscence from Section 3.1.2, the sample includes 22 conventional banks both local as 
well as foreign owned incorporated in Malaysia and 18 Islamic banks both local and 
foreign owned which are mandatory members’ bank under the explicit deposit insurance 
system administered by MDIC.  However, the period of study only covers the period after 
the introduction of deposit insurance in Malaysia that is from 2006 until 2010.
37
  For each 
bank, there must be at least three years of data. The data are a balanced panel.  The five 
deposit taking institutions such as the development financial institutions that are not 
mandatory members of the deposit insurance protection system are excluded from the 
sample.  Being state-owned banks, these DFIs
38
 have some form of implicit guarantee by 
the government on the deposits even prior to the introduction of deposit insurance system 
in Malaysia.  The other more specialized institutions, like investment banks are also not 
included in the sample. 
This thesis uses secondary data in gathering information pertaining to the research topic.  
The data were collected personally from the banks’ financial statements as of calendar 
year-end either from the Bankscope
39
 or individual bank’s annual report. Our major data 
source is from the annual reports of individual banks, particularly the Islamic banks as 
banks that operate Islamic banking window report their Islamic banking operations under 
                                                 
37 The period before the introduction of deposit insurance (year 2002-2005) is excluded.  The insurance premium system is one of the 
design features of a deposit insurance.  In 2006 and  2007 the flat rate premium was adopted while from 2008 to 2010 the risk-based 
premium was adopted.  
38 The DFIs are also excluded from the sample as these banks do not report some of the data requirement listed in Table 5.1 such as the 
risk weighted asset and risk weighted capital ratio. 
39 Bankscope is a database of bank account figures by Bureau Van Djik, a publisher of financial database. 
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the Income Statement notes to the account.  The breakdown of the Islamic banking activity 
is only reported in the notes to the account in the respective banks individual annual report.  
The study would use the bank’s unconsolidated statements wherever available. 
3.2.5 Methodology 2: A Dynamic Panel Regression 
The dynamic panel regression is used to investigate the sensitivity of the insurance 
premium in a risk-based premium with bank risk post deposit insurance system.  The 
dynamic panel regression is appropriate for the study model as per the detail explanation in 
Section 3.1.3.  To test Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8 on page 102, the relevant model 
follows a one-way error component model and written as follows: 
NPLTAi,t  =  β0YNPLTAi,t-1 + β1RISKBASEDi,t + β2PREMIUMi,t + 
β3RISKBASEDxPREMIUMi, + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RWCRi,t + β6SIZEi,t +  
β7SIZExPREMIUMi,t +  error i,t                                                                               (3.24) 
ZSCOREi,t =  β0YZSCOREi,t-1 + β1RISKBASEDi,t + β2PREMIUMi,t + 
β3RISKBASEDxPREMIUMi, + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RWCRi,t + β6SIZEi,t +  
β7SIZExPREMIUMi,t +  error i,t                       (3.25) 
OVERHEADTAi,t = β0YOVERHEADTAi,t-1+ β1RISKBASEDi,t + β2PREMIUMi,t + 
β3RISKBASEDxPREMIUMi, + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RWCRi,t + β6SIZEi,t +  
β7SIZExPREMIUMi,t +  error i,t                        (3.26) 
Where:  
NPLTA i,t = the ratio of non-performing loans to total asset of the bank i at time t   
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ZSCORE i,t = the risk index of bank i at time t   
OVERHEADTA i,t = the ratio of overhead expenses to total asset of bank i at time t   
Y BANK RISK it-1  = the lagged dependent variable (NPLTA, ZSCORE & OVERHEADTA) of  
     bank i at time t   
RISKBASED = a dummy variable: one for risk-based assessment method; zero for flat rate   
                           assessment method. 
PREMIUM = the annual premium estimated paid by bank i at time t 
FOREIGN i,t  = a dummy variable: one for foreign banks; zero for local banks   
RWCR i,t  = the risk weighted capital ratio of bank i at time t   
SIZE i,t  = the natural log of total assets of bank i at time t   
error i,t   = is the error term 
To test Hypothesis 7 and 8, this study runs the full sample after the introduction of deposit 
insurance system with three equations as above. The sample is a balanced panel.  The 
equation above is first estimated by the ratio of non-performing loans over total asset 
(NPLTA) for the credit risk measure as the dependent variable.   Then, the same model is 
re-estimated with the ZSCORE and the ratio of overhead expenses to total asset 
(OVERHEADTA) including the three explanatory variables.   
Since the two hypotheses attempt to investigate whether the deposit insurance premium 
sensitivity improves in the risk-based premium assessment method and whether the 
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magnitude of the annual premium paid is associated with bank risk, the thesis only 
considers the bank year’s observations after the introduction of deposit insurance. The 
prediction of premium sensitivity towards bank risk in a risk-based premium system 
provides useful insights in explaining whether the insurance premium system i.e. the 
estimated insurance premium and the risk-based premium assessment method, has a direct 
relationship with bank risks thus indicating credibility of the policy to mitigate the moral 
hazard problem.   
3.2.5.1 Dependent variables
40
 
The dependent variables (NPLTA, ZSCORE & OVERHEADTA) are similar to the one 
described in detail in Section 3.1.3.1 from page 95 to page 97.     
3.2.5.2  Explanatory Variables  
The explanatory variables in Equation (3.24) until (3.26) are defined as follows: 
Annual Premium Paid 
This thesis estimates the annual premium paid; PREMIUM by banks based on the MDIC 
Guidelines.  The methodology to estimate the annual insurance premium paid is given in 
detail in Section 3.2.3 on pages 105-124.  For the period 2006-2007, the annual premium 
paid is estimated based on the flat rate premium as in Section 3.2.3.1.  Meanwhile, for the 
                                                 
40 The explanatory variables are selected based on the current literature on deposit insurance.  The literature presented in Section 2.3 
covers past studies that not only includes cross sectional studies for developed and developing countries but also country specific studies 
like US, Bolivia, Turkey, Indonesia and Russia.  The variables are derived from annual reports which are  mostly the accounting-based 
variables.  The annual reports of the Malaysian firms not only meet the standard prescribed by the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board 
but also comply with the international standard prescribed by the International Accounting Standards Board of the IFRS.       
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period 2008-2010, the annual premium estimated is based on the risk-based premium as in 
Section 3.2.3.2.     
Premium Assessment Method 
A dummy variable; RISKBASED takes the value one if the observation is from 2008-2010 
(premium calculated under the risk-based assessment method) and zero if the observation is 
from 2006-2007 (premium calculated under the flat rate assessment method).  This is 
similar to current literature on deposit insurance that investigates the credibility of the flat 
rate premium versus risk-based premium in different countries with deposit insurance 
system.
41
 The annual premium paid by each insured banks would change the banks’ risk 
taking as the premium rate is determined using a scoring grid based on the individual 
bank’s risk profile.  As such, banks with a higher risk profile would pay a higher premium 
than the banks with lower risks.  The FDIC was the first deposit insurer in the world that 
implemented a risk-based premium system in 1993.  Since then, a number of 24 countries
42
, 
including Malaysia, have adopted it. 
Premium*Riskbased 
To examine the sensitivity of annual premium in the risk-based deposit insurance system 
with bank risk, this study interacted the PREMIUM variable with the RISKBASED 
variable. The annual premium is expected to be more sensitive with bank risk in a risk-
based deposit insurance premium.   
 
                                                 
41 Literature suggests that the risk-based premium method would mitigate the moral hazard problem (see for example Cull, Senbet, & 
Sorge, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004) 
42 Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Marshal Island, Micronesia, Netherlands, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, United States & Uruguay. 
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3.2.5.3 Control Variables 
In investigating the relationship between risk and the explanatory variables, five other 
variables have to be taken into account, that are controlled for in this thesis, as shown in 
Equations (3.24) to (3.26).  
Ownership 
Foreign banks normally look at possible risk exposure in the initial stage of their product 
financial innovation by employing more sophisticated technology.  In addition, foreign 
banks might employ more sophisticated risk management tools and a better internal control 
system. This means the foreign banks have fewer incentives to increase their risk taking 
behavior in deposit insurance protection.  In addition, foreign banks have the capacity to 
diversify their asset portfolio across countries.  Hence, this thesis controls for bank 
ownership by differentiating the two types of bank ownership, foreign and local banks that 
present in the Malaysian banking system.  A dummy variable takes the value one if the 
bank is a foreign bank and zero if it is a local bank.  
Bank Size 
The thesis includes the log of total assets in Ringgit Malaysia to control for bank size. 
Larger banks usually have a greater potential to diversify their asset risk. They thus have 
stable earnings and have no incentives to increase bank risk taking.  Alternatively, the 
larger the banking firm, the greater the chances to increase risk taking, if the banks consider 
they are too big to fail. If too-big-to-fail guarantees were present in the Malaysian banking 
system, one would expect the large banks to take more risk than the smaller banks.  
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Premium*Bank Size 
Risk is embedded in the banks’ asset (size), thus big banks are expected to pay higher 
deposit insurance premium.  In a different twist, a small bank might end up paying a higher 
premium than the actual estimation if the actual premium computed is lower than the 
mandatory RM250,000.  Moreover, the correlation structure in Table 5.1 (Chapter 5) and 
Table 4.2 (Chapter 4) showed that there is a strong and significant correlation (0.704) 
between PREMIUM and SIZE. Hence, to control for the impact of premium on bank size in 
the model, this study also controls, apart from the size variables, the variable that interacts 
the bank size with deposit insurance premium.  
Regulatory variables: Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)  
Capital is the primary cushion against adverse changes in the bank’s asset quality and 
earnings. RWCR is controlled for in this thesis equation to provide the different level of 
riskiness among the banks due to regulatory limitations. An increase in RWCR indicates 
that banks decreasing their assets or increasing their capital would have a positive effect on 
bank operations as banks have sufficient buffer to handle unexpected adverse shocks.  
When banks reduce lending, leverage falls as assets comprise mostly of loans. Thus, 
regulatory pressure could prevent the banks from taking high risks following the 
introduction of deposit insurance.       
General Macroeconomic Conditions  
As in other studies, this thesis incorporates elements to check macroeconomic situation. 
Earlier studies such as Mannasoo and Mayes (2009) and Bonfim (2009) have shown that 
adverse macroeconomic conditions normally herald bank failures. Further, the present 
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world predicament calls for a good grasp of the potential consequences of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions on the buoyancy of the banking system. Chernykh and Cole 
(2011) applied year dummy variables to control for overall macroeconomic situations. On 
the other hand, Ioannidou and Penas (2010) used among others the Gross Domestic Product 
growth rate and the inflation rate to control for general macroeconomic conditions.   
Since macroeconomic factors are common factors that affect all the banks in a certain 
period, though they vary from period to period, their effects could be captured simply by 
including time-specific effects in the regression.  The time dummies is a collection of 
dummy variables; (n=T-1) where T is the number of years included in the study which are 
equal to 1 for one given year and zero otherwise. As there are nine years in the sample 
period, the research would have eight time dummies.  The inclusion of time fixed effects is 
one way of capturing the effect of unobservable common factors that vary with time but are 
constant for all banks.  Similar to Chernykh and Cole (2011), this study uses year dummy 
variables to control for general macroeconomics conditions such as inflation, household 
income, economic growth etc. and seasonal effects apart from the presence of explicit 
deposit insurance itself.   
3.3 Summary 
This chapter establishes the justification for the dynamic panel regression model and 
elaborates the data selection and analysis techniques.  Section 3.1.1 and 3.2.1 outline the 
development of eight hypotheses in this study.  The main methodology used in this thesis is 
the dynamic panel regression.  The dynamic panel regression model is estimated using the 
System Generalized Method of Moment.   
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Apart from that, this thesis estimates the bank's annual premium paid by employing the 
insurance premium assessment methodology (as per Guidelines issued by MDIC).  The 
annual insurance premium is estimated to investigate the sensitivity of the deposit insurance 
premium in the risk-based deposit insurance as part of an effective deposit insurance 
design.  The complete computation of the deposit insurance premium is discussed in detail 
under Section 3.2.3.  Finally, the link between the hypotheses developed and the research 
objectives are shown in Table 3.17 on page 133.  Table 3.18 until 3.20 on page 134 and 135 
summarizes the hypothesis statements and the expected sign. 
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Table 3.17: The Link between the Objectives and the Hypotheses of the Thesis 
Objectives Hypothesis 
To investigate the presence of 
moral hazard by way of 
increased bank risk in the  
Malaysian banking system 
after the introduction of 
deposit insurance system.  
H1: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases after 
the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
 
H2: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases 
after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
 
To evaluate and compare the 
risk taking behavior of the 
conventional and Islamic 
banks after the introduction of 
deposit insurance in the 
Malaysian banking system.  
H3: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases in the 
conventional banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
 
H4: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in 
the conventional banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
 
H5: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases in the 
Islamic banks after the introduction of a deposit insurance 
system. 
 
H6: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in 
the Islamic banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
 
To ascertain whether the 
deposit insurance premium is 
sensitive towards bank risk in 
the risk-based premium system 
in mitigating the moral hazard 
problem. 
H7: The risk-premium sensitivity significantly improves 
in the risk-based premium assessment method. 
 
H8: The magnitude of the annual premium paid is 
positively associated with the bank risk. 
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Table 3.18: The Hypotheses Statement and Expected Sign of Bank Risk and Deposit 
Insurance  
Hypothesis Statements Variables 
(Expected sign) 
H1: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases after 
the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
NPLTA & POSTDI (+ve) 
ZSCORE & POSTDI (-ve) 
  
H2: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases 
after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
OVERHEADTA & 
POSTDI (+ve) 
  
Table 3.19: The Hypotheses Statement and Expected Sign of Bank Risk and Deposit 
Insurance (Conventional vs Islamic) 
Hypothesis Statements Variables 
(Expected sign) 
H3: Bank risk in the form of financial risk  increases in the 
conventional banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
NPLTA & POSTDI (+ve) 
ZSCORE & POSTDI (-ve) 
 
 
H4: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in 
the conventional banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
OVERHEADTA & 
POSTDI (+ve) 
 
 
H5: Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases in the 
Islamic banks after the introduction of a deposit insurance 
system. 
NPLTA & POSTDI (+ve) 
ZSCORE & POSTDI (-ve) 
 
H6: Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in 
the Islamic banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
OVERHEADTA & 
POSTDI (+ve) 
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Table 3.20: The Hypotheses Statement and Expected Sign of Insurance Premium 
Sensitivity and Bank Risk in a Risk-based Premium   
Hypothesis Statements Variables 
(Expected sign) 
H7: The risk-premium sensitivity significantly 
improves in the risk-based premium assessment 
method. 
NPLTA & RISKBASED (+ve) 
ZSCORE & RISKBASED (-ve) 
OVERHEADTA & 
RISKBASED (+ve) 
 
H8: The magnitude of the annual premium paid is 
positively associated with the bank risk.  
NPLTA & PREMIUM (+ve) 
ZSCORE & PREMIUM (-ve) 
OVERHEADTA &  
PREMIUM (+ve) 
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Chapter 4 : Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings with regards to bank risk taking after the 
introduction of deposit insurance to the conventional and the Islamic banking systems in 
Malaysia. The chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.1 examines and explains the 
various banks-specific characteristics in addition to explanation for the observed trend.  
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1 discuss the correlation structure and diagnostic tests respectively.  
The empirical findings from the first research objective (bank risk and deposit insurance for 
all banks) are presented in Sections 4.3.2, Section 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 that deliberate the 
estimation results for conventional and Islamic banks.  Section 4.3.5 contains the 
robustness check.  Finally, the summary of this chapter is presented in Section 4.4. 
4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
The descriptive indicators for all the variables used in this study are presented in Table 4.1.  
The mean, median, minimum, standard deviation and the number of observations for each 
variable are reported.  The number of some observations differs across variables due to lack 
of data.  The descriptive indicators in Table 4.1 combine the data from all banks and years.   
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Indicators for the Variables of this Study 
Variables N (bank 
years) 
Mean Median Std. Dev  Min 
Panel A: Full Sample 
NPLTA 343 3.05 1.92 3.54 0 
ZSCORE 345 29.99 19.58 30.75 -26.14 
OVERHEADTA 345 1.285 1.24 1.67 0.03 
POSTDI (Dummy) 345 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM (RM 
million) 
200 2.42 0.46 4.24 0.25 
RISKBASED (Dummy) 200 - 1 - 0 
SIZE (RM million) 345 26943.77 9369.6 42833.29 93.06 
RWCR 345 24.61 14.44 29.36 -2.84 
FOREIGN 345 - 0 - 0 
 
Panel B: Conventional versus Islamic banks 
Conventional banks 
NPLTA 196 3.49 2.34 3.85 0.006 
ZSCORE 198 37.82 23.67 34.80 -26.14 
OVERHEADTA 198 1.32 1.32 0.45 0.22 
POSTDI (Dummy) 198 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM (RM 
million) 
110 3.82 2.10 5.23 0.25 
RISKBASED (Dummy) 110 - 1 - 0 
SIZE (RM million) 198 41082.41 27664.95 50368.57 516.5 
RWCR 198 25.74 14.35 28.82 9.16 
FOREIGN 198 - 1 - 0 
Islamic banks 
NPLTA 147 2.47 1.18 3.01 0 
ZSCORE 147 19.44 16.12 19.97 -15.46 
OVERHEADTA 147 1.24 0.91 2.51 0.03 
POSTDI (Dummy) 147 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM (RM 
million) 
90 0.70 0.27 1.09 0.25 
RISKBASED (Dummy) 90 - 1 - 0 
SIZE (RM billion) 147 7899.90 5373.31 7993.16 93.06 
RWCR 147 22.93 14.5 30.06 -2.84 
FOREIGN (Dummy) 147 - 0 - 0 
Note: NPLTA  Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset  
ZSCORE    The risk index 
OVERHEADTA Ratio of overhead expenses to bank asset 
PREMIUM Annual premium in RM 
RWCR  Risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
SIZE  The log total assets 
RISKBASED Dummy variable (1=risk-based premium; 0=flat rate premium) 
POSTDI  Dummy variable (1=post deposit insurance period; 0=pre deposit insurance period) 
FOREIGN Dummy variable (1=foreign banks; 0=local banksj) 
 
139 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Indicators for the Variables of this Study (continue) 
Variables N (bank 
years) 
Mean Median Std. Dev  Min 
Panel C: Foreign versus Local banks 
Foreign banks 
NPLTA 167 1.71 0.89 2.28 0 
ZSCORE 169 34.93 17.62 38.64 -19.37 
OVERHEADTA 169 1.38 1.19 2.29 0.05 
POSTDI (Dummy) 169 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM (RM 
million) 
100 0.72 0.25 0.97 0 
RISKBASED (Dummy) 169 - 1 - 0 
SIZE (RM million) 169 12378.52 4071.6 15858.79 93.06 
RWCR 169 34.58 17.96 38.83 0 
Local banks 
NPLTA 176 4.32 3.12 4.03 0 
ZSCORE 176 25.24 21.08 19.47 -26.14 
OVERHEADTA 176 1.19 1.26 0.66 0.03 
POSTDI (Dummy) 176 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM (RM 
million) 
100 4.18 2.42 5.36 0.15 
RISKBASED (Dummy) 100 - 1 - 0 
SIZE (RM billion) 176 40929.73 20213.9 52886.77 521.23 
RWCR 176 14.89 13.56 7.34 -2.84 
The sample consists of 345 bank year observations.  As there is a dual banking system in 
Malaysia, the majority of our sample is drawn from the conventional banks (57%) while the 
remaining comprise the Islamic banks (43%).  By ownership, 51% of our full observations 
are local banks while 49% are foreign banks.  The foreign-owned banks are the majority 
(60%) in our observations in the conventional banks category while local Islamic banks 
(60%) dominate our Islamic bank observations.   
In the full sample, the dependent variables; NLPASSET, ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA 
have a mean of 3.05%, 29.99% and 1.28% respectively. It appears that there is not much 
difference in the dependent variables between the Islamic and the conventional banks.  In 
general, the risk weighted capital ratio (RWCR) of the Malaysian banks are on average 
24.61% which exceeds the minimum requirement of 8% under Basel II and 10.5% under 
140 
 
Basel III. This indicates the banks have more than sufficient capital buffer. The median 
banks have RM9.37 billion of total assets.  On average, the Islamic banks’ asset size is 
relatively smaller (RM7.89 billion) compared to the conventional banks (RM41.08 billion).   
The explanatory variables are the deposit insurance period; POSTDI, the insurance 
premium system; RISKBASED and the annual premium paid by banks; PREMIUM. The 
Malaysian banks on average paid an annual premium of RM3.82 million with a median of 
RM460,000.  This amount is considered to be very small as it approximately less than 1% 
of the banks’ profit.  The minimum annual premium paid by the conventional banks and 
Islamic banks is RM250,000 as required by the MDIC Act.  The risk-based premium was 
implemented in 2008 and is in force until today.  Under a risk-based premium, each 
member bank’s annual premium could be different as it is calculated according to the 
individual risk categories.  However, the banks are subjected to a minimum annual risk 
premium of RM250,000.  Thus, if the premium calculated under the risk-based premium is 
lower than the stipulated amount, the banks are mandated to pay a minimum amount of 
RM250,000. The annual premium median for the Islamic banks is RM270,000 while the 
median for the conventional banks is RM2.1 million.     
In Panel C of Table 4.1 are descriptive statistics on the foreign and local banks of this study 
sample.  Average assets of the local banks are almost four times higher than the foreign 
banks.  Consequently, the average and the median annual premiums for the local banks are 
also higher than the foreign banks.  The average annual premium for the local banks are 
RM4.18 million in contrast to the average foreign banks’ annual premium of RM720,000.  
The median annual premium for the local and foreign banks are RM2.42 million and 
RM250,000 respectively.          
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However, since these indicators do not show how each variable progress over time, Figures 
4.1 to 4.3 present the evolution in the yearly mean of the dependent variables (risk proxy) 
for all banks over the period under study from 2002 until 2010. 
  
Figure 4.1: Mean of NPL Ratio, 2002-2010 (All banks) 
    
From Figure 4.1, the first bank risk proxy, the non-performing loan to asset ratio shows a 
declining trend that indicates the improvement of the banks’ quality of assets over the 
period under study.  This trend suggests that the introduction of deposit insurance in 2006 
may have no impact on bank credit risk.  However, the graph (Figure 4.2) shows a 
fluctuation in the ZSCORE.  
The ZSCORE deteriorates after the introduction of deposit insurance in 2006.  In the 2007/ 
2008 financial crisis period, it is noted the ZSCORE declines further concurrently with and 
subsequent to the financial crisis where it dips to a bottom in 2009.  This decline indicates 
that the banking industry in Malaysia was also affected by the instability stemming from 
the global financial crisis.  However, the ZSCORE improves thereafter.  This is credited to 
the banking sector reforms that were undertaken in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis. The consolidation of the banking sector and improved risk management practices 
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were amongst some of the reforms undertaken. These reforms have improved the financial 
stability of the banks which in turn strengthened the foundation of the Malaysian banking 
sector.  Thus, a higher ZSCORE reflects the banks are in greater financial strength with low 
probability to become insolvent, thus they are more stable.   
  
Figure 4.2:  Mean of ZSCORE, 2002-2010 (All banks)  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean of Overhead to Asset Ratio, 2002-2010 (All banks)
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On the other hand, the overhead to asset ratio (Figure 4.3) is at its highest level in 2006 
which was the year the deposit insurance system was introduced. The yearly mean of the 
overhead to asset ratio, a proxy for operational risk ranged from a high of 1.8% to a low of 
1.05%.  After the dissipation of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the banks increased their 
operational risk taking to grow and expand their asset (Figure 4.6) by leveraging on the 
deposit insurance protection.
43
 
 
Figure 4.4: Mean of Annual Premium, 2002-2010 (All banks) 
 
Malaysia adopted the flat rate premium assessment method in the early years of the deposit 
insurance system (from the year 2006-2007).  However, commencing from 2008 onwards, 
the premium is calculated on a risk-based formula.  Under the risk-based premium, the 
prescribed risk category rate   differs from each bank depending on the bank’s risk profile.  
From Figure 4.4 above, the mean of annual premium declines gradually from the year 2008 
following the implementation of risk-based deposit insurance premium.  It appears that the 
banks pay a lower premium in the risk-based deposit insurance period compared to the flat 
                                                 
43 During the period 2008-2010, the government blanket guarantee was also introduced.  Apart from paying the annual insurance 
premium, the banks are required to pay a fee to the Government - the Ministry of Finance (not MDIC) for this guarantee.  
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rate premium era.  The mean of the annual premium ranges from RM2.1 million in 2006 to 
a highest of RM2.8 million in 2008.   
 
Figure 4.5: Mean of Risk Weighted Capital Ratio, 2002-2010 (All banks) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Mean of Total Assets, 2002-2010 (All banks) 
 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 above depict the evolution for the mean of risk weighted capital 
ratio (RWCR) and mean of total assets (size).  The mean of RWCR bottomed out in 2008 
but rose steadily to peak in 2009.  Although the mean of RWCR slightly dropped thereafter, 
the capital buffer was still sufficient and exceeded the minimum requirement under Basel II 
of 8% and Basel III of 10.5%.  The banks’ asset size rose steadily after 2008.        
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Figure 4.7: Mean of Overhead to Asset Ratio, 2002-2010 (Conventional vs Islamic 
banks) 
 
Figure 4.8: Mean of NPL ratio, 2002-2010 (Conventional vs Islamic banks) 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Mean of ZSCORE, 2002-2010 (Conventional vs Islamic banks)
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Figure 4.10: Mean of Annual Premium, 202-2010 (Conventional vs Islamic banks) 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Mean of Risk Weighted Capital Ratio, 2002-2010 (Conventional vs 
Islamic banks)  
 
Figure 4.12: Mean of Total Assets, 2002-2010 (Conventional vs Islamic banks) 
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Figure 4.7 until Figure 4.12 above compare the yearly mean of the dependent variables and 
other variables for the conventional and Islamic banks over the 2002-2010 periods.  
Movement in the overhead to asset ratio
44
 for both the conventional and Islamic banks is 
primarily driven by the increase in the overhead expenses that moved in tandem with the 
expansion of the banks’ lending business activities.  It is noted the overhead to asset ratio is 
comparatively higher in the Islamic banks than the conventional banks in 2006 and after 
2008 that is both during the period of deposit insurance protection. Islamic banks 
experienced a higher overhead to asset ratio as supported by the growth in Islamic 
financing activities.  Effort to position Malaysia as an International Islamic financial hub 
under the 
45
Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre initiate have spurred the 
momentum for active recruitment activities of Islamic banking professionals and 
strengthened the Islamic banks’ information technology infrastructure during 2006. 
Furthermore, this trend was boosted with an increase in the number of full-fledged Islamic 
banks with an addition of three new Islamic banking licenses which were issued to foreign 
bankers.  Meanwhile, the ZSCORE in the conventional and Islamic banks both fluctuated 
before it peaked in 2008 in the conventional banks.  
For the period 2002-2010, the NPL yearly mean for the conventional bank is higher than 
the Islamic banks.  Similarly, during the global financial crisis period of 2007/2008, the 
conventional banks experienced a deterioration in asset quality whereas the asset quality in 
the Islamic banks indicated an improvement.  This trend exhibits sound asset quality in the 
Islamic banks despite a crisis.  Unlike conventional banks, Islamic banks are governed by 
Shariah principles that require financial transactions to be backed by underlying assets, 
thereby insulating the Islamic banks from excessive risk taking and speculative financing 
                                                 
44 Overhead to asset ratio is the measure for operational risk in this study. 
45 During 2006, the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) initiative was launched to promote Islamic financial products 
and services in international currencies for the global market. 
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activities.  Regardless of this, during the period under study, the banking assets of the 
conventional and Islamic all showed an increase.  It is evident that the conventional banks 
are larger than the Islamic banks in terms of asset size.  The mean assets in the conventional 
banks and Islamic bank for the year 2010 was close to RM60 billion and RM15 billion 
respectively.  In relation to the annual premium, both the conventional and Islamic banks’ 
annual premiums peaked in 2008, just before the implementation of the risk-based premium 
assessment method then declined steadily after the implementation of the risk-based deposit 
insurance premium.       
The conventional and Islamic banks continued to be well capitalized with strong financial 
buffers to withstand potential losses.  One substantial fact was that Islamic banks had 
higher capitalization that indicated greater flexibility and resilience to withstand the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008.  Although the RWCR ratio fluctuated over time, the ratio is 
well above the minimum requirement of 8% (Basel II) and 10.5% (Basel III) which 
indicated sound adequacy of capital buffer. Overall, there is a significant difference 
between the evolution of yearly mean for the variables as discussed above, in the 
conventional and Islamic banks during the period under study.   
4.2 Correlation Structure 
A bivariate relationship between the variables of the models in this study is first determined 
before estimating the model equations.  Specifically, this study analyzes the correlation 
coefficients between variables of each equation.  Correlation analysis is performed for two 
reasons.  Firstly, the bivariate relationship between the dependent variable and each of the 
explanatory variables help to explore the direction and strength of the relationship, 
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regardless of the existence of other variables.  Finally, the high correlation between 
explanatory variables may indicate, but not necessarily, a multicollinearity problem.   
Table 4.2: The Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables (NPL, ZSCORE 
& OVERHEADTA) and Explanatory Non-dummy Variables 
 NPL ZSCORE OPRISK PREMIUM SIZE RWCR 
NPL 1.000      
ZSCORE 0.046 
(0.387) 
1.000     
OPRISK 0.036 
(0.508) 
-0.024 
(0.661) 
1.000    
PREMIUM 0.221*** 
(0.002) 
0.141** 
(0.046) 
-0.013 
(0.855) 
1.000   
SIZE 0.248*** 
(0.000) 
0.395*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.984) 
0.704*** 
(0.000) 
1.000  
RWCR -0.179*** 
(0.001) 
-0.253*** 
(0.000) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
-0.186*** 
(0.008) 
-0.512*** 
(0.000) 
1.000 
Note: This table presents the correlation results.   
The p-value is in parentheses.  *, **and *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
NPL   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OPRISK  - Ratio of overhead expenses to bank asset (proxy for operational   
  risk) 
PREMIUM  - Estimated annual insurance premium 
SIZE   - Log of total assets 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
 
Table 4.2 above reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficient for all banks over the 
period 2002-2010.  Although the correlation coefficients are low but some them are 
statistically significant.  The correlations indicate NPL is significantly correlated with the 
PREMIUM (0.221), SIZE (0.248) and the RWCR (-0.179).  Similarly, the second 
dependent variable, ZSCORE is significantly correlated with the PREMIUM, SIZE and 
RWCR.  The third dependent variable, OPRISK is statistically significant with RWCR 
(0.299).   
The correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables are low but are statistically 
significant.  There is a strong and significant correlation (0.704) between PREMIUM and 
SIZE.  To ensure that there is no multicollinearity problem with the non-dummy variables 
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in this study, this thesis performs the Variance Inflation Factor test (VIF).
46
  The VIF test 
suggests that there is no multicollinearity problem as the VIFs of the regression are below 
10.  This confirms that there is a less collinearity problem in a panel data compared to time 
series and cross sectional data (Hsiao, 2003). 
4.3 Regression Results  
From Chapter 3, the three equations namely Equation (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) are reproduced 
below:  
NPLTAi,t =  β0YNPLTA it-1 +  β1POSTDIi,t + β2FOREIGNi,t + β3RWCRi,t   + β4SIZEi,t  + 
β5OVERHEADTAi,t + β6BKGSYSi,t + error i,t                                          (3.3) 
ZSCOREi,t  =  β0YZSCORE it-1 + β1POSTDIi,t + β2FOREIGNi,t + β3RWCRi,t   + β4SIZEi,t  + 
β5OVERHEADTAi,t + β6BKGSYSi,t + error i,t                                       (3.4) 
OVERHEADTAi,t =  β0YOVERHEADTA it-1 + β1POSTDIi,t + β2FOREIGNi,t + β3RWCRi,t   + 
β4SIZEi,t  + β5NPLTAi,t + β6BKGSYSi,t + error i,t                                               (3.5) 
The set of the variables (dependent variables, explanatory variables and control variables) 
retains the same definitions as in Chapter 3.  Cross section fixed effects are controlled 
through the first differencing of all variables as required by the System GMM and First-
differenced GMM algorithms.  Moreover, year dummies have been added to all GMM 
estimators to remove the general time-related shocks, such as the macroeconomic or 
seasonality shocks common to all banks from the error term as done by Roodman (2006) 
and Chernykh and Cole (2011).  System GMM estimators use the level of the bank risk 
                                                 
46 A VIF value of above 10 indicates the problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
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proxies (dependent variables) lagged two periods and earlier to the end of the available time 
series of the banks as instruments for the change in bank risk; and the estimators use the 
change of bank risk proxies two periods and earlier to instrument the level of bank risk 
proxies in the system of equations.  Other variables are assumed to be exogenous and hence 
they instrument themselves.  All the GMM models are estimated using the two-step System 
GMM estimation method  (see Hadad et al., 2011)   The following is a presentation of the 
results of the estimation. 
4.3.1. Diagnostic Test for GMM  
Before presenting the estimation results, three conditions should be satisfied for GMM 
estimators to be consistent that is: (i) the absence of second order correlation; (ii) the 
validity of the instruments; and; (iii) the model well fit the data.  Section 4.3.1.1 until 
4.3.1.3 elaborates the diagnostic tests to ascertain the quality of estimation.   
4.3.1.1 Autocorrelation of Residuals (Arellano-Bond Test) 
GMM estimators are expected to have first order autocorrelation, but the crucial 
requirement for GMM estimators to be consistent, is the absence of second order 
autocorrelation.  If the autocorrelation exists, some lags are invalid instruments and should 
be removed from the instrument set.  Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a test for the 
serial correlation in the disturbance term.  Both first and second order autocorrelations are 
reported in this study.  However, the absence of second order autocorrelation is the critical 
condition that should be satisfied.  The Arellano-Bond test specifies that the estimates are 
consistent if there is no second order autocorrelation. 
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4.3.1.2 Validity of Instruments (Sargan Test) 
For GMM to be valid, instruments must be exogenous.  Otherwise, the moment conditions 
will not be satisfied.  A test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions called the 
Sargan test is employed in this study.  Sargan test is also known as the Hansen test for over 
identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982).  The null hypothesis for this test is that all the 
instruments are valid.  The above null hypothesis should not be rejected in order to proceed 
with GMM estimation.  The rejection of the null indicates that at least one of the 
instruments is not valid.   
4.3.1.3 The Goodness of Fit (Wald Test) 
A Wald test is used for testing the goodness of fit of the model.  The Wald test indicates 
that the model well fits the data.  The null hypothesis of this test is that the set of 
coefficients of the model is simultaneously equal to zero.  If the null cannot be rejected, the 
variables of the GMM model are not doing a good job in predicting the dependent variable.  
The Wald test uses the chi-square in testing this hypothesis.  
4.3.2 Estimation Results for All Banks (Table 4.3) 
Table 4.3 reports the significance levels of AR(1) and AR(2) for both models.  As expected, 
AR(1) is significant at the 10% and 1% level, but AR(2) is insignificant for all the columns 
(a), (b) and (c). Hence, there is no second order autocorrelation.  The GMM requirement is 
satisfied. The null hypothesis that all the instruments are valid under the Sargan test cannot 
be rejected as presented in Table 4.3.  Finally, the Wald test also indicates that the three 
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models well fit the data.  Hence, this study can proceed to estimate the model using GMM 
dynamic panel regressions.   
In Table 4.3, the variable of interest is a dummy variable called POSTDI.  POSTDI is equal 
to one for post deposit insurance period and zero for pre deposit insurance period.  The 
POSTDI coefficient are highly significant at 1% level for all types of bank risk i.e. credit 
risk, insolvency risk and operational risk as presented in Model 1 till Model 3.  The 
POSTDI coefficients have the expected positive relationship with bank risk specifically 
insolvency risk and operational risk.  After the introduction of the deposit insurance system, 
it is noted that the banks’ risk increase.  These results are consistent with previous research 
(e.g. Chernykh & Cole, 2011 and Ioannidou & Penas, 2010) that banks’ exposure to risk 
taking increased after the implementation of deposit insurance system.   
Although the POSTDI coefficients for credit risk differ from the expected (column (a)), the 
credit risk relationship with POSTDI is still highly significant.
47
  The negative coefficient 
of 0.335 for POSTDI indicates that credit risk decrease by 33.5% after the introduction of 
deposit insurance system. Comparing the results in Model 1 to Model 3, it can be seen that 
credit risk decreases
48
 while insolvency risk and operational risk increase after the 
introduction of deposit insurance in a dual banking system like Malaysia.   
  
                                                 
47 The result indicates that credit risk reduce significantly after the introduction of deposit insurance.  The improvement in credit risk may 
partly due to the banks’ effort in improving their assets / credit management (credit risk) to avoid paying high deposit insurance premium.  
To reinstate, the risk based deposit insurance premium should penalise bank with higher risk profile to pay higher premium rate.   
48 When replacing the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets with non-performing loans to gross loans, the empirical results change 
– coefficient of POSTDI is positive and significant.  However, the significant level is only at 10% level compared to the 1% level in 
Model 1 of Table 4.4.    
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Table 4.3: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking (All banks) 
All Banks 
(Conventional & 
Islamic banks) 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 (a) Model 2 (b) Model 3 (c) 
Constant 8.779*** 
(1.367) 
-89.986*** 
(14.323) 
0.043 
(0.114) 
Risk i,t-1 0.669*** 
(0.007) 
0.197*** 
(0.017) 
0.106*** 
(0.002) 
POSTDI  -0.335*** 
(0.075) 
-14.482*** 
(1.931) 
0.252*** 
(0.049) 
FOREIGN -0.796** 
(0.374) 
36.511*** 
(5.551) 
0.478*** 
(0.074) 
BANKING 
SYSTEM 
0.103 
(0.139) 
-6.119* 
(3.776) 
-0.484*** 
(0.089) 
RWCR -0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.026*** 
(0.041) 
-9.46e-06 
(0.001) 
LOG_ASSET -0.735*** 
(0.131) 
1.612*** 
(9.944) 
0.092*** 
(0.013) 
OVERHEADTA -0.133*** 
(0.035) 
9.387*** 
(1.119) 
- 
NPLTA   0.047*** 
(0.005) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(13)=434947.60 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(13)=26903.85 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(13)=46918.02 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(32)=37.916 
(0.2175) 
Chi
2
(32)=25.797 
(0.7725) 
Chi
2
(32)=28.046 
(0.6671) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.8256 
(0.0679)* 
N(0,1)=-2.401 
(0.0164)* 
N(0,1)=-2.7544 
(0.0059)*** 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=0.7884 
(0.4304) 
N(0,2)=0.7321 
(0.4641) 
N(0,2)=0.2699 
(0.7872) 
N 303 305 304 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
BANKINGSYSTEM - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Conventional banks and 0=Islamic banks 
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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The result suggests banks increase their risks through insolvency risk (not in credit risk) 
and operational risk after the introduction of deposit insurance as shown by the negative 
and significant coefficient of POSTDI with ZSCORE and the positive and significant 
coefficient of POSTDI with OVERHEADTA.  Collectively, moral hazard is present in the 
Malaysian banks considering that banks increased their exposure to risk after the 
introduction of deposit insurance.  The results support the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in 
Chapter 3.  
With respect to the control variables, such as the ownership of banks, the regulatory 
pressure/capital buffer, RWCR and bank size, are all significant with the bank risk 
variables.  Further, the BANKING SYSTEM variable in Model 2 and Model 3 suggests 
that there is a significant difference in the bank risk for the conventional and Islamic banks 
as both POSTDI coefficients in Model 2 and Model 3 are statistically significant at 10% 
and 1% respectively.  These results confirm that there is a significant difference in bank 
risk taking between the Islamic banks and conventional banks in the Malaysian banking 
system after the introduction of deposit insurance.  To investigate this relationship, this 
thesis runs a separate regression (conservative approach rather than using interaction term) 
for the conventional and Islamic banks.  A detailed presentation of the results follows under 
Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.   
4.3.3 Estimation Results for Conventional Banks (Table 4.4) 
The primary variable of interest is still POSTDI.  The POSTDI variable is used to 
investigate the risk change in the conventional banks after the introduction of deposit 
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Table 4.4: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking (Conventional banks) 
Conventional 
banks 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 4.175 
(5.848) 
-130.107 
(51.682) 
7.674*** 
(0.877) 
Risk i,t-1 0.792*** 
(0.115) 
-0.471*** 
(0.133) 
0.249** 
(0.104) 
POSTDI  1.432 
(1.423) 
-13.684** 
(4.359) 
0.256*** 
(0.071) 
FOREIGN -1.344 
(1.270) 
29.467** 
(11.728) 
-0.7467** 
(0.305) 
RWCR -0.002 
(0.007) 
0.113 
(0.112) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
LOG_ASSET -0.325 
(0.448) 
12.350* 
(6.672) 
-0.616*** 
(0.084) 
OVERHEADTA -0.618** 
(0.311) 
10.159 
(19.439) 
 
NPLTA   -0.026* 
(0.013) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(12)=27311.37 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(12)=5122.76 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(12)=1329.86 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(33)=8.673 
(1.0000) 
Chi
2
(33)=6.818 
(1.0000) 
Ch
2
(33)=8.968 
(1.0000) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.4159 
(0.1568) 
N(0,1)=-3.417 
(0.0006) 
N(0,1)=-1.9914 
(0.0464)** 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=1.1325 
(0.2574) 
N(0,2)=0.228 
(0.8196) 
N(0,2)=1.1257 
(0.2603) 
N 174 176 175 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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insurance.  Hence, the results only estimate the conventional banks’ risk change in respect 
to the   introduction of deposit  insurance.   If the conventional  banks increase  their bank 
risk through insolvency risk and operational risk, the POSTDI coefficient will have a 
negative and positive coefficient with ZSCORE in Model 2 and OVERHEADTA in Model 
3 respectively.  Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 of Table 4.4 explore the impact of bank risk 
for the conventional banks after the introduction of deposit insurance system. 
From Table 4.4, the System GMM is significant (Wald test) and consistent as there is no 
second order serial correlation and the instruments introduced in the model are valid 
(Sargan test). The coefficient of the variable of interest-POSTDI is statistically significant 
at the 1% level and have a positive relationship with bank risk.  The POSTDI coefficient is 
-13.684 and 0.256 for insolvency risk and operational risk respectively.  The results as 
shown in Table 4.4, indicate that there is a significant increase in bank risk through 
insolvency risk and operational risk in the conventional banks after the introduction of 
deposit insurance system.  On the contrary, there is no increase in risk taking in the form of 
credit risk and this is consistent with results of the study by Tuan, Ying, and Nya (2010). 
The overall result is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis that banks have the 
incentive to increase risk, as they know that the insurance protection will provide a buffer 
for the downside uncertainties.  The result of this study is similar to the results of current 
studies that banks are more likely to undertake higher risk after the introduction of deposit 
insurance.
49
  Unlike Chernykh and Cole (2011), this study provides statistically strong 
evidence that operational risk increases in the conventional banks after the introduction of 
deposit insurance system.  
                                                 
49 See for example Chernykh and Cole (2011) and Ioannidou and Penas (2010).  
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Turning to the control variables, this study finds that the conventional foreign banks and 
large banks are more stable and good operational risk management practices.  The 
regulatory pressure variable, RWCR does not enter significantly in Model 1 and Model 2 
regressions.  These results support the Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 in Chapter 3.  
Overall, these results confirm the hypothesis that the deposit insurance system causes moral 
hazard problem in the conventional banks through an increase in risk taking. 
4.3.4 Estimation Results for Islamic Banks (Table 4.5) 
Table 4.5 shows the effect of deposit insurance on Islamic banks risk taking after the 
introduction of deposit insurance.  Interestingly, the results reported in Table 4.4 for the 
conventional banks differ from the Islamic banks.  Table 4.5 suggests that the moral hazard 
problem is not present in the Islamic banks.  In addition, the models satisfy all the three 
system GMM estimator conditions as discussed under Section 4.3.1.  
The POSTDI coefficients are not statistically significant with all the three variables of bank 
risks i.e. NPLTA, ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA.  As the lagged bank risk variables   
(Risk i,t-1) are also not significant and this further indicates that there is no dynamic change 
of bank risk in the Islamic banks after the introduction of deposit insurance.  The 
implications of the introduction of deposit insurance system on the Islamic banks have not 
been studied before.  Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of Islamic 
finance/banking will provide us with some grounds to extrapolate the results.    
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Table 4.5: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking (Islamic banks) 
Islamic banks Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 7.727** 
(1.367) 
21.969 
(274.255) 
0.222 
(2.943) 
Risk i,t-1 0.212 
(0.514) 
-0.376 
(0.027) 
0.122 
(0.089) 
POSTDI  -2.540 
(2.111) 
-17.359 
(26.121) 
0.210 
(0.242) 
FOREIGN -0.936 
(9.393) 
245.002 
(311.761) 
1.476 
(1.432) 
RWCR 0.010 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.246) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
LOG_ASSET -0.491 
(0.681) 
-15.931 
(20.469) 
-0.012 
(0.337) 
OVERHEADTA -0.118 
(0.394) 
-24.076 
(17.687) 
- 
NPLTA   -0.0076 
(0.040) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(14)=2203.53 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(14)=429.11 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(14)=97.99 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(33)=2.558 
(1.0000) 
Chi
2
(33)=4.4574 
(1.0000) 
Chi
2
(33)=5.191 
(0.6671) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-0.3536 
(0.7236) 
N(0,1)=0.6023 
(0.5470) 
N(0,1)=-0.7043 
(0.4812) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=0.2241 
(0.8227) 
N(0,2)=-0.996 
(0.3192) 
N(0,2)=0.8504 
(0.3951) 
N 129 129 129 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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Malaysia plays a leading role in promoting the Islamic finance industry. The Islamic 
banking asset in Malaysia captured a 20% market share in 2010 since its inception in 1983. 
Further, total Islamic banking deposits stood at RM188.8 billion which comprise 19.3% of 
the total deposits.
50
  The aftermath of the recent financial crises has shown that both the 
conventional banks and the Islamic banks have been affected. On the other hand, the 
Islamic banks have been credited for their resilience performance due to the intrinsic 
strength of the Islamic banking.
51
  Hence, the intrinsic values attributed to this resilience 
such as the restrictions on the use of leverage and speculation, less exposure to toxic assets 
through collateralized debt obligations and mortgage backed securities has indeed 
prevented the Islamic banks from escalating their exposure to risk unlike the conventional 
banks after the introduction of deposit insurance system.   
From an agency framework, moral hazard may also present in Islamic banks. However, 
reminiscent of the results in Table 4.5 which indicate the ethical financing under the 
Shariah principles guide the operating principles of the Islamic banks and restrict the 
inclination towards riskier business that are prohibited by the Shariah.  In addition, the 
contractual framework under the Islamic banking requires banks to be diligent in risk 
management as the banks share profit and loss in an investment.  Although Mudarabah 
financing is minimal in Malaysia, the profit of an investment is shared between banks and 
customers (borrowers).  Thus, as capital provider, the banks bear the risk of loss on the 
investments if the borrowers have exercised scant due diligence in the conduct of their 
business leading the Islamic banks to be prudent in their risk management.  The results of 
this study show that the Islamic banks are reasonably cautious to increase bank risk taking 
even in the presence of deposit protection.  In the same vein, Hassan (2009) suggests that 
                                                 
50 Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Stability and Payment Systems Report, 2010 
51 Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability Report, Islamic Financial Services Board 2010 
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the Islamic banks are active in managing risk.  Malaysia is the only country that provides 
deposit insurance for all Islamic deposits including profit sharing investment account 
(PSIA) for the members’ banks.  In other jurisdictions that provide deposit insurance, 
coverage excludes PSIA due to its nature that prohibits any guarantee on its principle and 
profit.  Thus, the Malaysian data provides an unbiased comparative ground between 
conventional and Islamic banks.  
The bank risks and deposit insurance in the three models in Table 4.5 are not statistically 
significant.  The introduction of deposit insurance does not alter the Islamic banks’ 
exposure to risk.  Thus, the results cannot support Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 as there 
is no change in bank risk in the form of financial and operational risk in the Islamic banks 
after the introduction of deposit insurance. Comparing the results presented in the 
conventional and Islamic banks, the findings indicate that there is a difference in bank risk 
taking between the Islamic banks and conventional banks after the introduction of the 
deposit insurance system.   
4.3.5 Robustness Checks  
This study offers robustness tests to illustrate that the above results are robust. I am 
concerned that the results of this study may be driven by the effect of bank risk variables.  
Therefore, the risk factors namely the NPLTA and OVERHEADTA are excluded from the 
models.  Again, all the models satisfy the three System GMM estimator conditions as 
discussed under Section 4.3.1 whereby there is no second order autocorrelation, the 
instruments used are valid and the models well fit the data. Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the 
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estimation results of the equation excluding the risk factors from the model. These results 
obtained are qualitatively similar to the main results in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.   
To ensure that there is no linear association between POSTDI and the time dummies
52
, this 
thesis exclude the time dummies from the estimation models.  Table 4.9 until Table 4.11 is 
the estimation results for the equation excluding time dummies and risk factors.  Generally, 
the results obtained are similar to the main results.
53
     
 
                                                 
52 A linear association between the time dummies variable and POSTDI can lead to multicollinearity problem. 
53 When the time dummies are excluded from the model (see Table 4.11), operational risk is present in the Islamic banks after the 
introduction of deposit insurance.  However, there is no increase in financial risk for the Islamic banks.  Thus, generally Islamic banks do 
not increase risk after the introduction of deposit insurance.  
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Table 4.6: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking - Risk Factor Not Controlled (All banks)  
All Banks 
(Conventional & 
Islamic banks) 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 7.953*** 
(1.214) 
-54.869*** 
(20.278) 
-0.279* 
(0.172) 
Risk i,t-1 0.664*** 
(0.008) 
0.223*** 
(0.021) 
0.106*** 
(0.003) 
POSTDI  -0.429*** 
(0.079) 
-13.014*** 
(1.657) 
0.201*** 
(0.041) 
FOREIGN -0.589** 
(0.302) 
36.351*** 
(4.280) 
0.432*** 
(0.113) 
BANKING 
SYSTEM 
-0.014 
(0.134) 
-3.560 
(2.744) 
-0.487*** 
(0.065) 
RWCR -0.014*** 
(0.014) 
-0.062 
(0.044) 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
LOG_ASSET -0.659*** 
(0.119) 
7.475*** 
(2.290) 
0.143*** 
(0.015) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(12)=180e+06 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(12)=13346.01 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(12)=35306.74 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(32)=38.260 
(0.2064) 
Chi
2
(32)=31.334 
(0.5001) 
Chi
2
(32)=30.5889 
(0.5380) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.8347 
(0.0665) 
N(0,1)=-2.4174 
(0.0156) 
N(0,1)=-2.6278 
(0.0086) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=0.7972 
(0.4253) 
N(0,2)=0.6250 
(0.5320) 
N(0,2)=0.2492 
(0.8032) 
N 303 305 304 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
BANKINGSYSTEM - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Conventional banks and 0=Islamic banks 
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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Table 4.7: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking - Risk Factor Not Controlled (Conventional banks)  
Conventional 
Banks 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 3.243 
(6.920) 
-145.317*** 
(50.375) 
7.414*** 
(0.959) 
Risk i,t-1 0.710*** 
(0.103) 
0.4800*** 
(0.110) 
0.063 
(0.128) 
POSTDI  0.297 
(1.251) 
-14.388*** 
(4.179) 
0.267*** 
(0.073) 
FOREIGN -1.349 
(1.133) 
26.768*** 
(10.048) 
-0.573** 
(0.314) 
RWCR -0.005 
(0.008) 
0.164** 
(0.068) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
LOG_ASSET -0.213 
(0.576) 
15.439*** 
(4.979) 
-0.581*** 
(0.088) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(11)=14368.91 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(11)=3456.07 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(11)=1757.28 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(33)=11.8808 
(0.9997) 
Chi
2
(33)=6.929 
(1.0000) 
Chi
2
(33)=10.244 
(1.0000) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.2314 
(0.2182) 
N(0,1)=-3.5397 
(0.0004) 
N(0,1)=-2.3005 
(0.0214) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=1.0015 
(0.3166) 
N(0,2)=0.1612 
(0.8720) 
N(0,2)=1.3306 
(0.1833) 
N 174 176 175 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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Table 4.8: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking - Risk Factor Not Controlled (Islamic banks) 
Islamic Banks Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 26.162*** 
(9.931) 
316.336* 
(179.946) 
0.6247 
(1.038) 
Risk i,t-1 0.613*** 
(0.111) 
-0.242 
(0.263) 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
POSTDI  0.590 
(0.677) 
12.592 
(14.599) 
0.079 
(0.278) 
FOREIGN -4.512 
(3.109) 
-153.711 
(124.966) 
2.121 
(1.694) 
RWCR -0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.103 
(0.235) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
LOG_ASSET -2.828** 
(1.180) 
-30.937* 
(17.851) 
-0.065 
(0.116) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(13)=3731.70 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(13)=450.04 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(13)=12632.79 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(33)=2.393 
(1.000) 
Chi
2
(33)=6.4056 
(1.000) 
Chi
2
(33)=2.7485 
(1.000) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.544 
(0.123) 
N(0,1)=-0.025 
(0.9801) 
N(0,1)=-0.7045 
(0.4811) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=-0.074 
(0.9412) 
N(0,2)=-1.1545 
(0.2483) 
N(0,2)=-0.1732 
(0.8625) 
N 129 129 129 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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Table 4.9: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking – Excluding Time Dummies (All banks) 
All Banks 
(Conventional & 
Islamic banks) 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 10.163*** 
(1.175) 
-24.994** 
(11.280) 
0.874*** 
(0.064) 
Risk i,t-1 0.585*** 
(0.009) 
0.291*** 
(0.009) 
0.088*** 
(0.0007) 
POSTDI  -0.261*** 
(0.019) 
-4.368*** 
(0.372) 
0.075** 
(0.026) 
FOREIGN -1.244*** 
(0.197) 
30.097*** 
(4.824) 
0.350*** 
(0.083) 
BANKING 
SYSTEM 
-0.126 
(0.101) 
-0.242 
(2.886) 
-0.419*** 
(0.059) 
RWCR -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.024 
(0.034) 
-0.001* 
(0.0003) 
LOG_ASSET -0.851*** 
(0.100) 
2.873** 
(1.251) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
OVERHEADTA -0.218*** 
(0.035) 
6.835*** 
(0.515) 
 
NPLASSET   0.026*** 
(0.002) 
Wald test Chi
2
(7)=1.37e+06 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(7)=594179.62 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(7)= 1.13e+06 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(32)=33.767  
(0.3821) 
Chi
2
(32)=32.946  
(0.4206) 
Chi
2
(32)=31.474 
(0.4931) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)= -1.721 
(0.0853)* 
N(0,1)=-2.403 
(0.0163)** 
N(0,1)=-2.6487 
(0.0081)*** 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=0.732 
(0.464) 
N(0,2)=0.947 
(0.3434) 
N(0,2)= 0.2584 
(0.7961) 
N 303 305 304 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
BANKINGSYSTEM - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Conventional banks and 0=Islamic banks 
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
 
167 
 
Table 4.10: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking – Excluding Time Dummies (Conventional banks) 
All Banks 
(Conventional & 
Islamic banks) 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 18.568*** 
(2.755) 
-98.041** 
(38.756) 
6.150*** 
(0.620) 
Risk i,t-1 0.522*** 
(0.013) 
0.419*** 
(0.031) 
0.158** 
(0.073) 
POSTDI  -0.447*** 
(0.092) 
-7.634*** 
(1.599) 
0.054** 
(0.022) 
FOREIGN -5.361*** 
(0.459) 
33.779*** 
(6.571) 
-0.372* 
(0.194) 
RWCR -0.004 
(0.003) 
0.034 
(0.076) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
LOG_ASSET -1.238*** 
(0.232) 
9.282** 
(3.991) 
-0.464*** 
(0.055) 
OVERHEADTA -1.562*** 
(0.214) 
8.418** 
(4.984) 
 
NPLASSET   -0.037*** 
(0.005) 
Wald test Chi
2
(5)=119042.50 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(6)=1199.05 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(6)=4346.74  
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(33)=19.752  
(0.9668) 
Chi
2
(33)=17.820 
(0.9855) 
Chi
2
(33)=12.994 
(0.9993) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.212 
(0.2255) 
N(0,1)=-3.4838 
(0.0005)*** 
N(0,1)=-1.9769 
(0.0480)** 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=0.978 
(0.3277) 
N(0,2)=0.754 
(0.4506) 
N(0,2)=1.064 
(0.2872) 
N 174 176 175 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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Table 4.11: System GMM Estimation Results for the Effect of Deposit Insurance on 
Bank Risk Taking – Excluding Time Dummies (Islamic banks) 
All Banks 
(Conventional & 
Islamic banks) 
Dependent variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLTA (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.745* 
(1.001) 
64.418*** 
(18.175) 
0.259 
(0.747) 
Risk i,t-1 0.750*** 
(0.027) 
0.209*** 
(0.029) 
0.075** 
(0.031) 
POSTDI  -0.535** 
(0.234) 
-2.600 
(5.627) 
0.456*** 
(0.099) 
FOREIGN 1.503*** 
(0.354) 
-25.265*** 
(4.748) 
0.602*** 
(0.218) 
RWCR -0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.104 
(0.072) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
LOG_ASSET -0.182* 
(0.109) 
-5.143*** 
(1.930) 
0.003 
(0.092) 
OVERHEADTA 0.117 
(0.193) 
4.298 
3.160 
 
NPLASSET   0.072*** 
(0.014) 
Wald test Chi
2
(6)=8054.71 
(0.000)*** 
Chi
2
(6)=1427.43 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(6)=416.79  
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(33)=8.936  
(1.000) 
Chi
2
(33)= 12.128 
(0.9997) 
Chi
2
(33)=12.823 
(0.9994) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.828 
(0.0675)* 
N(0,1)=-1.549 
(0.1212) 
N(0,1)=-2.163 
(0.031)** 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=-0.213 
(0.8312) 
N(0,2)=0.618 
(0.5362) 
N(0,2)=-0.425 
(0.6707) 
N 129 129 129 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
POSTDI   - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Post-deposit insurance and 0=Pre-deposit insurance 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter discussed the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk taking for 
both the conventional and Islamic banks using panel data research design. The data of this 
research consists of all the conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia for the period 2002-
2010, which were subjected to certain criteria to reduce the effects of outliers.  This thesis 
employs the dynamic panel data specification, precisely the System GMM of Blundell and 
Bond (1998) to estimate the parameters as the dynamic panel is an unbiased, precise and 
efficient estimator particularly in solving the endogeneity problem in a panel data model 
(Baltagi, 2005).  Several specification tests namely the Arrelano-Bond test, Sargan test and 
Wald test were conducted to satisfy with the GMM requirement.  Furthermore as an 
alternative check for robustness, the risk factors namely the NPLTA and OVERHEADTA 
were excluded from the models.  Similar qualitative results were reported.  Therefore, the 
results are robust.  
All the results in this chapter generally support a statistically significant relationship 
between bank risk (moral hazard problem) and the introduction of deposit insurance.  
Specifically, for a dual banking system like Malaysia, the moral hazard problem is 
prevalent in the conventional banks.  On the contrary, the panel data estimates indicate that 
the moral hazard problem by way of an increase in risk taking is not present in the Islamic 
banks.  Therefore, the results of this thesis are consistent with findings of existing studies 
that the conventional banks increase risk taking including new empirical evidence on 
operational risk taking after the introduction of deposit insurance.  In addition, it provides 
new insights on the different implication of deposit insurance on the Islamic banks’ risk 
taking.         
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Chapter 5 : Risk-Premium Sensitivity and Bank Risk  
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, this thesis examined the problem of moral hazard in the 
conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia.  The findings indicate that the problem of 
moral hazard by way of increased bank risk taking is significant after the introduction of 
deposit insurance in a dual banking system like Malaysia but is limited to the conventional 
banks through insolvency risk and operational risk.  This leads to the examination of the 
final objective of this thesis whether the insurance premium is sensitive towards bank risks 
in the risk-based premium system and able to mitigate this moral hazard problem after the 
implementation of deposit insurance system.   
At this juncture, there is no country specific study that investigates whether the premium 
sensitivity improves in the risk-based premium assessment method and whether the 
magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively associated with bank risk under a 
deposit insurance.  There are a few cross-country empirical studies, but these studies 
employ dummy variables instead of estimating the annual premiums.  Literature suggests 
that the risk-based premium method will mitigate the moral hazard problem (see for 
example Cull, Senbet, & Sorge, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-
Kunt & Huizinga, 2004).  However, none of the country specific empirical studies in the 
deposit insurance literature (see Chernykh & Cole, 2011; Hadad et al., 2011; Ioannidou & 
Penas, 2010) have thus far examined the sensitivity of deposit insurance premium towards 
bank risk in the risk-based premium system as these countries (Russia, Indonesia and 
Bolivia) continue to adopt the flat rate insurance premium until today.  On the contrary, 
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Malaysia migrated from the flat rate premium to the risk based premium scheme in the year 
2008.  
This study is distinct from current studies as it not only investigates whether the risk-
premium sensitivity under the risk-based premium improves but also the correlation 
between the magnitude of the annual premium paid to bank risks.  This thesis first 
estimates the annual insurance premiums paid by adapting the MDIC methodology as 
discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3.  Thereafter, the sensitivity between bank risk and the 
insurance premium system in a risk-based premium assessment method is investigated 
using the dynamic panel regression specifically the System GMM.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  The correlation structure is 
presented in Section 5.1.  The empirical findings of the System GMM regression results are 
presented in Section 5.2.  The summary of the chapter is presented in Section 5.3.   
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5.1 Correlation Structure 
Table 5.1: The Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables (NPL, ZSCORE 
& OVERHEADTA) and Explanatory Non-dummy Variables 
 NPL ZSCORE OPRISK PREMIUM SIZE RWCR 
NPL 1.000      
ZSCORE 0.055 
(0.434) 
1.000     
OPRISK 0.024 
(0.735) 
-0.031 
(0.659) 
1.000    
PREMIUM 0.221*** 
(0.002) 
0.141** 
(0.046) 
-0.013 
(0.855) 
1.000   
SIZE 0.341*** 
(0.000) 
0.441*** 
(0.000) 
-0.119 
(0.093) 
0.704*** 
(0.000) 
1.000  
RWCR -0.257*** 
(0.000) 
-0.221*** 
(0.000) 
0.398*** 
(0.000) 
-0.186*** 
(0.008) 
-0.503*** 
(0.000) 
1.000 
Note: This table presents the correlation results.   
The p-value is in parentheses.  *, **and *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
NPL   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE   - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OPRISK  - Ratio of overhead expenses to bank asset (proxy for operational risk) 
PREMIUM  - Estimated annual insurance premium 
SIZE   - Log of total assets 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
 
Table 5.1 above reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficient for all banks over the 
deposit insurance establishment period 2006-2010.  Although the correlation coefficients 
are low but some of the correlations are statistically significant.  The correlations indicate 
NPL is significantly correlated with the PREMIUM (0.221), SIZE (0.341) and the RWCR 
(-0.257).  Similarly, the second dependent variable, ZSCORE is significantly correlated 
with the PREMIUM, SIZE and RWCR.  The third dependent variable, OPRISK is 
statistically significant with RWCR (0.398).   The qualitative results are similar to the 
correlation structure for the full period reported in Table 4.2.  
The correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables are low but are statistically 
significant.  Consistent with the results in Table 4.2, there is a strong and significant 
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correlation (0.704) between PREMIUM and SIZE.  To ensure that there is no 
multicollinearity problem with the non-dummy variables in this study, this thesis performed 
the Variance Inflation Factor test (VIF).
54
  The VIF test suggests that there is no 
multicollinearity problem as the VIFs of the regression are below 10.  This confirms that 
there is a less collinearity problem in a panel data compared to time series and cross 
sectional data (Hsiao, 2003). 
5.2 Regression Results 
The set of the variables (dependent variables, explanatory variables and control variables) 
retains the same definitions as in Chapter 3.  From Chapter 3, the three equations that are 
Equation (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26) are reproduced here:  
NPLTAi,t  =  β0YNPLTAi,t-1 + β1RISKBASEDi,t + β2PREMIUMi,t + 
β3RISKBASEDxPREMIUMi, + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RWCRi,t + β6SIZEi,t +  
β7SIZExPREMIUMi,t +  error i,t                                                                               (3.24) 
ZSCOREi,t =  β0YZSCOREi,t-1 + β1RISKBASEDi,t + β2PREMIUMi,t + 
β3RISKBASEDxPREMIUMi, + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RWCRi,t + β6SIZEi,t +  
β7SIZExPREMIUMi,t +  error i,t                       (3.25) 
OVERHEADTAi,t = β0YOVERHEADTAi,t-1+ β1RISKBASEDi,t + β2PREMIUMi,t + 
β3RISKBASEDxPREMIUMi, + β4FOREIGNi,t + β5RWCRi,t + β6SIZEi,t +  
β7SIZExPREMIUMi,t +  error i,t                        (3.26)
                                                 
54 A VIF value of above 10 indicates the problem of multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
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Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the regression variables.  Overall, the banks 
have paid an average of RM2.45 million of annual premiums over the period 2006-2010. 
The maximum annual premium paid was RM25.32 million whilst the minimum was 
RM250,000 which is also the minimum mandatory premium stipulated by MDIC. The 
median bank in the sample that paid RM463,000 in annual premium, had a non-performing 
loan of 1.34%, a risk index of 18.34, a ratio of total expenses to asset of 1.25% and a risk 
weighted capital adequacy ratio of 15%.  
 Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Non-Dummy Explanatory Non-
Dummy Variables Post Deposit Insurance   
 N (bank 
years) 
Mean Median Std. Dev  Min Max 
NPLTA 200 2.045 1.34 2.274 0 15.93 
ZSCORE 200 28.596 18.346 31.136 -26.137 136.02 
OVERHEADTA 200 1.406 1.25 2.098 0.05 29.64 
PREMIUM 200 2.453 0.463 4.221 0.25 25.324 
RWCR 200 23.079 15 26.638 -2.84 211.92 
SIZE 200 9.461 9.315 1.421 5.675 12.423 
Note:  NPLTA  Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset  
ZSCORE    The risk index 
OVERHEADTA Ratio of overhead expenses to bank asset 
PREMIUM Annual premium in RM 
RWCR  Risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
SIZE  The log total assets 
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This section presents the results of three regressions for each three different dependent 
variables: result of credit risk, NPLTA; for insolvency risk, ZSCORE and operational risk, 
OVERHEADTA.  In each regression, the study examined whether the risk-premium 
sensitivity improved in the risk-based premium assessment method and whether the 
magnitude of the annual premium paid is associated with bank risk and insurance premium. 
The correlation structure in Table 5.1 and Table 4.2 reported that there is a strong and 
significant correlation (0.704) between PREMIUM and SIZE. As a result, to control the 
sensitivity of size on the estimated insurance premium, the study interacted the deposit 
insurance annual premium with bank size.  In addition, the deposit insurance premium was 
interacted to the risk-based variable to examine the sensitivity of annual premium in the 
risk-based deposit insurance system with bank risk.  Thus, this study includes the two 
interactions, interacting the annual premium with bank size and interacting the annual 
premium with the risk-based premium. A series of other control variables are also included 
in this study.  The control variables are dummies for foreign bank as opposed to local banks 
and time dummies to control for macroeconomic effects.  This study also controls bank size 
and regulatory pressure as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and risk 
weighted capital adequacy ratio respectively.   
Table 5.3 reports the significance levels of AR(1) and AR(2) for both models.  AR(1) is 
significant at the 10% and 5% level, but AR(2) is insignificant for all the columns (a), (b) 
and (c). Hence, there is no second order autocorrelation.  The null hypothesis that all the 
instruments are valid under the Sargan test cannot be rejected as presented in Table 5.3.  
Finally, the Wald test also indicates that the three models well fit the data.  Hence, the 
GMM requirement is satisfied.  
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Table 5.3: System GMM Estimation Results on the Risk-Premium Sensitivity and 
Bank Risk 
All Banks 
(Post deposit 
insurance) 
Dependent variable  
NPLTA  ZSCORE  OVERHEADTA  
Model 1 (a) Model 2 (b) Model 3 (c) 
Constant 13.274*** 
(4.738) 
-63.417 
(69.241) 
6.418*** 
(1.509) 
Risk i,t-1 0.853*** 
(0.036) 
0.248*** 
(0.076) 
0.066*** 
(0.003) 
RISKBASED 0.769*** 
(0.203) 
-4.899 
(4.483) 
0.262*** 
(0.089) 
PREMIUM -1.953*** 
(0.647) 
34.596*** 
(9.774) 
-0.145 
(0.151) 
PREMIUM x  
RISKBASED 
-0.03*** 
(0.014) 
0.271 
(0.398) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
PREMIUM x  
LOG_ASSET 
0.165*** 
(0.056) 
-3.010*** 
(0.840) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
FOREIGN -2.367** 
(1.191) 
104.417*** 
(26.927) 
1.387** 
(0.623) 
RWCR -0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.031 
(0.036) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
LOG_ASSET -1.269*** 
(0.437) 
3.463 
(7.716) 
-0.627*** 
(0.157) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test Chi
2
(10)=1574.39 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(10)=77.39 
(0.0000)*** 
Chi
2
(10)=6301.81 
(0.0000)*** 
Sargan test Chi
2
(7)=4.8027 
(0.6840) 
Chi
2
(7)=7.2180 
(0.4065) 
Chi
2
(7)=5.6230 
(0.5836) 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
N(0,1)=-1.773 
(0.0762)* 
N(0,1)=-2.515 
(0.0119)* 
N(0,1)=-2.1968 
(0.0280)** 
Arrelano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
N(0,2)=0.453 
(0.650) 
N(0,2)=0.1312 
(0.7211) 
N(0,2)=0.1491 
(0.8814) 
N 160 160 160 
Note: This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
NPLTA   - Ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset (proxy for credit risk)  
ZSCORE                  - The risk index (proxy for insolvency risk) 
OVERHEADTA - Ratio of overhead to total assets (proxy for operational risk) 
RISKBASED  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Risk-based premium and 0=Flat rate premium 
PREMIUM  - Estimated annual insurance premium 
PREMIUMxRISKBASED - Interaction term between the variable PREMIUM and RISKBASED 
PREMIUMxLOG_ASSET - Interactiin term between the variable PREMIUM and LOG_ASSET 
FOREIGN  - A dummy variable that equals to 1=Foreign bank and 0= Local bank  
LOG_ASSET  - Log of total assets (bank size) 
RWCR   - The risk weighted capital adequacy ratio 
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In Table 5.3, this thesis presents the results from the System GMM regression which 
analyzes the sensitivity of the bank risk to insurance premium in the risk-based insurance 
premium.  The primary variables of interest are the risk-based premium assessment method, 
RISKBASED; the estimated annual premium paid, PREMIUM and the interaction term, 
PREMIUMxRISKBASED. 
The coefficient for the level variable of interest, RISKBASED is aimed at capturing the 
change in bank risk under different premium assessment methods in a deposit insurance 
system.  The RISKBASED is a dummy variable that equals to one for the risk-based 
premium and zero for the flat rate premium. The coefficient is 0.769 and it is significant at 
the 1% level. This indicates that, in the risk-based deposit insurance system, the banks’ risk 
are higher than in the flat rate deposit insurance system. In the risk-based system, banks’ 
credit risk increase by 76.9% while operational risk increase by 26.2%.  
Next variable of interest is the annual premium paid, PREMIUM.  The objective of this 
variable is to identify whether the premium is adequate to cover for the increase in bank 
risk.  The PREMIUM variable is the estimated annual premium in RM million. This 
variable tests Hypothesis 8 of this study.  The operational risk coefficient is not significant 
but the PREMIUM coefficient is significant at 1% level for the dependent variable NPLTA 
(credit risk) and ZSCORE (insolvency risk).  The PREMIUM coefficient is -1.953 and is 
statistically significant at 1% level for credit risk while the insolvency risk is significant at 
1% level with a positive coefficient (34.569).  Generally, these results report that the annual 
premium has a negative relationship with the bank risk. When there is an escalation in risk, 
the premium is inadequate to cover the increase in risk while if there is reduction in risk, it 
is adequately covered.  For example, the annual premium would decrease by RM1.953 
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million for a RM1 million increase in bank’s credit risk (Model 1).  On the other hand, the 
annual premium could adequately cover by RM1.953 million for a RM1 million reduction 
in bank’s credit risk.  The PREMIUM variable suggests that when there is a reduction in 
risk, the banks still pay adequate annual premiums.  However, when there is an increase in 
risk, the annual premium is inadequate to cover the increase in risk.  Although the results 
for the relationship between the annual premium and risk are significant, the direction is 
negative or inversely related.  The result fails to support Hypothesis 8 that the magnitude of 
the annual premium paid is positively associated with the bank risk.   
The final variable of interest is the interaction variable PREMIUM x RISKBASED. The 
purpose of this variable is to probe whether the risk-premium sensitivity improves in the 
risk-based deposit insurance system.  The variable PREMIUM in RM million is interacted 
with the RISKBASED dummy variable (1=risk-based premium; 0=flat rate premium).  
This interaction variable tests Hypothesis 7.  The coefficient for PREMIUM x 
RISKBASED is only significant with credit risk in Model 1.  The coefficient is -0.03 and is 
significant at the 1% level.  The negative coefficient indicates that the risk-based premium 
is inadequate to cover for the increased bank risk, since if there is increase in risk, there 
would be a drop in the annual premium.  Given that, in the risk-based deposit insurance 
system, the premium is more inadequate compared to the flat rate deposit insurance system.  
This suggests that banks have the incentives to increase risk (moral hazard problem) in the 
risk-based deposit insurance premium system, as despite incurring higher risk, the 
premiums paid are lower than their risk profiles.  Indirectly, the results explain why there 
exists a moral hazard problem in the first place after the introduction of deposit insurance 
system in Malaysia.  In this instance, the risk-based deposit insurance system is an 
ineffective policy because there is no improvement in the risk-premium sensitivity in the 
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risk-based premium method.  Therefore, these results do not support Hypothesis 7.  Taken 
together, although the risk-based deposit insurance premium is sensitive towards bank risk, 
the relationship is in the inverse, suggesting that the current design of the risk-based deposit 
insurance premium policy is not effective to mitigate the moral hazard problem.            
The first control variable, LOG_ASSET controls for the bank size.  The coefficient for 
LOG_ASSET shows a negative and significant relation with NPLTA and OVERHEADTA 
in Models 1 and 3 but insignificant relations with ZSCORE in Model 2.  This indicates that 
the small banks have higher credit risk and operational risk after the introduction of deposit 
insurance system.  The coefficient for the next control variable – PREMIUM x 
LOG_ASSET is statistically significant at 1% level with bank risk through credit risk 
(NPLTA) and insolvency risk (ZSCORE).  The PREMIUM x LOG_ASSET coefficient for 
dependent variable NPLTA is significant and positive at the 1% level while the coefficient 
is negative and significant at 1% level for ZSCORE.  The results indicate that bank size 
matters in determining the annual deposit insurance premiums paid by the banks.  As risk 
increases in larger banks, these banks also pay adequate premiums. On the contrary, the 
premiums paid by the smaller banks are less adequate to cover risk compared to the larger 
banks. Hence, the larger bank are more adequately covered and they have less moral hazard 
problem than the small bank. 
The control variable for ownership, FOREIGN is significant in all models revealing that the 
foreign banks are better than the local banks in managing credit and insolvency risk.  
However, local banks have better operational risk management than the foreign banks.   
Finally, the regulatory variable, RWCR is not significant in any regressions and may 
partially imply that the bank risk taking in a deposit insurance system is not significantly 
affected by regulatory pressure.   
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5.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the risk-premium sensitivity in the risk-based premium assessment method 
is first investigated.  The thesis offers an alternative measure to investigate the effectiveness 
of the deposit insurance policy by estimating the annual deposit insurance premium.  The 
risk-premium is found to be significantly inadequate in the risk-based premium assessment 
method with the annual premium significantly worsen in the risk-based premium system 
and the magnitude of the annual premium paid is negatively associated with bank risk.   
Therefore, the results are robust to conclude that the current risk-based deposit insurance 
system in Malaysia is ineffective in mitigating the moral hazard problem.  This indicates 
that the effectiveness of the current Malaysian risk-based deposit insurance premium policy 
to mitigate the moral hazard problem is debatable.  However, the results in this chapter do 
not imply that the risk-based premium method is an ineffective tool to mitigate the moral 
hazard problem.  The results in this chapter merely demonstrate that the risk-based deposit 
insurance system in Malaysia needs to be fine-tuned further so that the premium is sensitive 
towards bank risk particularly with the small conventional banks.  
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Chapter 6 : Conclusions, Implications and Future Research 
6.1 Introduction 
In confronting information asymmetries and adverse selections, it is vital to provide 
protection for small depositors who are likely to cause a bank run (Dewatripont & Tirole, 
1994).  These small depositors cannot correctly assess the risks they take when depositing 
their savings in a particular bank and neither have the incentive to monitor banks.  
International bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have 
acknowledged the importance of deposit insurance system.  In fact, on 18 June 2008, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Association of Deposit 
Insurers jointly issued a voluntary framework for effective deposit insurance practices 
known as the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance System to encourage more 
countries to adopt a formal deposit insurance system as mark of financial stability.   
Nevertheless, like any other insurance, the deposit insurance system creates moral hazard to 
the banks as they increase their risk taking as they are somewhat free of the consequences 
of their actions.  As evidenced in the recent bank crisis, taxpayers’ money was used to bail 
out the banks in many countries.  Thus, regulators must step into the shoes of depositors to 
control this moral hazard problem especially in the conventional banks.  The moral hazard 
problem created by the introduction of deposit insurance could be minimized by ensuring 
credible design features
55
 that includes an insurance premium system that is sensitive to the 
risks profiles of the banks.  More specifically, a risk-based insurance premium would 
mitigate the moral hazard problem compared to the flat rate premium.  Attempts by 
                                                 
55 The four distinct design features of deposit insurance are; (i) the funding type, (ii) sources of funds, (iii) insurance premiums systems 
and (iv) the coverage limits and coinsurance. 
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previous researchers to investigate the relationship between bank risk taking (moral hazard 
problem) and the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance system have been 
inconclusive. Therefore, the need exists for understanding this moral hazard problem 
particularly in a dual banking system like Malaysia and ascertaining whether the moral 
hazard problem could be mitigated with an effective design of deposit insurance premium 
policy.   
In this study, broadly, four empirical tests are performed.  The first test of this thesis 
confirms the presence of moral hazard problem by way of an increase in bank risk in a dual 
banking system like Malaysia after the introduction of a formal deposit insurance 
protection.  Thereafter, the second and third empirical analysis test the proposed hypothesis 
of significant difference in bank risk taking between the Islamic banks and conventional 
banks in Malaysia after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. These empirical 
analyses provide important new findings on the relationship between bank risk taking and 
deposit insurance in a dual banking system particularly the Islamic banks. The final 
empirical test evaluates the credibility or effectiveness of the insurance premium policy.  
The deposit insurance premium is credible when it is risk sensitive towards bank risk in the 
risk-based premium system.  This is examined by identifying whether the risk-premium 
sensitivity improves in the risk-based premium assessment method and whether the 
magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively correlated with bank risk.  The last 
empirical test offers new intuitiveness for regulators to incorporate the risk-based deposit 
insurance premium system as part of an effective design feature that mitigates the moral 
hazard problem.       
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: the summary of findings on the 
association between bank risk and deposit insurance are highlighted in Section 6.2; the 
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sensitivity between bank risk and insurance premium system in a risk-based deposit 
insurance system are summarized in Section 6.3; the implications of the overall findings are 
addressed in Section 6.4; and a brief description of the limitations and future research 
directions is presented in Section 6.5.   
6.2 Summary of Findings for Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk  
This section summarizes the findings for the first two research objectives.  The first 
objective is to investigate the presence of moral hazard by way of increased bank risk in the 
Malaysian banking system after the introduction of deposit insurance system. The second 
research objective is to evaluate and compare the risk taking behavior of conventional and 
Islamic banks after the introduction of deposit insurance system. 
To achieve these two objectives of this research, six tenable hypotheses are developed in 
Chapter 3.  The first two hypotheses expect a positive association between bank risk 
(financial risk and operational risk) with post deposit insurance system.  The third 
hypothesis expects bank risk taking to increase in the conventional banks but it should not 
increase in the Islamic banks after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  The 
concept behind these three hypotheses is that the study firstly investigates whether the 
moral hazard problem is present post deposit insurance in Malaysia.  If moral hazard is 
present and supports Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, this study further explores whether 
there is a significant difference in bank risk taking post deposit insurance between the 
conventional and Islamic banks.         
The third and fourth hypotheses establish that bank risk in the form of financial risk and 
operational risk increases after the implementation of deposit insurance system in the 
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conventional banks in Malaysia.  Finally, the fifth and sixth hypothesis postulates that bank 
risk in the form of financial risk and operational risk increases in the Islamic banks in 
Malaysia after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  The hypotheses and research 
design of the study are discussed in Chapter 3.  The panel data for all banks sample and 
Islamic banks is unbalanced while the conventional banks sample is a balanced sample.  
Nine regression equations are estimated for investigating the first six hypotheses using 
three different sub-samples: one for all banks, one for conventional banks and one for 
Islamic banks.  This study uses three different measures of bank risk namely credit risk, 
insolvency risk and operational risk apart from alternative models for robustness.  The 
estimation is carried out in the dynamic panel framework.  The System GMM is used 
because it is assumed based on the literature, to have the least biased estimator among other 
alternatives.       
For the all banks sample, the main findings are that the bank risk in the form of insolvency 
risk and operational risk increased significantly after the introduction of a deposit insurance 
system.  In contrast, the non-performing loan, the most direct measure of credit or asset risk 
decline after the introduction of deposit insurance in the all banks sample.  Specifically, 
comparing the conventional and Islamic banks increase in risk, the moral hazard problem is 
only prevalent in the conventional banks. Hence, the findings support the Hypothesis 1, 
Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 in Chapter 3.  Interestingly, the dynamic 
panel estimates provide limited evidence for increase in bank risk taking in the Islamic 
banks indicating that the moral hazard problem is not present in the Islamic banks post 
deposit insurance.  The findings cannot provide empirical support for Hypothesis 5 and 
Hypothesis 6 that bank risk in the form of financial risk and operational risk increases in the 
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Islamic banks in Malaysia after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  Therefore, 
the findings differentiate the bank risk taking between the conventional and Islamic banks.  
Overall it could be stated that, the findings in this thesis are consistent with findings of 
existing studies that the conventional banks increase risk taking after the introduction of 
deposit insurance.  This study includes new empirical evidence in increase operational risk 
taking by the conventional banks after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  In 
addition, it provides new insights into the different implications of deposit insurance on the 
Islamic banks risk taking.  All the six hypothesis statements and the findings of the panel 
regression estimates are summarized in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Investigation Results of the Hypotheses on Bank Risk and Deposit 
Insurance  
Hypothesis Details Accept / 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1 Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases after the 
introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
 
Accept 
Hypothesis 2 Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases after the 
introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
 
Accept 
Hypothesis 3 Bank risk in the form of financial risk increases in the 
conventional banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
 
Accept 
Hypothesis 4 Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in the 
conventional banks after the introduction of a deposit 
insurance system. 
 
Accept 
Hypothesis 5 Bank risk in the form of financial increases in the Islamic 
banks after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. 
 
Fail to 
accept 
Hypothesis 6 Bank risk in the form of operational risk increases in the 
Islamic banks after the introduction of a deposit insurance 
system. 
 
Fail to 
accept 
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6.3 Summary of Findings for Risk-Premium Sensitivity and Bank Risk  
This section summarizes the findings for the final objective of this research.  The final 
objective is to ascertain whether the deposit insurance premium is sensitive towards bank 
risk in the risk-based premium system and in mitigating the moral hazard problem.  In 
contrast to previous studies
56
, this thesis not only investigates the sensitivity between bank 
risk and the risk-based assessment method but also examines the magnitude of association 
between the annual premium and bank risk.  To achieve these objectives, two testable 
hypotheses are developed in Chapter 3.  In this respective, Chapter 5 examines the most 
critical issues related to the risk-based deposit insurance design to mitigate the moral 
hazard problem, in an effort to guide policy makers in designing an effective deposit 
insurance system.   
The findings, therefore, are based on a sample of mandatory member banks of deposit 
insurance protection scheme for a period of deposit insurance coverage i.e. 2006-2010. 
Contrary to expectations, the risk-premium sensitivity worsens in the risk-based premium 
assessment method.  Thus, Hypothesis 7 cannot be accepted.  Moreover, the empirical 
evidence reports that the magnitude of the estimated annual premiums paid by the banks is 
negatively related with the bank risk.  This finding indicates that the annual premium is 
ineffective to mitigate the moral hazard problem as the premium is inadequate to cover for 
the increase in bank risk. Thus, the finding fails to support  Hypothesis 8 that the magnitude 
of the annual premium is positively associated with the bank risk.   
                                                 
56 Previous studies that investigate the relationship between bank risk and risk-based assessment method is based on a  cross-countries 
study.  Whereas, for the first time, this study uses a bank level data in the context of Malaysia to investigate the relationship in depth.  
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In addition, the study findings further establish that size matters as larger banks increase 
risk, they pay adequate premiums, whereas, the premiums paid by small banks do not 
commensurate with their increased risk profiles.  These findings partly explain why big 
banks are usually the least enthusiastic to voluntarily become a member bank under a 
deposit insurance protection as the big banks are likely to pay hefty insurance premiums 
compared to the small banks.  The findings also demonstrate that the small conventional 
banks have the incentive to increase risk in the risk-based deposit insurance system as the 
premiums paid by these banks are inadequate or do not commensurate with the increased 
risk.  In a different twist, the risk-based deposit insurance system creates regulatory 
arbitrage for the small conventional banks to increase their risk taking as being small and 
risky, these banks are not penalized with higher premiums.  Therefore, the implementation 
of the risk-based deposit insurance system in Malaysia aggravates the moral hazard 
problem especially in the small conventional banks instead of overcoming it.  The premium 
should be designed to incorporate features to strengthen it to address such issues.          
The two hypothesis statements and the findings of the dynamic regression test are presented 
in Table 6.2 below:   
 Table 6.2: Investigation Results of the Hypotheses on Risk-Premium Sensitivity and 
Bank Risk   
Hypothesis Details Accept / 
Reject 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 7 The risk-premium sensitivity significantly improves in the 
risk-based premium assessment method. 
 
Fail to 
accept 
Hypothesis 8 The magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively 
associated with the bank risk. 
 
Fail to 
accept 
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It was argued in Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.3.5 that deposit insurance is here to stay 
despite the moral hazard problem.  Specifically Section 2.3.5 postulates that a credible 
design features of deposit insurance system particularly the risk based deposit insurance 
premium could overcome the moral hazard problem.  Notwithstanding this, the findings in 
Chapter 5 indicate that risk-based deposit insurance does not necessarily mitigate the moral 
hazard problem unless the risk-premium is sensitive towards bank risk.  Hence, the 
Malaysian policy regarding the risk-based deposit insurance system that is currently in 
force is arguable effective to mitigate the moral hazard problem, which explains why banks 
increase their risk taking after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  
6.4 Implications of the Findings 
It is deliberated that a credible risk-based deposit insurance system will eventually promote 
prudent and sound risk management practices among the banks. On the contrary, a poorly 
designed deposit insurance system may affect the stability of the banking system. In this 
study, I found that moral hazard is present by way of increased risk taking in the Malaysian 
banking system after the implementation of deposit insurance.  Following this, there is a 
significant difference in bank risk taking between the conventional and Islamic banks in 
Malaysia after the introduction of deposit insurance system.  Given that, I then questioned 
the effectiveness or credibility of the risk-based deposit insurance system policy in 
mitigating this moral hazard problem.   
This findings of this thesis could enable the Malaysian policymakers to evaluate whether 
deposit insurance escalates or retards risk-taking behavior by insured banks in addition to 
whether there is improvement in the sensitivity of risk-premium to bank risk. Such an 
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evaluation would enable policymakers to institute appropriate policy measures to counter 
risk taking behavior by banks.  The contributions of this thesis towards knowledge and 
methodology are outlined in Section 1.7 of Chapter 1.  This section outlines the 
implications of the study for literature and policy formulation by regulators like the 
Ministry of Finance, Central Bank and deposit insurance organizations as well as bankers.  
In the following sections, some of these implications are discussed.   
6.4.1 Implications for the Literature 
6.4.1.1 Risk-based Deposit Insurance System Not Necessarily Mitigate Moral Hazard    
Problem 
The findings of this study indirectly evaluate the effectiveness of the risk-based deposit 
insurance system in Malaysia.  It is apparent from the empirical evidence that the risk-
based system replacing the flat rate system since 2008 is still an inferior policy to counter 
the moral hazard problem.  The objective of regulators to migrate from the flat rate 
premium to risk-based premium scheme is to prevent banks from increasing their risk 
taking.  However, the risk-based deposit insurance premium will only be effective in 
replacing the flat rate premium if the risk-premium sensitivity improves.  However, this is 
not the case for the Malaysian risk-based deposit insurance system.  The moral hazard 
problem is present in the form of increased bank risk after the introduction of the deposit 
insurance system because the premium is inadequate to cover the risk.  In general, the 
findings do offer an insight to regulators that migrating from the flat rate to risk-based 
premium may not necessarily mitigate the moral hazard problem unless the premium 
coverage adequately covers the increase in risk.  
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6.4.1.2 Significant Difference in Bank Risk between the Islamic Banks and 
Conventional Banks Post Deposit Insurance 
The introduction of deposit insurance system does not alter the risk exposure of the Islamic 
banks, as there is no change in the Islamic banks risk taking.  Only the conventional banks 
alter their risk profiles after the introduction of deposit insurance.  The conventional banks’ 
objectives have always been seen as seeking higher profits and their bottom line 
considerations.  High-risk investments will generate higher profits.  Thus, the deposit 
insurance protection provides a protective buffer for the conventional banks to embark on 
risky investments as the deposit protection will partly cover their downside risks.  On the 
other hand, the Shariah principles guided the Islamic banks to create value in their 
investments.  Therefore, the Islamic banks will only consider a calculated risky investment 
that adds value not only to the borrower but also to the real economy. 
6.4.1.3 Inadequate Risk-based Premium Provides Opportunity for Arbitrage 
The current risk-based deposit insurance system in Malaysia allows regulatory arbitrage for 
the small conventional banks.  The first part of the empirical study indicates that only the 
conventional banks increased their risk taking after the introduction of deposit insurance 
system.  As such, the regulatory arbitrage is enjoyed only by the small conventional banks. 
If a small conventional bank increases risk, the bank only pays low premium which is 
inadequate to commensurate with the increase in risk.   
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6.4.2 Implications for the Policy 
6.4.2.1 Bank Size Matters 
The implications of this study for policy are to infer that the bank size matters in the annual 
premiums paid.  The findings of this study suggest that big banks that have high risk pays 
adequate premium while at the same time small banks that have high risk profiles pay 
inadequate premiums.  The findings of this study also offer a rationale on why the big 
banks are reluctant to participate in a deposit protection scheme if the participation is 
voluntary.  In terms of policy, the measures for annual premium should differ between the 
small and big banks.  The current measures for computing the annual premium are 
inadequate to cover the small banks.  In a bigger picture, the small banks should be 
regulated more stringently.     
6.4.2.2 Implementation of an Early Warning Mechanism 
Risk-based deposit insurance premiums have been adopted by several deposit insurance 
agencies including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Canada 
Deposit Insurance Corporation to mitigate the moral hazard problem.  A credible deposit 
insurance system promotes financial stability, thus provides sound and stable environment 
for bank intermediation to support economic growth.    The potential problem of moral 
hazard requires articulation to design credible deposit insurance schemes particularly the 
insurance premiums to rectify the moral hazard problem.  Malaysia thus far, has no
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 incidences of bank runs.  Nonetheless, given the reality that the financial crisis is cyclical 
in nature, it is vital to put in place a well-designed deposit insurance premium that is risk-
premium sensitive as part of the existing financial safety net.
57
  The ramifications of a 
financial crisis would impact more severely the small banks than the big banks as the 
premiums are inadequate to cover the small banks.  In a financial crisis, the small banks 
normally fail.  This situation asserts the importance to institute an early warning mechanism 
as part of the early intervention framework for the deposit insurer to step in when a bank 
faces failure. 
6.4.2.3 Cross-Border Cooperation and Information Sharing   
This thesis provides new evidence that operational risk taking increases in post deposit 
insurance period. Major operational losses caused by internal or external fraudulent 
activities or slack in internal controls, are often the common source of bank failures.  The 
inclusion of operational risk as one of the pillars in Basel II was in response to the collapse 
of Barings Bank in 1995, which was recognized as the oldest (1762-1995) merchant bank 
in London. The collapsed was due to the lag and lapses in internal control of its personnel 
(Nick Leeson) and the processes involved.  The collapse of a bank that was in operation for 
more than 200 years took the financial sector players by surprise.  Barings suffered 
irreparable loss of $1.3 billion loss that was caused by rogue trading activities.   
This anecdote highlights the fact that the conventional banks are constantly exposed to 
different kinds of operational risk.  Operational losses of banks are more often passed on to 
their customers.  This thesis resorts to management efficiency as a proxy for operational 
                                                 
57 Section 1.3 describes the component of a financial safety net. 
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risk to include people as the essence of operational risk.  Although operational risk is 
commonly perceived as firm or bank specific, the systemic component of its impact is 
growing in importance as evidenced by the 2007/2008 global financial crisis.  Specifically, 
as the relationships among financial institutions in particular, the systematically important 
financial institutions located in different countries increase, operational disruptions are 
likely to lead to an increased market volatility and contagion across markets and countries. 
Hence, this necessitates a formal cooperation in particular on compensation frameworks 
and information sharing protocols between deposit insurance agencies and supervisory 
authorities in the region to deal more effectively with systemic bank failures.   
6.4.2.4 Ethical Principles of Islamic Finance 
The findings of this thesis raise the question on why Islamic banks do not adjust their risk 
after the introduction of the deposit insurance system unlike the conventional banks. This 
thesis suggests that compliance with Shariah principles prevent the Islamic banks from 
adjusting their risk post deposit insurance.  Islamic financing amongst others prohibits 
investment in activities that have uncertainties (gharar) especially risk, interest (riba) and 
gambling (maysir) activities.  In other words, these ethical principles are the compelling 
aspects of Islamic banking that could be also applied to conventional banking.
58
  These 
important ethical fundamentals of Islamic finance inadvertently allows the Islamic banks’ 
resources only to finance real assets rather than financial derivatives.  On this front, this 
limits the Islamic banks' exposure to risk.  Therefore, Islamic banks do not adjust their risk 
contrary to their conventional counterparts after the introduction of deposit insurance in 
Malaysia.   
                                                 
58 To illustrate, the Gramen Bank applies many of these ethical principles of Islamic finance to alleviate poverty in Bangladesh.  
Professor Muhammad Yunus (the founder) won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize.   
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Despite arguments forwarded especially by the efficient market school that deposit 
insurance system may not function as an effective safety net to prevent financial crisis; like 
the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, it could be concluded that deposit insurance is here to 
stay. Deposit insurance cannot prevent financial instability but it could buffer and insulate 
risks to minimize the effects.  If financial instability other than bank runs causes bank 
failures, then to conclude that the deposit insurance system is ineffective is not correct.  
Bank  failures may  be  caused  by  many  other  exogenous factors  like  bad  economic  
environment,  political  instability or  non-credible designs of existing deposit insurance 
systems that are  more  prone  to  banking  instabilities. With the above in mind, it is 
suggested that policymakers should carefully consider design features for an effective risk-
based deposit insurance system that is risk-premium sensitive to ensure financial stability.    
6.5 Limitations and Future Research   
Any research is prone to limitations.  The limitations of this research could provide 
motivation and directions for future research.  The main limitations and directions for 
future research of this study are deliberated in the following sections.    
6.5.1 Limitations 
1. This thesis employs only the accounting-based bank risk measures instead of the 
market-based measures.  The market-based measures would greatly restrict the 
sample size.  Out of the 18 Islamic banks, only one Islamic bank is listed on the 
stock exchange.  Moreover, I do not want to lose the wealth of the Islamic banks’ 
data that was included in this research.  Therefore, the market measures of risk are 
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not considered in this study.  This justifies only the accounting-based bank risk 
measures are employed in this research.   
 
2. This study only looks into the impact of deposit insurance on three different types 
of risk namely credit risk, insolvency risk and operational risk.  Banks cannot 
function without taking risks. Other types of risk include market risk, legal risk and 
liquidity risk.  Therefore, other types of risks could be tested in future research. 
 
3. This research context is narrow as the sampling frame is only limited to Malaysia.  
Notwithstanding this, the research provides greater depth in understanding the 
moral hazard problem in a dual banking system like Malaysia and assessing whether 
the risk-based deposit insurance premium is sensitive to bank risk (credible) to 
overcome the moral hazard problem after the introduction of deposit protection 
scheme.  From the literature, it is noted that Malaysia is the only country with a dual 
banking system that has both conventional and Islamic deposit insurance system 
that coexists but administered separately. Furthermore, Malaysia has the most 
number of Islamic banks operating in a dual banking system in the region and 
adopts the risk-based deposit insurance premium instead of the flat-rate premium.  
Coincidentally, the incomplete financial data for the Islamic banks in Bankscope are 
available in the financial reports for the Islamic banks in Malaysia unlike other 
countries.  Hence, Malaysia is an ideal context for this thesis to investigate in-depth 
the relationship between deposit insurance and bank risk in a dual banking system 
as well as the credibility of the deposit insurance premium to overcome the moral 
hazard problem. 
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4. It is important to note that the measurement attracts estimation errors. Hence, the 
results have to be interpreted in a broader context.  
6.5.2 Future Research 
1. Future research could extend the context of investigation to other country specific 
studies.  Over time, an in-depth comparative study could be done to compare and 
contrast the design features of an effective deposit insurance for financial stability.  
 
2. This study differentiates and explains the moral hazard implications from the 
perspective of the bank i.e. the risk taking behavior of both the conventional and 
Islamic banks. Accordingly, a follow-up study is required to assess the effectiveness 
of deposit insurance in instilling depositors’ confidence.  The stability of the 
banking system is heavily reliant on and influenced by the level of depositors’ 
confidence in the system.  Loss of depositors’ confidence could trigger a contagion 
effect, which could affect even the healthy banks.  Depositors’ confidence is 
essential for financial intermediation.   
 
3. Another area of research that can be considered is to determine whether depositors 
in a dual banking system exercise market discipline in the presence of deposit 
insurance.   
However, it has to be acknowledged that the limitations listed above do not devalue the 
importance of the research findings that provide direction for future research.  Looking 
ahead, the topic of deposit insurance certainly offers abundant opportunities for future 
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research.  Ideally, such research should focus on the effective design features of deposit 
insurance, namely the deposit insurance premium to mitigate the moral hazard problem.              
199 
 
References 
Abdelaziz Chazi, & Lateef A.M. Syed. (2010). Risk exposure during the global financial 
crisis: The case of Islamic banks. International Journal of Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and Management, 3(4), 321-333. 
Abduh, M., Omar, M. A., & Duasa, J. (2011). The impact of crisis and macroeconomic 
variables towards Islamic banking deposits. American Journal of Applied Sciences , 
8(12), 1413-1418. 
Abedifar, P., Molyneux, P., & Tarazi, A. (2011). Risk and stability in Islamic banking. 
Bangor Business School, University of Wales, Bangor. 
Al-Hamzani M. (2008). Islamic banks unaffected by global financial crisis. available at: 
www.asharq-e.com. 
Allen, F., & Santomero, A. M. (1997). The theory of financial intermediation. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 21, 1461-1486. 
Alter, G., Goldin, C., & Rotella, E. (1994). The Savings of Ordinary Americans-the-
Philadelphia-Saving-Fund-Society in the Mid-19th-Century. Journal of Economic 
History, 54, 735-767. 
Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Zhu, M. (2012). How does deposit insurance affect 
bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis. The World Bank. 
Angkinand, A. P. (2009). Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises. Journal 
of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money , 19, 240-257. 
200 
 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 58(2), 277-297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-component models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29-51. 
Ariss, R. T. (2010). Competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional banking: A global 
perspective. Review of Financial Economics , 19, 101-108. 
Arshad, K. H. (2011). Chapter 24 Islamic Deposit Insurance System: The Malaysian 
Model. In J. R. La-Brosse, R. Olivares-Caminal, & D. Singh (Eds.), Managing Risk 
in the Financial System (pp. 442-448). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Ltd. 
Baer, H., & Brewer, E. (1986). Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: Some 
new evidence. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data (3 ed.). West Sussex : John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Bank for International Settlements, & International Association of Deposit Insurers. (2009, 
June). Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. Retrieved from 
http://www.iadi.org/cms/secure/docs/JWGDI%20CBRG%20core%20principles_18
_June.pdf 
Bank Negara Malaysia. (2011). Financial Sector Blue Print 2011-2020.  
201 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). (2006, October). Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision. Retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.htm 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2003). Sound Practices for the Management 
and Supervision of Operational Risk. Basel: Bank of International Settlements. 
Baum, C. F. (2006). An Introduction to Econometric Using Stata. USA: Stata Press. 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Merrouche, Q. (2013). Islamic vs. conventional banking: 
Business model, efficiency and stability. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 433-
447. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in a dynamic 
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143. 
Bonfim, D. (2009). Credit risk drivers: Evaluating the contribution of firm level 
information and of macroeconomic dynamics. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 
281-299. 
Boyd, J. H., Nicolo, G. D., & Jalal, A. M. (2006). Bank Risk Taking and Competition 
Revisited: New Theory and New Evidence. Working Paper, IMF, WP/06/297. 
Calomiris, C. W. (1990). Is deposit insurance necessary? A historical perspective. The 
Journal of Economic History, 50, 283-295. 
Calomiris, C. W. (1999). Building an incentive-compatible safety net. Journal of Banking 
& Finance, 23, 1499-1519. 
202 
 
Calomiris, C., & White, E. (1994). The origins of federal deposit insurance. In C. Goldin, 
& G. Libecap, The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political 
Economy (pp. 145-188). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Caprio, G., & Honohan, P. (1999). Restoring banking stability: Beyond supervised capital 
requirements. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13, 43-64. 
Chernobai, A., Jorion, P., & Yu, F. (2011). The determinants of operational risk in US 
financial institutions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(6), 1683-
1725. 
Chernykh, L., & Cole, R. A. (2011). Does deposit insurance improve financial 
intermediation? Evidence from the Russian experiment. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 388-402. 
Cihak, M., & Hess, H. (2008). Islamic banks and financial stability: An empirical analysis. 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Cole, R. A. (1993). When are thrift institutions closed? Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 7, 283-307. 
Cope, E. W., Piche, M. T., & Walter, J. S. (2012). Macroenvironmental determinants of 
operational loss severity. Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 1362-1380. 
Cull, R. (1998). How deposit insurance affct financial depth: A cross country analysis. 
Washington: World Bank. 
203 
 
Cull, R., Senbet, L. W., & Sorge, M. (2002). The effect of deposit insurance on ﬁnancial 
depth: A cross country analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 
42, 673–694. 
Cull, R., Senbet, L. W., & Sorge, M. (2005). Deposit insurance and financial development. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37, 43-82. 
DeLong, G., & Saunders, A. (2011). Did the introduction of fixed-rate federal deposit 
insurance increase long-term bank risk taking? Journal of Financial Stability, 7, 19-
25. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (1998). The Determinants of Banking Crises in 
Developing and Developed Countries. IMF Staff Papers, 45, 81-109. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002). Does deposit insurance increase banking 
system stability? An empirical investigation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49, 
1272-1406. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Huizinga, H. (2004). Market discipline and deposit insurance. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, 375-399. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Sobaci, T. (2001). A new development database:Deposit insurance 
around the world. The World Bank Economic Review, 15, 481-490. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Kane, E. J., & Laeven, L. (2008). Deposit Inusrance Around the 
World: Issues of Design and Implementation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Kane, E. J., & Laeven, L. (2008). Determinants of deposit-insurance 
adoption and design. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17, 407–438. 
204 
 
Devinaga Rasiah, & Peong, K. K. (2011). The rationale of deposit insurance in Malaysia 
and how regulatory conditions and reforms can also help support a stable 
environment. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative 
Sciences, 188-199. 
Dewatripont, M., & Tirole, J. (1994). The Prudential Reputation of Banks. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity. 
Journal of Political Economy, 401-419. 
El Tiby, A. M. (2010). Islamic Banking: How to manage Risk and Improve Profitability. 
Haboken, US: Wiley. 
El-Hawary, D., Grais, W., & Iqbal, Z. (2007). Diversity in the regulation of Islamic finance 
institutions. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46, 778-800. 
Errico, L., & Farahbaksh, M. (1998). Islamic banking: Issues in prudential regulation. IMF 
Working Paper, No 98/30. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 
88, 288-307. 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF). (2008, April). Report of the Financial Stability Forum on 
Enhancing Market and Institutional Reliance. Retrieved from 
http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0804.pdf 
Financial Stability Forum. (2001). Guidance for developing effective deposit insurance 
system.  
205 
 
Flores, F., Bonson-Ponte, E., & Escobar-Rodriguez, T. (2006). Operational risk information 
system: a challenge for the banking sector. Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance, 14, 383-401. 
Forssbaeck, J. (2011). Ownership structure, market discipline and banks' risk taking 
incentives under deposit insurance. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 2666-
2678. 
Freixas, X., & Rochet, J.-C. (2011). Taming SIFIS. Working Paper, Zurich University. 
Garcia, G. G. (2000). Deposit insurance: Actual and good practices. IMF Occasional Paper 
, No. 197. 
Gorton, G., & Huang, L. (2004). Liquidity, efficiency and bank bailouts. The American 
Economic Review, 94, 455-483. 
Greene, W. H. (2012). Econometric Analysis (7 ed.). Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Gropp, R., & Vesala, J. (2004). Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring. 
Review of Finance, 8, 571-602. 
Gropp, R., Hakenes, H., & Schnabel, I. (2011). Competition, risk-shifting and public bail-
out policies. The Review of Financial Studies, 24, 2084-2120. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. 
Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. C. (2009). Basic Econometrics (Fifth ed.). Singapore: 
McGraw Hill. 
206 
 
Hadad, M. D., Agusman, A., Monroe, G. S., Gasbarro, D., & Zumwalt, J. K. (2011). 
Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from 
Indonesian banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 1552-1562. 
Hannan, T. H., & Hanweck, G. A. (1988). Bank insolvency risk and the market for large 
certificates of deposit. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, 203-211. 
Hansen, L. P. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments 
estimators. Econometrica, 50(4), 1029-1054. 
Hasan, M., & Dridi, J. (2010). The effects of the global crisis on Islamic and conventional 
banks: A comparative study . IMF Working Paper. 
Hassan, A. (2009). Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei Darussalem. 
Journal of Risk Finance, 10(1), 23-37. 
Hazlett, D. (1997). Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model 
with a risky technology. Economic Theory, 9, 453-470. 
Hovakimian, A., Kane, E. J., & Laeven, L. (2003). How country and safety-net 
characteristics affects bank risk shifting. Journal of Financial Services Research, 
23, 177-204. 
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of Panel Data (Second ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
International Association of Deposit Insurers. (2008, February). Core Principles for 
Effective Deposit Insurance Systems. Retrieved from 
http://www.iadi.org/docs/Core_Principles_final_29_Feb_08.pdf 
207 
 
International Association of Deposit Insurers. (2010). Survey on Islamic Deposit Insurance: 
Results.  
International Association of Deposit Insurers. (October, 2011). General Guidance for 
Developing Differential Premium Systems.  
Ioannidou, V. P., & Penas, M. F. (2010). Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence 
from internal loan ratings. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19, 95-115. 
Iyer, R., & Puri, M. (2008). Understanding bank runs: the importance of depositor-bank 
relationships and networks. NBER Working Paper 14280. 
Kane, E. J. (1989). Changing incentives facing fnancial-services regulators. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 3, 265-274. 
Kane, E. J. (2000). Designing financial safety nets to fit country circumstances. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2453. 
Karas, A., Pyle, W., & Schoors, K. (2013). Deposit insurance, banking crises and market 
discipline: Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 45, 179-200. 
Kareken, J. H., & Wallace, N. (1978). Deposit insurance and bank regulation: a partial-
equilibrium exposition. Journal of Business, 51, 413-438. 
Karels, G. V., & McClatchey, C. A. (1999). Deposit Insurance and Risk-Taking behaviour 
in the credit union industry. Journal of banking and Finance, 23, 105-134. 
208 
 
Kayed, R., & Hassan, M. (2009). The global financial crisis, risk management and social 
justice in Islamic finance. ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance, 1(1), 33-
58. 
Kettell, B. B. (2011). Introduction to Islamic Banking and Finance. Haboken, USA: Wiley. 
Khan, M., & Bhatti, M. (2008). Islamic banking and finance: On its way to globalization. 
Managerial Finance, 34(10), 708-725. 
Khan, T., & Ahmed, H. (2001). Risk management: An analysis of issue in Islamic financial 
industry. Islamic Research and Training Institute/Islamic Development Bank. 
Kreps, D. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press. 
Krugman, P. (2009). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New 
York: Norton. 
LaBrosse, J. R., & Mayes, D. G. (2007). Promoting financial stability through effective 
depositor protection: The case for explicit limited deposit insurance. In A. 
Campbell, J. R. LaBrosse, D. G. Mayes, & D. Singh (Eds.), Deposit Insurance (pp. 
1-39). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Laeven, L. (2002). Bank risk and deposit insurance. The World Bank Economic Review, 16, 
109-137. 
Lei, S., & Tzu-Pu, C. (2011). A comprehensive analysis of the risk effects of risk measures 
on bank efficiency:Evidence from emerging Asian countries. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 35, 1727-1735. 
209 
 
Mannasoo, K., & Mayes, D. G. (2009). Explaining bank distress in Eastern European 
transition economies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 244-253. 
Matthews, K., & Thompson, J. (2008). The Economics of Banking. Chichester: Wiley. 
Maysami, R. C., & Sakellariou, C. (2008). Financial liberalization, deposit insurance and 
bank stability. Applied Economics Letters, 15, 743–747. 
McCoy, P. A. (2007). The moral hazards implications of deposit insurance: Theory and 
evidence. International Monetary Fund Seminar on Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law.  
Mckenzie, J. A., Cole, R. A., & Brown, R. A. (1992). Moral hazard,portfolio allocation and 
asset returns for thrift institutions. Journal of Financial Services Research, 5, 315-
339. 
Merton, R. C. (1977). An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan 
guarantees. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1, 3-11. 
Mirakhor, B. A.-H. (1989). Essays on Iqtisad: The Islamic Approach to Economics 
Problem. In A. Mirakhor, General Characteristics of An Islamic Economic System 
(pp. 45-80). MD, USA: Nur Corp. 
Mishkin, F. S. (2009). Financial Markets and Institutions (6th ed.). Boston: Perason 
Prentice Hall. 
Moosa, I. A. (2007). Operational risk: A survey. Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Instruments, 16, 167-200. 
210 
 
Nash, R. C., & Sinkey, J. F. (1997). On competition, risk and hidden assets in the market 
for bank credit cards. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 89-112. 
Nijskens, R., & Wagner, W. (2011). Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How 
banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system 
at the same time. Journal of Banking and Finance , 35, 1391-1398. 
Obaidullah, M. (2005). Islamic Financial Services. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic 
Economics Research Center, King Abdulaziz University. 
Peria, M. S., & Schmukler, S. L. (2001). Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? 
Market discipline, deposit insurance and banking crises. Journal of Finance, 56, 
1029-1051. 
Poole, W. (2010). Causes and consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 33, 421-441. 
Powell, D. (2003). Statement on the new Basel Accord. Subcommittee on Domestic and 
International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology of the Committee on 
Financial Services of the US House of Representatives. 
Rolnick, A. J. (1993). Market discipline as a regulator of bank risk. In R. R. (ed.), 
Safeguarding the Banking System in an Environment of Financial Cycles 
(Conference Series No. 7). Boston, MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to "Difference" and "System" 
GMM in Stata. Centre for Global Development, Working Paper No. 103. Retrieved 
211 
 
from http://www.cgdev.org/files/11619_file_HowtoDoxtabond6_12_1_06.pdf [12 
September 2012] 
Sargent, T. J. (2011). Where to draw lines : Stability versus efﬁciency. Economica, 78, 
197–214. 
Schich, S. (2008). Financial crisis: Deposit insurance and related financial safety net 
aspects. Financial Market Trends 2, 76-121. 
Schooner, H. M., & Taylor, M. W. (2010). Global Bank Regulation: Principles and 
Policies. United States of America: Elsevier. 
Shanmugam, B., Alam, N., & Zahari, Z. R. (2008). Encyclopedia Islamic Finance. Kuala 
Lumpur: Insight Network Sdn Bhd. 
Talley, S. H. (1994). Deposit protection and the spread of deposit insurance: Some 
guidelines for developing countries. Washington: The World Bank. 
Tiby, A. M. (2011). Islamic Banking: How to manage risk and improve profitability. 
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
Tuan, H. N., Ying, S. L., & Nya, L. T. (2010). Deposit insurance and bank risks: The case 
of Malaysia. European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative 
Sciences, 19-27. 
Walter, J. R., & Weinberg, J. A. (2002). How large is the federal financial safety nets? Cato 
Journal, 21, 369-393. 
Wheelock, D. C., & Wilson, P. W. (1995). Explaining bank failures: Deposit insurance, 
regulations and efficiency. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, 689-700. 
212 
 
Wilmarth, A. E. (2010). Why Financial Conglomerates are at the Centre of the Financial 
Crisis. In R. W. Kolb (Ed.), Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, 
Consequences and Our Economic Future (pp. 403-410). New Jersey: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Yilmaz, E., & Muslumov, A. (2008). Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: The 
case of Turkish banking system. Applied Economics, 40, 2147–2163. 
  
